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Recent decades have seen a sustained growth of interest from academics and 
practicing managers in structural change in the contemporary workplace. Some 
of this attention has been directed at the implementation of initiatives of 
planned organizational change, often involving newer information and 
communications technologies, and often conceived and labelled by managers 
as projects. Most empirical studies of projects of organizational change have 
been concerned with the promotion of universal guides to management success 
and, by implication, to organizational prosperity. The bias towards generalized 
prescriptions for performance and management ‘best practice’ has been 
accompanied by a relative shortage of context-bound studies intended to reveal 
the reality of the nature and role of the project concept in relation to 
organizational change. The purpose of this study is to contribute to 
understanding of what change project management processes are adopted and, 
further, how they are determined by the characteristics of an organization. 
 
In pursuit of this broad aim the research takes a grounded, theory-generating 
approach. The foundation of the research design is a series of case studies of 
projects of change in four UK organizations in contrasting sectors. The main 
source of data is unstructured audio-taped interviews with ‘change drivers’ - 
those managers responsible for the conception and implementation of the 
projects. The constant comparative method of qualitative analysis is used to 
compare and contrast instances of expressions of managerial action or intent 
which arise from managers’ attention to contextual considerations. Data 
reduction is carried out in three stages, each representing a progressively higher 
level of theoretical abstraction. 
 
The findings of the research are expressed as an integrated theory and a series 
of propositions, generalized within the boundaries of the study, relating 
management process to context via a set of intermediate variables representing 
the extent to which the change drivers feel in control of the change. The 
conclusions may be summarized in three statements. First, drivers of projects 
of organizational change apply a general repertoire of six common 
management processes, each of which is employed to a greater or lesser extent 
at any time. Second, the extent of enaction of each process element may be 
considered as an expression of the change drivers’ possession or pursuit of 
personal control over the change. Third, feelings of personal control are partly 
determined by managers’ attention to selected issues which arise from key 
characteristics of the organization and its sector. 
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The purpose of this introductory chapter is to outline the shape and boundaries 
of this doctoral research project. The chapter is presented in two sections. 
Section 1.1 describes the rationale and overall aim of the study. Section 1.2 
describes the main features of the research design and methods, and 
summarizes the principal research findings. The chapter concludes with a brief 
summary of the nine chapters of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Research rationale and aim 
 
This section describes the origins of interest in the concept of the management 
of projects of organizational change in different industries, and its potential as 
an important research topic. The concept is distinguished from two 
overlapping, but subtly different aspects of the contemporary project 
phenomenon. 
 
The combined effect of the preference for a rational perspective in project 
management and the predominance of quantitative research methods is 
discussed. The theory-building aim of the research, using qualitative methods, 
is outlined. 
 
1.1.1 Origins of interest 
 
This study has its origins in an accumulation of ideas arising from informal 
conversations with senior managers in various organizations. These managers 
clearly perceived that they devote much of their time to conceiving and 
implementing initiatives of structural and cultural organizational change, often 
linked to the application of advances in information and communications 
technologies. It was evident that these drivers of change conceptualized and 
defined the initiatives as programmes or projects, with objectives, titles, scopes 
and envisaged end-points. 
 
In the overlapping literatures on project management, strategic management 
and the management of change in general, practitioner and academic advocates 
of a project approach to organizational change were found to have a significant 
presence. The management of projects of organizational change was clearly an 
important issue. It had the twin qualities of being endemic and difficult to 
achieve. But what did we know about projects of organizational change and 
their contemporary role or function in organizations? 
 
A review of popular change management literature (Partington, 1996) 
confirmed the breadth of interest in the ‘projects of change’ phenomenon. The 
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financial consequences of getting it wrong have ensured that there is no 
shortage of prescriptive advice, both on what to change and how to do it. 
However, there appear to be few empirically-based accounts in the literature of 
the actual management processes that are employed by drivers of planned 
change, how those processes are determined by the context of change and how 
they might change over time in response to changes in that context. 
 
Acknowledgment of the scarcity of empirical studies of actual change 
management processes is itself a feature of the literature. In strategic 
management literature, for example, Pettigrew observes that: 
 
 There are remarkably few studies of change that actually allow 
the change process to reveal itself in any kind of substantially 
temporal or contextual manner. (Pettigrew, 1987b: 655) 
 
In literature on the management of projects Morris identifies a need for more 
comparative empirical studies: 
 
 There is a shortage of case studies [of projects]; there are even 
fewer studies comparing the project management practice 
between industries... (Morris, 1994: vii) 
 
As the pace of change quickens the gap in knowledge between theory and 
practice is, if anything, widening. The rapidly changing circumstances of 
organizations and societies suggest that the need for new theories, generated 
from the rigorous study of practice in context, will, at least for now, continue to 
be insatiable. 
 
1.1.2 Three concepts of project management 
 
The discipline of project management is well established as the controlled 
response to managing the complexity of major technical projects in such 
industries as construction and aerospace. Now, some writers on the 
implementation of organizational change are recommending a ‘project 
management approach’ (for example Cleland, 1987; Lord, 1993; Pellegrinelli 
and Bowman, 1994). The logic behind this argument is that since the objective 
of an organizational change initiative is to change the status quo it should be 
managed separately, as a project, outside the existing structure. 
 
Despite the practical appeal of this idea, its rational, linear, life-cycle 
implications may be at odds with the objectives of many large scale 
organizational change interventions. This is particularly so when the change is 
concerned with allowing a bottom-up, participative culture of continuous 
learning and organizational regeneration to emerge, as many are. 
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In addition to the traditional use of project management in major projects, and 
its newer application in organizational change, the literature shows that the 
contemporary role of projects has a third dimension. There is a general call for 
the abandonment of cumbersome, inward-looking bureaucracies and for the 
adoption of a flexible, customer-focused ‘project team’ approach to 
organization. Experience shows that, for some, the project team approach has 
become entangled and confused with traditional notions of project 
management. 
 
Thus there are the three overlapping concepts of managing traditional major 
projects, managing projects of planned organizational change, and managing 
scarce resources in a flattened project team-based organization. Their 








  The project     The management of 
  team approach to    projects of 




Figure 1.1: Three concepts of project management 
 
There is no shortage of evidence that all three are characterized by complexity 
and great practical difficulty, often challenging and stretching management 
expertise to the limit and beyond. However, the seductive association of 
projects tends to disguise the fact that, as management processes, they may 
otherwise have little in common. 
 
This research examines one of the three processes, the management of projects 
of organizational change, in four different contexts. The importance of context, 
both internal and external, in studying strategic change is well established. As a 
result much research effort is directed at understanding how the context, 
content and process of longer-term strategic change relate to one another and to 
the emergent, unfolding performance and survival of organizations. 
 
But what about shorter-term management processes? At a level lower than 
grand, performance-related theories of strategic management there remain 
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largely unstudied and unanswered some important questions. Senior managers 
in most large organizations are involved in conscious attempts to plan and 
implement projects of change. The projects’ objectives are broadly the same. 
They reflect the reality of what Kanter (1989: 33) has labelled the ‘post-
entrepreneurial revolution’, in which organizations aim to become at once 
creative, disciplined and agile. The projects’ aims may be defined in the new 
managerial vocabulary of downsizing, delayering, outsourcing, forming 
alliances, organizational learning, innovation and empowerment. What is the 
management approach to such a project, and how is it affected by, for example, 
the fact that the organization is a manufacturing operation, or a police force, or 
a bank, or a public hospital, or a construction company? 
 
1.1.3 A qualitative, theory building approach 
 
In project management literature and in project management training and 
education there is a concentration on so-called ‘hard’, technical aspects of 
projects and their management. The emphasis on rationality tends to play down 
the importance of ‘soft’ social and political management processes, which are 
generally acknowledged to be the main source of problems for managers of 
change (see for example Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1996). 
 
A parallel exists between this emphasis on hard aspects of projects and project 
management and the high proportion of quantitative studies of management 
which follow the well-established traditions of research into the natural 
sciences. The growing application of project management techniques has been 
reinforced and supported by a proliferation of attractive, powerful and 
accessible software tools for scheduling and resource control1. At the same 
time, in management research, eagerness to apply hard methodological 
approaches to soft behavioural variables has been intensified by the rapid 
introduction of sophisticated statistical tools of analysis (Blalock, 1984; 
Parkhe, 1993). 
 
Approaches to project management research are influenced by the dominance 
of the rational perspective in the discipline of project management, and by the 
prevalence of quantitative research methods in management research generally. 
Perhaps as a result, qualitative studies of project management are 
comparatively rare. Nevertheless there is evidence in the literature of a growing 
tradition of acceptance that the phenomenon of planned change is too complex 
to be understood from a purely rationalist viewpoint, and too ill-understood for 
the unquestioning application of quantitative, theory-testing research methods. 
Some writers and researchers in the field of organizational change have turned 
                                                          
1 Baker (1997) identifies 240 ‘project management’ software packages commercially available in the 
UK. 
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to other perspectives, such as political, cultural and network. Some have shown 
that qualitative research designs have the potential to contribute a great deal to 
our understanding. Many further opportunities exist for developing new 
insights from exploratory interdisciplinary research in a new and changing 
field. 
 
The aim of this research project is to improve understanding of actual 
approaches to the management of projects of organizational change, in 
particular to learn from comparing practice in different industries. Building on 
the observations and sentiments expressed in this rationale, the intent is to 
justify, develop and successfully apply a theory-building methodological 
approach. In Chapter 3 it is explained in detail why the study’s research design 
and methods were chosen for their potential to make a contribution to 
organizational knowledge in the substantive area of project management, more 
specifically in the field of planned organizational change. 
 
It should be emphasized that the central concern of the research is not whether 
the projects studied were a good idea, or were ‘successful’. Setting aside that 
consideration, the concern is to explore, describe and understand the projects’ 
management processes, thereby generating new perspectives, propositions and 
ideas for further study. 
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1.2 Research outline 
 
This section provides an overview of the principal features of the study, 
including the methodological stance, the methods used, the research design, 
and the principal findings. The section ends with a summary of the nine 
chapters of the thesis. 
 
1.2.1 Outline of research design and methods 
 
The central feature of the research design is a sequence of case studies of 
projects of organizational change in four organizations, each in a different 
industry sector. In two of the four organizations two separate projects were 
studied, making a total of six case studies. The unit of analysis in each case is 
the set of individual managers identified within the organization as having been 
responsible for conceiving and implementing the project - collectively referred 
to as the change drivers. The boundaries of each case, including the 
identification of the ‘set’ of change drivers, were determined from the change 
drivers’ own observations. 
 
The approach known as theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) was 
followed, whereby the findings of the earlier cases were allowed progressively 
to guide selection and analysis of the later cases. Theoretical sampling was 
used jointly with the method of constant comparison (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967) as a way of building theory from case data. The principal characteristic 
of constant comparison in this study is the coding into categories of instances 
of management processes and related phenomena, while constantly comparing 
them with previous instances in the same and different cases coded in the same 
category. Through this process theoretical properties of the category are 
generated, as: 
 
 the analyst starts thinking in terms of the full range of types or 
continua of the category, its dimensions, the conditions under 
which it is pronounced or minimized, its major consequences, its 
relation to other categories, and its other properties. (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967: 106) 
 
Chapter 3 clarifies the position of the constant comparison method in social 
scientific research in relation to other approaches to qualitative analysis, 
including the method known as analytic induction, the aim of which is to 
establish causal relationships between variables. An important characteristic of 
constant comparison is that it stops short of claims to universality or absolute 




Bhaskar’s (1975) ‘Realist’ ontology is used in Chapter 3 as the basis for an 
argument for the utility of the constant comparison approach for answering 
open ended research questions about management processes in organizations 
using interviews with managers as data. The main assumptions underlying the 
argument are that reality exists at various levels, and that neither a purely 
objectivist nor a purely subjectivist ontology is appropriate for the purposes of 
this study. The argument concludes that managers’ accounts of their response 
to their perceptions of reality are a potential source of researcher access to 
plausible mechanisms or underlying tendencies which, if they existed, would 
explain connections between context and management process. 
 
The six case studies are presented individually in sequence in Chapters 4 to 7. 
The cases are linked by theoretical sampling and emerging theoretical issues, 
with earlier cases being revisited at intermediate stages in the sequence. An 
overall cross-case comparison is then made, bringing together and summarizing 
data and analysis from all six cases. 
 
The whole research process, including the different stages of field work and 












      
 Pre-study 
interviews 
   "Refine aims and inform case selection 
"Practice open-ended interview 
techniques 
      




 "Confirm gap in knowledge 
"Generate research questions and 
identify suitable research framework 
      
  
Cases 
1 and 2 
   "Determine process categories 
"Study two projects in the same 
organization with contrasting content 
"Evaluate multiple driver approach 
      
  
Cases 
3 and 4 
   "Refine process dimensions 
"Different sector 
"Effect of wider sample of informants 
"Explore context-process links 
      
   Project control 
and personal 
control 
 "Inform emerging theory 
      
  
Case 5 
   "Major project of change 
"Refine process dimensions 
"Determine effect of project orientation 
"Develop personal control dimensions 




   "Further major project 
"Confirm saturation of process 
dimensions 
"Confirm saturation of personal control 
dimensions 
"Determine effect of manufacturing 
orientation 
      




 "Cross-case comparison and 
generalization 
"Define implications for management 
theory, management practice and future 
research. 
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1.2.2 Outline of research findings 
 
The contribution to knowledge made by this study is described in Section 9.1, 
where it is explained how the contribution builds on existing knowledge. For 
the purpose of setting out the overall shape of the study in this introductory 
chapter the principal findings are simplified and summarized as follows: 
 
1 Managers who conceive and drive projects of organizational change 
employ a bounded repertoire of management processes. These processes 
may be described as a set of six categories, each with properties and 
dimensions, which are employed variably, to a greater or lesser extent, 
over the life of a project. The six categories are: 
 
 (a) Use of external agents of change. 
 (b) Planning and control formality. 
 (c) Control of the pace of change. 
 (d) Staff participation in decisions. 
 (e) Justification of actions. 
 (f) Definition of individuals’ roles. 
 
2 The extent of each of the six categories at any time is an expression of 
the change drivers’ perceived possession or pursuit of personal control 
over their environment. The personal control construct represents an 
intermediate set of variables between the context of change and the 
management process. Personal control is a balance of individual and 
collective perceptions in five categories: 
 
 (a) autonomy 
 (b) resources 
 (c) competence 
 (d) opportunity 
 (e) the expected co-operation of staff 
 
 Conjectured links between each category of management process and 
each category of personal control are expressed as a series of 
propositions. 
 
3 Personal control is partly determined by managers’ attention to selected 
characteristics of the organization and its sector. These characteristics 
include, for example, extent of private ownership, traditional self-image, 
independence, product-tangibility and project-orientation. 
 
 The relationship between context and management process, and the 
intermediate role of personal control, have potentially important 
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consequences for managers. There is support in the literature for the 
notion that higher feelings of personal control are associated with more 
effective decision making. If managers are able to understand the 
positive and negative aspects of their organization, which give rise to 
higher or lower feelings of control they may be able to enhance the 
positive and reduce the negative. 
 
1.2.3 Chapter summaries 
 
The thesis follows a theory-building structure, in which successive chapters 
‘unravel a new part of the theoretical argument being made’ (Yin, 1989: 139). 
It is presented in nine chapters, as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 (this chapter) sets out the background and aims of the research. The 
methodological position is outlined, the fieldwork settings are described. The 
research design, principal findings and thesis structure are summarized. 
 
Chapter 2 is a review of literature on the management of projects of 
organizational change. The review seeks to capture what is known about the 
ways in which organizations are changing, and about the role of projects and 
project management in implementing planned change. The review finds a bias 
in the literature towards a concern with the outcomes of organizational change 
initiatives and with general prescriptions for their successful achievement. It is 
argued that this performance bias has diverted research attention from the 
actual processes which are adopted by drivers of change projects, and from the 
ways in which those processes are determined by the context of change. 
 
The review leads to the formulation of two open-ended research questions 
which provide a guiding foundation to the design of the empirical study. The 
questions ask what processes are adopted by managers of projects of change 
and how those processes are determined by their context. The chapter ends with 
a clarification of terminology and a listing of the aims of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 is concerned with research methodology. The chapter builds on the 
research aims and the conclusions from the literature by considering a number 
of philosophical issues which together form the basis for a set of guiding 
assumptions which underpin and justify the research design. Further theoretical 
and practical considerations are explored, which help determine the parameters 
of the research design. A simple theoretical framework is selected to give a 
broad outline structure to the data analysis. General details and guiding 




Chapter 4, the first of four ‘results’ chapters, contains Cases 1 and 2. The 
cases are concerned with two distinct projects of change in Ealing Hospital 
NHS Trust, a public general hospital in west London which had recently 
acquired trust status. The subject of Case 1 is a realignment of the trust’s 
management structure to suit its new commercial environment. Case 2 
examines a project of updating the hospital’s information systems. The pair of 
projects were chosen for being dissimilar in character. 
 
Specific details of case selection and data collection are described. Each of the 
two cases is presented at a primary analytical level, in narrative form supported 
by quotes, structured around the elements of the theoretical framework, 
followed by a secondary level of analysis which summarizes and tabulates 
emerging categories of management process. Six categories are defined, and 
their dimensions identified. 
 
Chapter 5, which contains Cases 3 and 4, follows the same ‘paired projects’ 
approach. Cases 3 and 4 are set in the editorial office of Associated 
Newspapers Ltd., a dynamic and profitable private sector company. Case 3 is a 
project of amalgamating two photographic services support departments. The 
change involved physical work, structural reorganization and redundancies. 
Case 4 is centred on the reorganization of an innovative software development 
project which had got out of hand. 
 
Chapter 5 builds on and refines the findings of Chapter 4 to achieve the 
definition of a set of management process categories which is generalizable to 
all four cases studied up to this point. 
 
At this intermediate stage in the study, speculation about possible links 
between context and process leads to the idea that the actions of managers may 
be considered as an expression of their possession of, or pursuit of, control. 
Three theoretical perspectives of the concept of managerial control in the 
literature are considered. The construct known as personal control is found to 
be a useful conceptual intermediary between context and project management 
process. 
 
Chapter 6 contains Case 5, concerning a major project of ‘business process re-
engineering’ in the London offices of US-based multinational construction firm 
Bechtel. Although the reorganization consisted of two nominally separate 
projects the two were so closely related that they were found to be more 
appropriately presented as one. At this point the paired projects approach 
adopted in Cases 1 to 4 was dropped. It became clear that other considerations, 




The same format of case presentation and two-stage analytical process is 
followed, with the addition that the personal control concept is introduced into 
the analysis. 
 
Chapter 7 contains Case 6, the final case. The setting is the Luton-based 
domestic appliance manufacturing operation of Swedish-owned group 
Electrolux. The case is concerned with the factory’s locally-driven efforts to 
become a ‘world class’ organization through a wide-reaching project of internal 
change. 
 
The same format as Case 5 is followed. Saturation of data is achieved. 
 
Chapter 8 brings together the findings from the six cases in a cross-case 
summary. The output of the research is presented as a series of propositions, 
linking the six management process categories positively or negatively with the 
five categories of personal control. The central issues in each of the six cases, 
to which managers directed their attention, and which gave rise to greater or 
lesser feelings of control are identified. The central issues from all six cases are 
aggregated into a set of seven generic ‘key organizational characteristics’ 
which were possessed to a greater or lesser extent by each organization. 
 
Chapter 9 draws conclusions from the whole study. These are presented in the 
form of a summary of the study’s contribution to knowledge followed by a 
discussion of implications for management practice, including practical advice 
for managers. The chapter concludes with an acknowledgment of the 
shortcomings of the research, and a consideration of opportunities for further 
study which have arisen from this work. 
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2 PROJECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to build a picture of contemporary understanding 
of the management of projects of organizational change. It is argued that there 
is a need for comparative empirical studies of the processes by which such 
projects are managed, and that studies should take greater account of the 
contexts within which those processes occur. 
 
Section 2.1 asks the questions: why and in what ways are organizations 
changing? The section examines the shifting environmental forces which have 
accompanied a surge of academic and practical interest in the organizational 
change phenomenon in recent decades. 
 
Section 2.2 is concerned with the processes by which organizations change, 
focusing on the role of managers in the conception and implementation of 
change. With reference to the ‘strategic choice’ debate the position of projects 
of change in relation to the wider phenomenon of organizational change is 
examined. It is argued that a disproportionate concern with organizational and 
project performance and prescription for success has limited the attention paid 
by researchers to the role of projects and to actual project management 
processes. 
 
Section 2.3 examines the relationship in the literature between the process of 
change project management and its context. The acknowledged shortage of 
context-bound studies of management process is considered, and opportunities 
to extend existing knowledge are discussed. 
 
The conclusions and implications of this literature review are summarized in 
Section 2.4. The chapter ends with two open-ended research questions which 
are used as the foundation from which to conduct exploratory enquiry into the 
topic. The aims of the thesis are listed. 
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2.1 The content of change 
 
This section sets the scene by examining from a general perspective the 
phenomenon of organizational change. The section describes how the increasing 
forces for change which have resulted in calls for flexible forms of organization 
have been accompanied by a growth in the ‘management industry’, exemplified 
by a proliferation of best-selling books on organizational change. The themes of 
the popular ‘change gurus’ are explored and summarized as the ways in which 
organizations are changing. These are the ‘what’, or content of change. 
 
2.1.1 Forces of change and new wave themes 
 
In recent decades, and in particular since the early 1980s, empirical and anecdotal 
studies of organizations have formed the basis of a flow of best-selling 
management books. These works present a close-knit blend of ideas and strategies 
for organizational change and survival. Their themes are those of post-industrial 
corporate fashion. Their subject matter shows that they have achieved their 
success by capitalizing on the need for corporations and individuals to change in 
order to survive. 
 
An overview of the fads and fashions of organizational change sums up the 
phenomenon. Typical examples of the themes of the best-sellers are: 
organizational deconstruction and reshaping (Peters, 1992; Hammer and Champy, 
1993); synergy, partnership and individual empowerment (Kanter, 1989); the 
changing nature of work and careers (Kanter, 1989; Handy, 1989); the gaining of 
strategic advantage (Ohmae, 1982; Pascale, 1990; Porter, 1985); quality and 
customer focus (Deming, 1986; Peters, 1992; Davidow and Malone, 1992); 
innovation (Peters, 1992; Kanter, 1984); learning and the learning organization 
(Drucker, 1989; Senge, 1990; Pascale, 1990); Japanese management (Ouchi, 
1981; Pascale and Athos, 1981). 
 
The aggregate of advice offered by these ‘change gurus’ is described in 
favourable terms by Kreiner (1992: 41) as ‘a pastiche of ideas, metaphors, 
perspectives and fragments of models’. The gurus are not without their critics, 
who claim that their ideas are fads or not new (Grint, 1993; Nohria and Berkley, 
1994; Thomas, 1994), or even bad advice (Solomon, 1993). Huczynski (1993: 
244) is disparaging about the vain managerial quest for universal rules of success, 
which he labels the ‘fast food approach to learning’. He claims that the approach 
removes the need for managers to expend effort to discover the ‘relevance, 
application or practicability of the general propositions offered [by the gurus] to 
their personal situation or problems’. 
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Nevertheless, Kreiner notes the critical status accorded in management literature 
to such popular studies of organization as Peters and Waterman’s (1982) much 
cited In Search of Excellence and to autobiographies of well-known industrialists. 
He refers to this status as an indication of the growing rejection of ‘scientific’ 
organization theory in the postmodern epoch which is characterized by: 
 
 ... a watering down of the ‘rules of the game’ for the discourse 
because all ‘truths’ compete in a market where power, fashion and 
adventure may be just as important as the ‘scientific odour’. 
(Kreiner, 1992: 41) 
 
In addition to the change gurus’ infiltration of management scholarship, there is 
evidence that management practice has succumbed to their influence. In a recent 
call for a return to managerial pragmatism Nohria and Berkley (1994) report a 
massive growth of the ‘management industry’ in the USA between 1982 and 
1992. Condemning ‘flavour of the month’ management, they attribute the rise in 
management schools, consultants, media and gurus to management insecurity 
brought about by foreign competition and industrial decline. 
 
The extent to which the prescriptions of the gurus actually influence corporations 
is impossible to tell. It may be that fashionable writers on organizations are simply 
providing a global service of popular corporate journalism, reporting on the latest 
fads and trends. However, the amount of interest which is shown in these writers’ 
ideas and which is reflected in their books’ sales suggests a desire on the part of 
managers to keep up with the pack and to heed popular advice on individual and 
corporate survival. 
 
The forces for organizational change which have accompanied the growth in the 
management industry arise from a complex and powerful brew of technological, 
economic and social factors. These are summed up by Mohrman et. al. (1989) in 
four categories: 
 
1 Increasing competition and globalization (accompanied by stagnant 
domestic markets). 
 
2 Changing expectations of stakeholders (including the desire by employees 
for meaningful work; the ruthlessness of shareholders and financial 
markets; the sophistication of customers). 
 
3 Technological developments (four major trends are identified by Boddy 
and Gunson (1996): availability of hardware, software, databases and 
communications technology). 
 
4 Changes in legal context (including deregulation and employee rights). 
 16
 
In addition to environmental factors, managerial fashion has become a force for 
change in its own right, and a topic worthy of academic attention (see 
Abrahamson, 1996). The importance of the activities and styles of other firms is 
reflected in the idea that to copy the competition is desirable. Peters (1987: 229) 
calls this ‘creative swiping’. Mintzberg (1979a) lists fashion as a contingency 
factor for the ‘adhocracy’ structure. There has been a trend towards the practice of 
‘benchmarking’, (see Karlof and Ostblom, 1993). Some writers claim that much 
of the growth in popularity of the new management ideas has its origins in a desire 
by managers of declining western corporations to emulate the success of the 
Japanese, for whom coveted values such as team working are more natural to their 
national culture (see Ouchi, 1981; Pascale and Athos, 1981; Drucker, 1989). 
 
A recent study of reasons behind the adoption of matrix structures in UK hospitals 
finds a variety of influences including not only technical rationality but also the 
‘normative pressure of interorganizational networks’ (Burns and Wholey, 1993: 
108). A further suggestion of the power of the desire that organizations should 
conform to social norms is found by the research of DiMaggio and Powell (1983), 
who propose that a combination of three kinds of isomorphism operate to bring 
about the paradoxical phenomenon whereby people trying to change their 
organizations make them increasingly similar. Conscious attempts to copy 
successful companies may fail, however, due to contextual differences. Hassard 
and Sharifi (1989) point out the inherent difficulty of emulating ‘cultural styles’. 
 
The spreading need to abandon bureaucratic structures and ideas of ‘rational’ 
management, and to adopt popular or fashionable ‘new wave’ ideas is widely 
perceived. Surveys of corporate transformation in large organizations were 
conducted in the UK in 1989, 1990 and 1991 (Coulson-Thomas, 1992). The 
research showed that, in each of the three years, managers claimed that the 
primary issue facing them was the need to make organizations more flexible and 
responsive. Kanter cites a review of studies covering thousands of workplaces. 
The review found that the most commonly reported changes were towards ‘flat, 
lean structures, multiskilled employees, and team configurations.’ (Kanter, 1989: 
273) 
 
Ezzamel, Lilley and Willmott (1996) report a survey of UK corporate sector 
managers’ perceptions of various aspects of change. The study finds strong 
evidence of gradually increasing pressure for results, stronger customer 
orientation and greater use of technology. In a corporate climate distinguished by 
the ever-present threat of redundancy there is increasing individual accountability 
accompanied by a growing emphasis on team work and collaboration. These 
researchers find little indication of radical ‘sea-changes’ in management practices, 
but a more gradual, incremental shift. Their summing up of the overall picture 
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encapsulates the essence of the forces and the directions of organizational change 
in the literature: 
 
 The overall impression is one of an intensification and 
individualization of work, facilitated by new technologies and 
promoted by new management ideas. (Ezzamel, Lilley and 




The themes of popular management writers are taken as a reflection of the broad 
aggregate of change. A summary of their work, broadly confirmed by surveys of 
change, suggests that organizations are reflecting demands for change in the 
following ways: 
 
Downsizing. Organizations are getting smaller. In the new climate of technical and 
administrative innovation, new businesses outpace the growth of established 
businesses (Kanter, 1989). Businesses have fewer, better-qualified people (Handy, 
1989). Drucker comments on the ‘decline in the advantage of being big’ and 
observes that medium sized firms are replacing bigger corporations as ‘the engine 
driving the US economy’ (Drucker, 1989: 205). 
 
Co-operation. The boundaries of organizations are becoming less distinct. Overall 
performance is improved by moving work between an organization, its customers 
and suppliers (Hammer and Champy, 1993). Distributors and retailers are 
‘surrogate employees’ (Davidow and Malone, 1992). ‘International alliances and 
partnerships are associated with competitive strength’ (Kanter, 1989: 120). 
 
Delayering. Organizations are moving towards flatter structures with fewer layers 
of management, made possible by the new information technologies. The 
response to complexity and the need for faster action is organizational fluidity and 
flexibility (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Kanter, 1989). The new information-
based firm needs fewer levels of management (Drucker, 1989). Middle managers 
are a dying breed (Davidow and Malone, 1992). 
 
Learning. There is a growing emphasis on knowledge and learning, at individual 
and corporate level. The idea represents a shift away from the notion of training 
(how) towards education (why) (Hammer and Champy, 1993). Senge (1990) 
claims that learning may be the only sustainable source of competitive advantage. 
At the individual level, learning is the new form of security (Drucker, 1989). 
 
Innovation. There is a perceived need to encourage innovation and creativity, and 
to foster a climate where mistakes which are made in the pursuit of innovation 
may be tolerated. Rational management punishes mistakes thereby discouraging 
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innovation (Peters and Waterman, 1982). It is important to reward the generation 
of ideas, not just the right answer (Kanter, 1989). 
 
Empowerment. Closely related to the encouragement of innovation is the concept 
of empowerment of the individual in the form of worker participation in schemes 
for quality and productivity. Employee participation in the management of change 
is more likely to lead to its success (Peters, 1987). Allowing employees to seize 
information, resources and support allows their potential to be released (Kanter, 
1984). 
 
Cross-functional teams. There is a trend towards the use of cross-functional task 
forces and teams and new explicit managerial roles such as task force leader and 
change agent. Drucker describes how, in the organization of the future: 
 
 Business is conducted in a decentralized, networked organizational 
structure where the basic structural elements are projects. Work is 
done in task-focused teams. (Drucker, 1989: 134)  
 
These ‘new wave’ management themes are closely entwined with one another and 
to the changing goals that they help organizations to pursue. They are made 
possible by advances in information technology, and are often accompanied by 
the introduction of new systems of communication. Structural changes which are 
reflected in the new managerial vocabulary of downsizing, outsourcing, 
decentralizing and delayering are linked to the fashionable behavioural ideas 
exemplified by visionary leadership and cultural change, individual creativity and 
empowerment. Accompanying the decline in the perceived appropriateness of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy, these themes represent the ways in which organizations 
are changing. It will be seen that their prevalence is borne out by the content of the 
organizational change projects in this study.
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2.2 The process of change 
 
Interpretations of how organizational change is produced or managed are 
necessarily shaped by assumptions about how change works. Adopting a 
project perspective of organizational change implies a certain set of 
assumptions and thus raises questions about the consequences for researchers 
and managers of thinking about change in this way. This section considers the 
implications of conceiving organizational change in terms of projects. 
 
Section 2.1 describes the ways that organizations are said to be changing. 
These ways may be considered as the content of change. This section 
addresses the question: what is the process by which organizations 
change? Some theorists have argued that to draw a distinction between 
content and process is artificial (Schendel, 1992) or unhelpful (Pettigrew, 
1992), at least for the purpose of strategy process research, where the two 
are claimed to be analytically inseparable. In this study it is argued that, 
in the context of project management, the theoretical distinction between 
content and process is helpful, since it is a well-established and 
convenient way of distinguishing the objectives and scope of a project 
from the processes and techniques which are used to achieve them. 
 
The current nature of projects and project management is first reviewed and 
related to literature on organizational change. Issues arising from assumptions 
associated with the project conceptualization are then discussed. The issues are 
concerned with the idea, commonly expressed in the literature, that the project 
perspective implies a voluntarist, rational-linear process. It is argued that there 
is a need for an improved understanding of the extent to which managers make 
this assumption, and that the project perspective offers rich potential for 
empirical research into change management processes. 
 
2.2.1 Projects and project management 
 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the noun project as ‘a planned 
undertaking’. In the context of management the word has taken on a narrower, 
more precise meaning which captures a level of complexity. Management 
textbook definitions suggest that projects are characterized by some or all of a set 
of distinguishing characteristics. Projects are complex multi-task, multi-function 
undertakings with defined objectives, schedules and budgets (Archibald, 1976). 
Projects are unique endeavours which create change (Turner, 1993a). Projects 
have life cycles (Morris, 1994). 
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The term project management is used in several ways. A brief exploration of three 
of its meanings will help to illuminate the current theoretical and professional 
focus of the discipline. 
 
Firstly and fundamentally, project management is a deceptively simple idea 
(Morris, 1994: viii). which has at its core the notion of the project manager as the 
single point of integrative responsibility (Archibald, 1976) pursuing defined 
objectives over a finite project life cycle. Morris defines the generic concept in 
concise terms. 
 
 [Project management] is the process of integrating everything that 
needs to be done (typically utilizing a number of special project 
management tools and techniques) as the project evolves through its 
life cycle (from concept definition through implementation to 
handover) in order to ensure that its objectives are achieved. (Morris, 
1994: viii, emphasis in original) 
 
From a second perspective, project management is an industry, providing products 
and services to a growing market of private and public-sector organizations which 
have projects to manage and whose members perceive value in a professional 
approach to project management. In the UK, biannual national trade exhibitions 
provide evidence that a widening range of project management software, 
packaged procedures, training and consultancy is available to satisfy the demand 
for the approach. 
 
The third sense of project management is a professional discipline with its own 
body of knowledge. In several countries, notably the UK and the USA, official 
associations of project management academics and practitioners have attempted to 
formalize and define the realm of their discipline for the purposes of member 
accreditation and certification. An example is the Body of Knowledge (BoK) 
published by the UK’s Association for Project Management (1996). The 
document contains outlines of 40 ‘topics’ against which candidates for 
certification may assess their level of experience and knowledge. The range of the 
topics is wide, and reflects the gamut of skills, know-how and personal 
characteristics that the modern project manager is expected to possess. 
 
The BoK divides the topics into four sections: 
 
1 Project management: systems management, programme 
management, project management, project life cycle, project 
environment, project strategy, project appraisal, project 
success/failure criteria, integration, systems and procedures, 
close-out. 
2 Organization and people: organization design, control and 
co-ordination, communication, leadership, delegation, team 
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building, conflict management, negotiation, management 
development. 
3 Techniques and procedures: work definition, planning, 
scheduling, estimating, cost control, performance 
measurement, risk management, value management, change 
control, mobilisation. 
4 General management: operational/technical management, 
marketing and sales, finance, information technology, law, 
procurement, quality, safety, industrial relations. 
(Association for Project Management, 1996) 
 
The USA’s Project Management Institute (PMI) has developed a marked caution 
about its own claims to being able to produce a definitive documentary 
encapsulation of the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK). The 
1987 edition of the PMBOK is superseded in 1996 by a document which: 
 
 ... is not the PMBOK. The 1987 document defined the PMBOK as 
‘all those topics, subject areas and intellectual processes which are 
involved in the application of sound management principles to... 
projects.’ Clearly, one document will never contain the entire 
PMBOK. (Project Management Institute, 1996: vii, emphasis in 
original) 
 
The 1996 document, which is titled A Guide to the Project Management Body of 
Knowledge, distinguishes project management context from process before setting 
out the process as nine ‘knowledge areas’. Each knowledge area is described as a 
‘subset of project management’, with defined processes. One of the nine, for 
example, is Project Scope Management, summarized as follows: 
 
 A subset of project management that includes the processes required 
to ensure that the project includes all the work required, and only the 
work required, to complete the project successfully. It consists of: 
• Initiation - committing the organization to begin the next 
phase of the project. 
• Scope planning - developing a written scope statement as the 
basis for future project decisions. 
• Scope definition - subdividing the major project deliverables 
into smaller, more manageable components. 
• Scope verification - formalizing acceptance of the project 
scope. 
• Scope change control - controlling changes to project scope. 
(Project Management Institute, 1996) 
 
The UK APM’s broad range of topics, and the USA PMI’s reluctance to pin down 
the discipline reflect an emerging issue. As the project approach to management 
becomes the normal way for organizations to deal with the growing demands for 
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change, its contexts and processes, of necessity, spread into broader domains of 
management. 
 
The Bodies of Knowledge thus include topics which are applicable not only to 
project management but to all of management, reflecting the widening application 
and convergence of project management with the management of change 
generally. Observing this trend, an editorial in the International Journal of Project 
Management contemplates the identity of the discipline: 
 
 .... as project-based management becomes all of general management, it 
ceases to have any identity of its own; as it takes over everything, it 
becomes nothing. (Turner, 1993b: 195) 
 
It is possible to trace project management’s short life from its more specialized 
origins to its present day orientation. The modern form of project management 
arose in recent decades from a practical need to find new systems and techniques 
for managing projects with unprecedented organizational and technological 
complexity. Morris (1994) describes how, in the 1950s, parallel developments in 
the military and civilian sectors in the USA gave rise to the scheduling techniques, 
for example PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique) and CPM 
(Critical Path Method), which became synonymous with project management.  
 
At the same time, it was recognised by those responsible for the new military 
projects of extraordinary technological and organizational complexity that there 
was a need for a holistic, systems approach to the management of such projects, 
using a prime contractor as integrator throughout a three-phase life cycle (concept, 
creation, operation). Fragmented approaches to managing the new complexity 
were grossly deficient (Morris, 1994). 
 
Perhaps due to the inadequacies of early computer hardware and software, PERT 
did not deliver its promised expectations (Fleming and Fleming, 1991). However, 
by the end of the 1950s the project management idea was beginning to spread 
from its origins on major aerospace, defence and construction projects into 
mainstream management thinking, particularly in the manufacturing context.  
 
Evidence of this spread may be found in articles in contemporary issues of the 
Harvard Business Review. Management writers were starting to formulate ideas 
about the newly-perceived potential of using the concept of projects and project 
management as a device for integrating complexity and managing change in a 
more general sense. For example, Gaddis (1959) was one of the first to ask, and 
attempt to answer, questions like: What does a project manager do? What kind of 
man [sic] must he be? What training is prerequisite for project management 
success? Wickesberg and Cronin (1962) saw how the increasing rate of change in 
organizations where shorter product lives, lower profits and shorter production 
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runs was giving rise to a new need for a project approach to management. 
Middleton (1967) expressed the trend: 
 
 Generally, the project approach can be effectively applied to a one-time 
undertaking that is definable in terms of a specific goal; infrequent, 
unique or unfamiliar to the present organization; complex with respect 
to interdependence of detail task accomplishment. (Middleton, 1967: 
73) 
 
The ‘project approach’ described by Middleton involves the adoption of a 
project/functional matrix organizational structure, supposedly combining the 
benefits of a temporary, flexible task-focused project team with the organizational 
stability of a hierarchy. Other writers, rather than taking a structural perspective of 
project management, sought applications of project management’s techniques in 
new sectors and new project types. An example is the 1967 British Civil Service 
paper entitled ‘Network analysis in forming a new organization’ (Ryan, 1967). 
Entirely mechanistic in approach, the paper purports to ‘bring out the value of 
network analysis in the control and management of administrative operations, as 
well as at the planning stage’. 
 
These examples reflect a dawning recognition of the general benefits of an 
adaptable approach to managing unfamiliar, complex organizational tasks. Now, 
as we approach the end of the 20th century, the project approach to management 
is more generally accepted and understood. It is becoming part of the staple fare 
of business education. Text book writers such as Lock (1996) stress that project 
management is widely practised in many sectors of industry and commerce. 
Understandably, much project management activity takes place in the 
predominantly project-based industries such as aerospace, construction, defence, 
energy, and utilities and resource industries. Other sectors, although not primarily 
project-based, also make routine use of projects to a greater or lesser extent. These 
include banking, computer systems, education, public health, government and 
civil service, pharmaceuticals, sport and telecommunications (see Morris, 1994; 
Stuckenbruck, 1986). 
 
The perceived need for integration through projects has spread not only to new 
sectors, but also to new kinds of projects. In addition to the growing use of 
projects for product innovation, organizational change initiatives are increasingly 
being managed as projects, particularly when they involve the introduction or 
updating of information technologies. In Section 2.1 it was shown how 
organizational innovations such as flatter structures, new information and 
communication strategies, customer focus and quality initiatives - and the 
resulting call for the use of project teams - are effectively spreading ever-wider the 
use of project management. Lord (1993) describes how the growing adoption of 
project-based methods for the management of organizational change is giving rise 
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to new approaches to project management, both in sectors which are anyway 
primarily project-based and in sectors where projects are less central to the main 
business of organizations. 
 
A review of the recent contents of the two more prominent academically-oriented 
project management journals illustrates the present focus of the discipline and the 
importance of organizational change projects in relation to other project classes. In 
the UK-based International Journal of Project Management and in the US-based 
Project Management Journal the percentage of the broadly-categorized subject 
matter of articles published during three years in the mid-1990s is shown in Table 
2.1: 
 
Table 2.1: Project management articles categorized by subject matter 
 
         UK US 
Tools and techniques for project planning and decision making:  45  48 
Individual project strategies and success/failure factors:   25  29 
Organizational strategies and structures for multi-projects:  19   11 
Behavioural and human resource issues:     11  12 
         ___ ___ 
         100 100 
 
These figures show that the focus of the discipline is heavily biased towards the 
technical aspects of project management and the successful management of 
individual projects. 
 
Categorizing the same articles on the basis of project content illustrates further the 
orientation of the discipline: 
 
Table 2.2: Project management articles categorized by project content 
 
         UK US 
General - unrelated to project content:       42   43 
Major projects (construction, power, defence, aerospace etc.):  38  33 
Organizational change including information systems:   11  13 
Manufacturing, R&D, new product/service development:     9   11 
         ___ ___ 
         100 100 
 
Table 2.2 highlights two features of the orientation of project management in the 
UK and in the USA. First, the fact that nearly half the articles are unrelated to a 
particular sector or project type suggests that, despite the acknowledged problems 
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of defining the scope of the body of knowledge in general terms, much of project 
management is considered generic, or independent of a project’s content.1 
 
Second, the table shows that, whilst articles concerning internal projects of 
organizational change are less prevalent than those relating to major external 
projects, they nevertheless have a significant presence. The predominance of 
interest in major projects reflects the origins of the discipline in construction, 
defence and aerospace. However, the general increase in the use of project-based 
management for the management of all kinds of organizational change has been 
keenly observed by project management academics and other project management 
professionals, who have looked forward with enthusiasm to the application of 
their discipline in new fields where change is to be managed. 
 
This is shown by the widespread belief within the project management profession, 
suggested by Table 2.2, that the principles of project management are generic and 
applicable to the management of all kinds of change. Sharad (1986: 61) is typical 
of those who claim that the principles of project management are universal. 
Stating that the project approach is an ‘ideological breakthrough’ he attempts to 
explain why the approach may be applied to ‘virtually any business activity’. 
Cleland (1991: 20) sees ‘unlimited domains’ for project management. Turner 
(1993a: 4) observes that ‘project-based management has become the new general 
management through which organizations respond to change’. 
 
The universal applicability of project management has been widely explored. 
Both the 1990 and 1993 annual conferences of Internet, the international project 
management organization, took as their central theme the notion of project-based 
management as a central management strategy in ‘new’ project-oriented 
companies. At the 1990 conference, titled ‘Management by Projects’, the issue 
was given a prominent airing in the international arena. The 1993 conference, 
titled ‘Management by Projects in Practice’ was set up ostensibly to review the 
progress achieved over the intervening three years. 
 
The content of the two conferences is typical and internationally representative of 
project management literature on the subject. In the keynote paper of the 1990 
conference, Gareis (1990a) assesses the new forces for change facing companies 
and individuals, making a logically-derived case for project-based management 
strategies which are both structurally (multi-project) and methodologically (multi-
method) integrative. He acknowledges, however, the considerable organizational 
challenges and problems of introducing project-based management into an 
organization. Turner, Clark and Lord (1990) reinforce this note of caution by 
assessing the negative effects of increased project orientation on an organization’s 
                                                          
1 One explanation for this phenomenon might be that individual writers on generic project management are 
‘sectorally introspected’ to the extent that they do not feel it necessary to make explicit the context of their 
writings. 
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structure (less efficient, lower cultural identity), on its systems (less permanent 
expertise, fewer new systems), and on its people (less fulfilment of personal 
development and career needs). 
 
The aim of the 1990 conference was ‘the development, application and 
dissemination of new, future-oriented project management know-how’ (Gareis, 
1990b). As a source of empirical or theoretical developments of models of project 
management practice for general organizational change the conference 
proceedings have the undeveloped feel of an emerging discipline. They reflect the 
combination of novelty and complexity which characterizes the topic. The 
conference papers consist largely of single case studies of organizational change 
and opinion-based views of the ‘new-age’ organization. The 1993 conference 
proceedings are similar in style and content to the 1990 ones. 
 
One overall conclusion which can be drawn from the proceedings of the two 
conferences is that the growing general strategic use of projects for organizational 
change is considered important but is theoretically undeveloped. Its perceived 
value is borne out by the appearance of the topic in newer project management 
text books (see Turner, 1993a), and by the repeated voicing of the theme in the 
principal project management journals and at project management conferences 
(see Cooper, 1993; Fangel, 1993; McElroy, 1993; Skerritt, 1993). Yet there has 
been a notable lack of progress in developing a greater understanding of models 
of organizational change project management practice, and a notable lack of 
comparative empirical research into the subject, despite published anecdotal 
evidence of the adoption of project-based change management in many individual 
organizations (see for example Bronner and Moberg, 1990; Des Rosiers and 
Pinard, 1990; Fetters and Tuman, 1990; Briner, 1993; Roux-Kiener, 1993). 
 
2.2.2 A conceptual assumption 
 
This review of the contemporary orientation of project management has shown 
how the subject has developed as an idea, as an industry and as a spreading body 
of knowledge, and how at the same time its application to organizational change 
has grown. This growth has accompanied increasing incidence and awareness of 
the organizational change phenomenon. 
 
The review has shown that traditional conceptions of project management 
emphasize predefined objectives, scopes and plans developed and executed within 
a defined organizational structure and working towards an envisaged end point. 
These characteristics illustrate that a fundamental assumption may legitimately 
underlie a project management perspective of organizational change: change 
project management is a rational-linear process arising from the voluntary, pre-
planned actions of managers. 
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A long-running central debate in management literature on the process of 
change concerns the extent to which organizational change is environmentally 
determined or the result of managerial choice (see Astley and Van de Ven, 
1983). Mohrman et. al. (1989) summarize the debate, contrasting the 
deterministic, Darwinian ‘population ecology’ theory of organizations (often 
attributed to Hannan and Freeman, 1977), with a number of other theories 
which admit various degrees of managerial choice, including the ‘strategic 
choice’ theory described by Child (1972). The conceptualization, by managers 
or researchers, of organizational change in terms of projects clearly assumes a 
position towards the voluntarist end of this ‘choice’ spectrum. The implications 
of this assumption, that organizational change may be planned and 
implemented as a project, are embodied in the definitions and descriptions of 
project management described in Section 2.2.1. They assume that the project 
manager of change is, to some extent at least, capable of controlling the project 
environment. 
 
The literature suggests that the validity of this assumption depends on the 
nature of the change. Much research into processes of organizational change 
has concerned strategic change, characterized by long-term perspective and 
organization-wide impact (Johnson and Scholes, 1989). Mintzberg’s (1978) 
description of strategy as ‘a pattern in a stream of decisions’ conveys the 
essence of two salient issues relating to strategy and its implementation. First, 
if strategy is the relatively long-term pattern then the discrete decisions which 
make up that pattern are not, in themselves, strategy. Second, the pattern is not 
necessarily planned in advance, but may be at least partly unintended or 
emergent. 
 
Whether the distinction between strategic change and non-strategic change is 
relevant in the context of managerial intervention in change initiatives is 
questionable, since, as a result of its emergent nature, strategic change may 
only be identified as such after it has happened (Mintzberg, 1989). 
Nevertheless, the impact of a planned managerial intervention in the face of 
external, environmental forces for change is related to the scale and nature of 
intended change (Adler and Shenhar, 1990). Mohrman et. al. (1989) identify 
three dimensions determining difficulty: the depth of change, the size of the 
organization and the pervasiveness of change. There is an intuitive logic in the 
notion that outcomes of major programmes of long-term organizational change 
are more likely to be distorted over time to a greater extent by unintended or 
unpredictable influences than those of minor, short-term projects of change. 
 
Quinn’s (1980) notion of the process of organizational change as logical 
incrementalism provides a helpful perspective from which to delimit intended 
projects of change within their broader context of longer-term, emergent 
strategic change. Quinn’s studies of the reality of strategic change found that, 
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contrary to widely held beliefs, large scale strategy formulation and 
implementation was not a formal, rational process, but necessarily arose from 
the integration of ‘strategic subsystems’ whose change patterns were 
incremental and opportunistic. His research confirms that the question is one of 
the scale or extent of change, the boundaries of rationality being set by the 
cognitive and process limits of strategic organizational subsystems. Thus the 
strategy of an organization is the cumulative result of many discrete steps, or 
incremental decisions or relatively minor projects of change, over time. 
 
2.2.3 Prescriptive models 
 
Following the large scale, emergent nature of strategic change, much attention 
to organizational change in the literature is not directed at management process. 
Rather, it is concerned with analyzing external conditions under which certain 
types or directions of large scale change occur, and how they may lead to 
survival or extinction, and economic success or failure, at both firm and sector 
level (Pettigrew, 1987a). This focus is summed up by Ketchen, Thomas and 
McDaniel’s (1996) view that strategic management as a field of study is 
fundamentally concerned with performance. Pettigrew (1987a) observes the 
bias in attention in the literature towards prescription and strategy formulation 
rather than description and implementation that has accompanied this 
deterministic preoccupation with relating change content and organizational 
performance to external conditions. 
 
In common with performance-based perspectives of longer-term, 
environmentally-determined strategic change, many voluntaristic theoretical or 
empirically-based models of organizational change are focused on universal or 
contingent prescriptions for the achievement of success. The majority of 
research into strategic change and into short-term, small scale, incremental 
change initiatives, where the domain of managerial choice is arguably less 
illusory or constrained, has been concerned with performance. 
 
Ghoshal and Bartlett (1996), for example, adopt a voluntarist, performance-
oriented position, offering a ‘blueprint for corporate renewal’ based on five 
years of research into organizational transformation. They found that two 
important features are evident in successful transformations, and absent in 
unsuccessful ones. These ‘success factors’ are, first, there must be a carefully 
phased approach rather that ‘flitting from one fad to another’, and second, there 
must be a focus on behaviour, not just strategies, systems and structures. 
 
Barczac, Smith and Wilemon (1987) also recommend a phased, linear 
approach, that managers of organizational change understand and follow in 
sequence four ‘key processes’: pattern breaking, experimenting, visioning, and 
bonding and attunement. Dean and Sharfman’s (1996) concern for performance 
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is at the level of the decision. They conducted a longitudinal study of 24 
participating firms to discover the effects of procedural rationality and political 
behaviour on decision making effectiveness. They found that effective 
decisions - those which had the desired outcomes - were more likely to have 
been based on a rational process of information collection and analysis, and 
less likely to have been based on the ‘political’ self-interest of individuals or 
groups. 
 
In addition to such general models as these some theorists recommend a 
contingency approach. Further examples of voluntaristic performance-based 
models include Dunphy and Stace’s (1993) behavioural contingency grid, 
which relates recommended management style to scale of change (see Figure 
2.1 below). 
 
Figure 2.1: Dunphy and Stace’s (1993) contingency model of corporate 
change 
    
     
 Collaborative Type 1: Type 2:  
  Participative Charismatic  
 Consultative evolution transformation  
Style of change     
management     
 Directive Type 3: Type 4:  
  Forced Dictational  
 Coercive evolution transformation  
     









  Scale of change  
 
Dunphy and Stace’s study, based on interviews with 450 managers in 13 
service sector organizations, found that the traditional universal Organizational 
Development (OD) model of change, involving incremental change and a 
participative approach, was inadequate to describe the diverse reality of 
approaches. Their contingency model, shown in Figure 2.1, is offered as a way 
of achieving effective organizational performance. The basis of the model is 
that managers should adopt a style appropriate to the scale of change rather 
than being guided solely by personal preferences. 
 
A different contingency approach is taken by Nutt (1987; 1989), who develops 
a framework for selecting tactics for implementing strategic plans. Nutt’s 
framework focuses on surveyed links between tactics and implementation 
success rate. A series of questions, presented in decision tree format, include 
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‘Does implementation exceed the manager’s authority to act?’ and ‘Does a 
technically sound plan exist?’ The model’s user is thus directed towards one of 
four tactics, labelled Persuasion, Intervention, Participation and Edict. 
 
Such models are attempts to encapsulate the lessons of success and failure. 
Boddy and Gunson (1996) observe that the pace of change has become so fast 
that it becomes increasingly difficult to learn from past successes or failures. 
Nevertheless, much research in the field of project management continues to be 
performance-based, relating to the identification of factors leading to project 
success or failure. Empirically-based enquiries include Morris and Hough’s 
(1987) case studies of major projects, Katz and Allen’s (1985) survey of 
perspectives of project performance in relation to organizational structure in 
research and development projects, and Couillard’s (1995) investigation of the 
contingent effect of project risk profile on management approach. 
 
Increasingly studies of factors leading to success and failure have been 
concerned with generalizable aspects of project management in technological 
organizational innovations. Examples of attempts to crystallize the universal 
rules of successful project management are seen in the work of Belassi and 
Tukel (1996), Deutsch (1991), McComb and Smith (1991) and Slevin and 
Pinto (1987). A typical list of determinants is the latter’s generalized 
empirically-based ten ‘critical factors in successful project implementation’. 
The factors, listed in Table 2.3 below, reflect the general emphasis on 
identifying experts’ perceptions of desired resources and skills, which 
characterizes the success and failure literature. 
 
Table 2.3: Slevin and Pinto’s (1987) critical success factors 
 
1 Project Mission. Initial clarity of goals and general directions. 
2 Top management support. Willingness of top management to provide the 
necessary resources and authority/power for project success. 
3 Project Schedule/Plan. A detailed specification of the individual action steps 
required for project implementation. 
4 Client Consultation. Communication, consultation and action listening to all 
impacted parties. 
5 Personnel. Recruitment, selection and training of the necessary personnel for 
the project team. 
6 Technical Tasks. Availability of the required technology and expertise to 
accomplish the specific technical action steps. 
7 Client Acceptance. The act of selling the final project to its ultimate intended 
users. 
8 Monitoring and Feedback. Timely provision of comprehensive control 
information at each stage in the implementation process. 
9 Communication. The provision of an appropriate network and necessary data 
to all key actors in the project implementation. 
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10 Trouble-Shooting. Ability to handle unexpected crises and deviations from 
plan. 
 
Pinto and Prescott (1988) took the investigation a stage further, adding a 
dynamic dimension. They conducted a further expert survey examining 
changes in the perceived importance of the ten factors over four stages in the 
project’s life cycle (conceptualization, planning, execution and termination). 
The survey found significant variations, many of which were predicted and 
hypothesized by the researchers, for example the importance of mission, top 
management support and client acceptance at the planning stage. 
 
Some general prescriptive models of change management have also 
emphasized attention to a sequential, phased approach. Kilmann’s (1989) 
model, for example, has clear links with the traditional project management 
cycle. The model defines five ‘critical stages’ in implementing planned change: 
 
1 Initiating the programme 
2 Diagnosing the problem 
3 Scheduling the ‘tracks’ (culture, management skills, team-building, 
strategy/structure, reward system) 
4 Implementing the tracks 
5 Evaluating the results 
 (Kilmann, 1989: 7) 
 
Some texts go further than hinting at project life cycle approaches. Explicit 
acknowledgement that project management may be used for the management of 
organizational change, strategic or otherwise, appears in some texts on the 
implementation of strategy and organizational change. Bowman and Asch (1987) 
present an illustration of project management techniques applied to strategy 
implementation which includes a brief selection of simple project management 
ideas. These include allocating responsibility and accountability for success, 
identifying specific actions and milestones, and monitoring progress. Grundy 
(1993) acknowledges the advantages of the project management approach to the 
implementation of organizational change. He states that: 
 
 project management provides powerful infrastructure to the change 
process which enables teams to mobilize for change far more 
effectively and efficiently than is feasible purely within functional 
and hierarchical structures. (Grundy, 1993: 96) 
 
He lists the benefits of using a project management approach for organizational 
change, asserting that ‘not to have access to a well-bedded-in project 
management process is a major competitive handicap’. He also identifies three 
pitfalls to be avoided: 
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 The specific change is seen in isolation and unlinked to other 
activities or areas of change. 
 The process becomes weighed down with too much control 
bureaucracy. 
 Project management is not seen as fitting the organizational 
paradigm and may be resisted. (Grundy, 1993: 95) 
 
A further structural argument for project management relates to the linking of the 
objectives of organizational innovations with the post-bureaucratic ideals 
described in Section 2.1. Romme (1996), for example, argues that both hierarchy 
and teamwork are necessary for large organizations in which project teams are 
the key learning unit. In the team novel information is absorbed and produced; in 
the hierarchy the learning results are processed and stored. Pellegrinelli and 
Bowman (1994: 125) recognize the potential problems of achieving de-
bureaucratization by using ‘the organization’s existing systems and structures, its 
‘status quo’ to change the status quo’. They assert that, because project 
management works outside the existing organizational norms, it is superior to 
conventional functionally-based approaches to managing change. 
 
Theories of change management have of course been developed from many 
other perspectives than the rationalistic approach implied by survey-based 
generalizations and embodied in linear life cycles. Some perspectives offer 
contrasting alternatives to the rational-linear view. Morgan (1986) describes the 
advantages and disadvantages of studying organizations from each of a variety 
of contrasting conceptual metaphors including machines, organisms, brains, 
cultures, political systems and instruments of domination. 
 
Other multiple conceptions are aimed at building on or complementing the 
rational-linear model. Borum and Christiansen (1993), for example, analyzed 
the implementation of a formal project management system from three 
perspectives derived from the literature, each of which was able to throw light 
on possible reasons for failure. The rational administrative perspective, derived 
from project management literature, explained failure through unclear goals or 
inappropriate formal structure. The political process perspective, based on 
stakeholder analysis, explained failure through resistance to change. The 
network process perspective, based on relations between organizational actors, 
explained failure through lack of cognitive and behavioural coupling. 
 
Others, including Buchanan and Boddy (1992), whose work will be explored in 
the next section, have built on the use of simultaneous multiple perspectives to 
understand the complexities of project management process. 
 
Whether one adopts contrasting single perspectives or combined multiple 
perspectives there is widespread appreciation of the inadequacy of purely rational 
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models to describe organizational change, whether linked to project management 
or not. A decade ago Johnson (1987) expressed the view that it was no longer 
necessary for researchers to concentrate on questions concerned with 
demonstrating the inadequacy of rational models as descriptions of process. The 
naive view of the management of projects as the simple application of a set of 
techniques has long disappeared from all but the most rudimentary project 
management texts. Views of project management have matured, such that it may 
be reasonable to assume that both advocates and applicants of a project approach 
to the implementation of organizational change do not simply mean rational-
linearity. 
 
In the face of all these models and formulae for success what, then, is the 
practical perception and function of projects of organizational change? 
Although longer term strategic change may be the result of an uncertain, 
emergent, iterative process (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991), managers 
nevertheless plan and attempt to implement change initiatives - even those 
intended to change what Gersick (1991) describes as the organization’s ‘deep 
structure’ - as if they were projects (Lundin, 1990). They are encouraged to use 
a project approach by some branches of a literature that is driven largely by the 
desire to develop prescriptive models for success. Because of the focus on 
performance, at industry, organization and project level, there is an inadequate 
understanding of the ways in which managers actually conceive projects of 
change and their management. 
 
The extent to which managers adhere to a rational-linear conceptualization of 
change management based on managerial choice and control is not clearly 
understood. It is reasonable to suppose that the meanings and interpretations 
attached by managers of change to projects and project management include 
subtleties derived from their individual experiences and from other ways of 
describing the process of change. The study of managers’ perspectives of projects 
of change offers opportunities to clarify and understand the function of projects 
and project management in relation to organizational change. 
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2.3 The context of change 
 
In Section 2.2 a conceptual distinction was made between the content, or scope, of 
a project of organizational change and the management process by which a 
project is conceived and implemented. It was argued that an exploration of the 
meanings attached by change project managers to such projects and their 
voluntaristic management offers opportunities for improved understanding of 
actual processes. The literature on the management of change suggests that 
contemporary meanings attached by managers of change to projects may not be 
limited to simple linear interpretations of project management based on rationality 
and choice. They are likely to include the complexities of other perspectives. 
 
In this section the concept of project context is discussed. It is first argued that the 
management process of any project will be determined by a complex set of 
contextual factors. Several areas of potential mismatch are identified between 
traditional project management approaches and the context of their application in 
projects of organizational change. This reinforces the need for studies of the 
complex reality of change project management process which take account of 
context. The established orthodoxy of a contextual perspective of strategic 
change, developed in Pettigrew’s work, is outlined. Shortcomings of Pettigrew’s 
analysis when applied to the management of projects of change, identified and 
pursued in the work of Buchanan and Boddy (1992), are described. 
 
It is concluded that the nature of project context in the literature is unclear, and 
that studies of change management should take account not only of contextual 
variations arising from the nature of a project and its immediate organizational 
circumstances, but also of the longer term characteristics of the organization in its 
environment. Building on previous work, research opportunities allowing as full a 
range of contextual influences as possible to enter the domain of the study are 
identified.  
 
2.3.1 Organizational change project management 
 
Section 2.2 demonstrated how project management literature shows a belief in the 
generic, transferable nature of the fundamental principles of project management, 
reinforced by generalized studies of ‘success factors’. At a certain level, by 
definition, this belief must be justified. If projects are to be managed, that means 
project management. However, there can be no single generic model of project 
management process. Many different models are possible, with widely varying 
degrees of rationality. Even for a single project the level of definition and control 
which is applied at each stage in the project’s life-cycle presents delicate choices. 
The project management processes which are most appropriate in any given 
situation will depend on many factors, including the characteristics of the project, 
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the individuals involved, the organization in which the project is performed and 
the environment within which the organization is operating. 
 
At a basic level, the very concept of managing projects implies some degree of 
embodiment of the key tenets of the discipline, such as the concept of the project 
having a finite life cycle, and that of the project manager as the single point of 
integrative responsibility. Immediately beyond these most fundamental concepts 
lie complex dependencies on context. An examination of the basic principles and 
techniques of project management in relation to popular beliefs, explored in 
Sections 2.1 and 2.2, about the use of projects for achieving and sustaining 
organizational flexibility, reveals a number of basic incongruities between the two 
doctrines. In the literature there is little acknowledgement of this mismatch, an 
exception being Cooke-Davies. Having identified over-expectations of ‘project 
management’ by business leaders he blames the project management community 
for inadvertently making the problem worse by making ‘exaggerated or imprecise 
claims for what project management has to offer in the field of organizational 
change’ (Cooke-Davies, 1994: 165). 
 
Five examples of major disparity may be identified: 
 
1 Procedures: Some of the most powerful techniques to have been 
developed in the name of project management have been procedures for 
maintaining quality standards and for ensuring that, as far as possible, the 
common causes of project failure, such as poor definition or inadequate 
sponsorship, are avoided. The formalization of project management 
processes has become an important part of the discipline of project 
management. It has resulted in the publication of many structured project 
management models or ‘methodologies’. Perhaps the best known of these 
in the UK is PRINCE (PRojects In a Controlled Environment), which was 
originally developed as an administrative framework for public sector 
management information systems development projects. PRINCE and its 
rivals are now enjoying considerable success in a growing number of 
public and private sector project domains, and are big business for the 
growing army of project management consultants who are employed 
installing them in companies and training staff in their use. 
 
 It is not surprising that procedures and project management go together. 
Project management started life as a branch of management science or 
operations research (OR). The basis of OR is that different forms of 
management problem exist (queueing problems, inventory problems, 
decision problems, scheduling problems) and that in practice any 
difference from the general form is merely a matter of detail. This is the 
underlying philosophy of project management’s ‘methodologies’. Arguing 
that OR is irrelevant, Checkland observes that: 
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 The problem is usually perceived as such because of the 
content detail which makes it unique rather than because of 
the form that makes it general. (Checkland, 1981: 74) 
 
 This reasoning could be extended to the idea that attempts to proceduralize 
projects, using PRINCE and the like, are futile, since projects are 
characterized by uniqueness and uncertainty. A more balanced view would 
be that, if a company’s projects are similar, then general procedures are 
more likely to be of value than if the projects are widely different, with 
uncertain goals and methods, as organizational change projects are likely 
to be (Turner and Cochrane, 1993). 
 
 The idea of the undesirability and worthlessness of administrative 
procedures in general has been expressed by others, who argue that 
‘prescribed systems of management are seldom transferable’ (Harvey-
Jones, 1988: 27). Formal systems and procedures which are designed in all 
good faith to avoid the repetition of past mistakes are stifling and anyway a 
waste of time because the old problems will be replaced by new problems 
(Peters and Waterman, 1982). In over-structured organizations, when new 
problems arise there can be a tendency to ignore them because there are no 
procedures to deal with them (Morgan, 1986). In these ways project 
management’s ‘methodologies’ sit uncomfortably with the new creed. 
 
2 Planning: Planning is central to project management, the aim of which is 
to achieve a defined objective within defined temporal and financial 
constraints. The sophisticated computer-based multi-resource scheduling 
systems which are synonymous with the modern conception and practice 
of project management have evolved from this ideal. Yet Kanter (1989: 
205) stresses that, in the new flexible organization which allows technical 
and organizational innovation, ‘project teams need to work unencumbered 
by formal plans’. Peters (1987: 196) states that one of the root causes of the 
failure of large firms to keep up with their smaller counterparts is over-
dependence on ‘ponderous planning systems and Big Projects’. 
 
3 Multi-project resource allocation: Most projects in organizations are 
interdependent. They have related objectives and share resources with 
other projects (Turner and Speiser, 1992). The need for project 
management systems solutions for monitoring and controlling the 
allocation of resources in a multi-project or programme environment has 
long been a concern of the project management profession. The design of 
such systems has often been based on the over-simplified concept that top 
management prioritize projects and scarce resources are allocated 
accordingly. Again in the context of innovation, Peters and Waterman 
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(1982) condemn this doctrine as bureaucratic. They argue in favour an 
internal ‘market forces’ system, whereby projects are encouraged to 
compete for resources. In this way resources are attracted to success, 
thereby reinforcing it. Kanter (1989: 74-82) opposes this idea of ‘in-house 
competition’. Citing research by social psychologists into the effects of 
competition on performance and productivity, she argues that internal 
competition is destructive and undermines goal achievement. Platje and 
Seidel (1993) describe how the multi-project resource allocation process 
forces management into a vicious circle of increasing bureaucracy, rigidity 
and demotivation which is reinforced, not solved, by large information 
systems. Morgan (1986) supports the view that, in general, information 
processing systems reinforce bureaucratic principles. 
 
4 Control: Central to project management is the planning/execution/control 
cycle. The role of the project manager is often defined in terms of 
‘classical’ definitions of the role of the manager to ‘plan, organize, staff, 
evaluate, direct, control and lead the project from point of inception to final 
completion’ (Archibald, 1976: 35). Mintzberg (1973) contends that the 
‘classical’ school of thought which emphasises planning and control, has 
little use in practice. Senge (1990) states that the role of managers is 
changing. He asserts that they should give up the old dogma of planning, 
organizing and controlling, and should concentrate instead on creating the 
conditions in which people can lead enriching lives. Kanter (1989: 158) 
points out the inappropriateness of a ‘brisk, no-nonsense, task-oriented’ 
management style in a team environment which should emphasise the 
importance of trust. 
 
 There is evidence that achieving the balance between excessive control and 
insufficient control in a multi-project innovation environment is 
problematic. Benghozi (1990) researched new product innovation projects 
in French Telecom. He found that the ‘administrative adhocracy’ 
characterized by an organic, decentralised structure with automated 
control, as envisaged by Mintzberg (1979a), works with one-off 
innovations but is too unstructured for controlling multiple projects for 
new ranges of products. 
 
5 Focus on events: The central project management scheduling techniques, 
PERT and CPM, evolved from a need for the systematic evaluation of the 
relationship between activities and events (Morris, 1994). For this reason 
earliest and latest event times and milestone events are central to project 
scheduling, and events provide natural focal points for people involved in 
projects. For Senge (1990: 21), however, a ‘fixation on events’ is one of 
the ‘seven learning disabilities’ which prevent the existence of the 
‘learning organization’. Senge argues that if people’s thinking is dominated 
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by short-term events, generative learning cannot be sustained and reactive 
management will prevail. 
 
Further examples of the problems of projects and the mismatch between formal 
aspects of project management and the creed of flexibility and teamwork can be 
drawn from the literature. They include: project teams should set their own 
performance criteria (Meyer, 1994); resistance to change is caused by 
commitment to a project (Grieco and Whipp, 1991); task-oriented organizations 
focus on individual parts at the expense of the whole (Critchley and Casey, 1989). 
These examples suggest that management processes in projects of organizational 
change are likely to differ significantly from the management processes of 
conventional major projects. 
 
2.3.2 Contextual studies of project management process 
 
The potential areas of disparity between conventional approaches to project 
management and their application to projects of organizational change identified 
in Section 2.3.1 emphasize the importance of an awareness of context and its 
effect on management process. In the field of strategic management the rich 
potential for understanding offered by a perspective which is able to focus on the 
content, process and context of change has been established in the influential work 
of Pettigrew (see for example Pettigrew, 1987a; 1987b; Pettigrew and Whipp, 
1991). 
 
Pettigrew’s perspective distinguishes external from internal context. External, 
or outer, context refers to the economic, competitive, political, social and 
technological environment within which an organization operates. Internal, or 
inner, context refers to the structural, cultural and political environment inside 
the organization. Pettigrew (1987b) argues that a broad analytical approach to 
the study of change, which takes account of both these components of context, 
as well as content and process, has important benefits. These include the 
possibility of answering questions about the why, how and what of change at 
different levels of analysis, including sector as well as firm, and in relation to 
other agencies. 
 
The perspective is described by Laughlin (1991) as ‘the new orthodoxy’ in change 
literature. Pettigrew’s argument for the need to focus simultaneously on the what 
(content), why (context) and how (process) of strategic change has been expressed 
as follows: 
 
 Change processes can only be studied against a background of 
structure or relative constancy, and... a crucial feature of 
contextualist analysis is that processes are constrained by structures 
and at the same time shape structures. (Pettigrew, 1987b: 656) 
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The content/process/context framework is thus able to emphasize the historical 
and dynamic interrelationship between the three constructs. It is able to take 
account of the inevitable analytical complication, identified in Section 2.2, that 
projects of organizational change are intended to change the structural context 
within which they are enacted. 
 
For researchers of projects of organizational change the potential theoretical 
richness of Pettigrew’s analytical approach has been observed by Buchanan and 
Boddy (1992). Buchanan and Boddy also point out the weaknesses of the 
approach which arise from its inherent complexity and emphasis on long term, 
large scale strategic change and which lead to Pettigrew’s analysis necessarily 
stopping short of offering practical advice to managers of change. 
 
Buchanan and Boddy’s own research addresses this shortfall by exploring the 
relationship between the role of the organizational change project manager and the 
context of the change (Buchanan, 1991; Buchanan and Boddy, 1992). They 
identify from the literature three ‘agendas’ which place demands on the project 
manager. 
 
1 The content agenda (demanding technical expertise); 
2 The control agenda (demanding planning and control expertise); 
3 The process agenda (demanding expertise in handling political and cultural 
issues). 
 
Buchanan and Boddy’s research explores how the context of a project affects the 
project managers’ attention to the three agendas. A two-stage design is used, with 
audio-diaries and a national questionnaire survey. The study identifies three key 
dimensions of context as follows: 
 
1 Interlocking (interdependencies on other departments and organizations) 
2 Shifting sands (changes in context) 
3 Ownership (unclear responsibility for project management.) 
 
Two extreme contexts, representing high and low project manager vulnerability, 
gave rise to different priorities. The characteristics of the two extremes are shown 
in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4: Two extreme contexts (Buchanan, 1991: 130) 
 
High vulnerability context Low vulnerability context 
Strategic changes Operational changes 
Rapid change, quick results Slow change, slow results 
Significant resource commitment Few extra resources needed 
Disinterested top management Supportive top managers 
Unrealistic top management expectations Realistic top management 
expectations 
Fickle support Solid support 
Uncertain means Certainty of means 
Complex interdependencies Few interdependencies 
Dependent on third parties Independent 
Multiple ‘ripples’ Self-contained 
Conflicting perceptions Shared views 
Multipurpose changes Single-function systems 
Unstable goals Stable goals 
Confused responsibilities for process and 
outcomes 
Clear ownership of process and 
outcomes 
 
In low vulnerability contexts the typical order of project managers’ priorities for 
the three agendas was found to be (1) content, (2) control and (3) process. In high 
vulnerability contexts the three were reversed. By highlighting the difference in 
demands placed on the project manager in different settings the research was thus 
able to extend the contextualist approach to provide a comprehensible model and 
practical advice about the selection and required expertise of project managers in 
different contexts. 
 
In a doctoral project exploring change project management processes three 
significant opportunities to build on Buchanan and Boddy’s work may be 
identified. First, Table 2.4 confirms the importance of the concerns, expectations 
and actions of senior managers. The critical role of senior management in 
corporate transformation has been established and emphasized by others (see for 
example Fitzgerald, 1988; Vogt and Griffith, 1988). It is often assumed in the 
literature that the role of the project manager in relation to that of the project 
sponsor and other senior managers is clear cut. The project manager is there to 
manage the project on a day-to-day basis while the sponsor provides resources, 
guidance and support (see for example Spühler and Biagini, 1990). Experience 
shows that this is not necessarily the case, particularly when the project has a low 
technical content in relation to the level of structural or cultural change being 
pursued. In practice there is likely to be considerable overlap between the two 
roles, and of those of other organizational members who have significant project 
responsibilities. Spühler and Biagini (1990) define the sponsor’s role as nine 
‘duties’, including project definition and prioritization, resource commitment 
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approval and project manager support. Spühler and Biagini’s observations 
confirm that sponsors frequently conform badly to their theoretical stereotypes, 
either overstepping their assumed role by intervening in project details or not 
fulfilling their duties. Buchanan and Boddy’s research bears out the importance 
and the complexity of the sponsor’s actual role, with definition of ownership of 
project outcomes being one of the elements of Table 2.4. For this reason the range 
of key informants in change management research should include not only the 
project manager but also others with significant project management 
responsibilities. 
 
The second way in which the perspectives developed in Buchanan and Boddy’s 
study may be extended for the benefit of greater understanding of change 
management processes is to explore further the characteristics of the wider 
organizational and environmental context within which the project is being 
managed, and to examine the effect of those characteristics on management 
process. Following Pettigrew’s broad notion of external and internal context, 
potentially important and interesting contextual variations may be direct 
determinants of management processes. These include both sector-level and 
organization-level characteristics such as public/private sector, 
service/manufacturing sector, the organization’s ownership and funding, its 
membership of an international group of companies, and the extent to which it 
undertakes projects as part of its mainstream business. 
 
Third, in Buchanan and Boddy’s work the control agenda is separated, at the 
theoretical level, from the process agenda. In Section 2.2 it was suggested that the 
meanings attached to projects and project management by managers of 
organizational change are likely to include elements from both agendas. 
Perceptions of the traditional, rational-linear control agenda are likely to be subtly 
augmented by the political and cultural perspectives associated with the process 
agenda rather than being held as distinct. By adopting an approach which allows 
exploration of managers’ meanings of the totality of project management the 





The purpose of this chapter has been to explore contemporary meanings of the 
management of projects of organizational change. A review of literature has 
shown that the phenomenon is important but that its processes are not well-
understood. Potentially fruitful opportunities for exploratory research were 
identified. This final section summarizes the argument developed in the chapter 
and concludes with two open-ended research questions. 
 
2.4.1 Summary of literature review 
 
The main points which can be drawn from this review of literature are: 
 
1 Organizational change is endemic and of increasing concern to 
managers. Organizations are subject to increasing pressure for change. 
Intensifying competition, globalization, the changing expectations of 
stakeholders, technological developments, changes in legal context and 
managerial fashion combine to shape the increasingly inauspicious 
environment in which managers must operate. The aggregate of 
organizational reactions to these forces is reflected in the topics of the 
best-selling management writers, whose popularity is an indication of 
heightened managerial concern. Popular themes, including downsizing, 
co-operation, delayering, organizational learning, innovation, 
empowerment and the use of cross-functional teams, represent a closely 
related blend of aspirations, solutions and directions of change. 
 
2 The application of ‘project management’ is spreading to new settings 
and new project types, including organizational change initiatives. 
Traditional conceptions of projects and project management emphasized 
the rational application of principles and techniques for managing 
technically and organizationally complex change through a planned life 
cycle. Since the start of development of the modern discipline in the 
1950s application of the project approach to managing complex change 
has spread to a broad base of industrial and commercial sectors and a 
growing range of project types, including technical and administrative 
organizational change. There is widespread interest in the literature in the 
broadening conception of project management but so far little empirical 
research into the forms of the phenomenon in its newer applications. 
 
3 Much research into organizational change emphasizes large-scale 
deterministic strategic change and organizational performance. 
Strategic management literature shows that the extent to which 
managerial choice plays a part in organizational change depends partly 
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on the scale of contemplated change. Generally, smaller increments of 
intended managerial response to environmental forces make up the long-
term emergent aggregate of strategy. There is an acknowledged emphasis 
of research attention to environmental rather than managerial 
determinants of strategic processes, and to the relationships of longer 
term processes with organizational performance and survival. 
 
4 Research on the voluntaristic management of projects of 
organizational change focuses on performance and prescriptions for 
success. Encouraged by performance-based literature and by arguments 
emphasizing the structural compatibility of the project approach with the 
non-bureaucratic aims of many change initiatives there is a broad 
acceptance that such initiatives should be conceived and managed as 
projects. The project management literature shows that, although the 
trends towards the use of a project approach to the management of 
organizational change is recognized as important, it is ill-understood and 
is receiving comparatively little attention in the form of empirical 
research into the practice of the management of organizational change 
projects. In project management literature and in literature on the 
management of change there is a similar focus on performance. Much 
empirical research is aimed at the generalization of determinants of 
performance and the production of universal or contingent prescriptive 
models for managerial success. 
 
5 Traditional conceptions of projects and project management are 
broadening, but their newer meanings are not understood. Despite 
the predominant emphasis in prescriptive literature of sequential, phased 
approaches to the management of change it has long been accepted that 
so-called rational-linear models are inadequate either to describe or to 
prescribe managerial processes. There is widespread adoption of multiple 
theoretical conceptions which emphasize not only linear approaches but 
also political and cultural perspectives. This suggests that managers’ 
understanding of project management in the context of organizational 
change is likely to have outpaced the literature on this novel and complex 
topic, a literature rooted in its recent traditional past. There is a need for 
research into the ways in which managers understand and use projects 
and project management as a process of change. 
 
6 It may be argued that some of the established principles and 
techniques of project management are unsuitable in the context of 
organizational change. At a fundamental level the principles and 
concepts of project management are considered generic, and this is borne 
out by project management literature. Immediately beyond the simple 
idea of the project approach, however, there is acceptance that each 
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specific model of project management will be strongly dependent on 
context, including not only the changing characteristics of the project but 
also other features of the organization’s internal and external 
environment. There are many ways in which traditional project 
management approaches match poorly the needs of projects of 
organizational change, but there is little understanding of how managers 
of such projects perceive or deal with these anomalies. 
 
7 There are several ways in which a contextual perspective of 
organizational change project management could be further 
explored. Some empirical research has combined the 
content/process/context analytical perspective, which has been applied so 
widely in the field of strategic change, with the project management 
approach. One such enquiry has resulted in a model of the project 
management of organizational change which is accessible to managers 
and which allows the identification of the competencies likely to be 
required by change agents in different contexts. Three opportunities to 
build on the tradition of context-bound project management research are 
identified. First, managerial interpretations could be extended to include 
the perspectives not only of project managers but also of other important 
organizational actors including project sponsors. Second, the possibility 
of overlap and inter-relationship between control and political agendas 
could be explored. Third, comparative analysis which is able to take 
account of differences in industry context could be undertaken. 
 45
2.4.2 Research questions, terminology and aims of thesis 
 
The final section of this chapter sets out the research questions, defines the key 




Building on the findings and assumptions discussed in this chapter two research 
questions are adopted for the study. 
 
1 What processes are employed by drivers of projects of organizational 
change? 
 
2 How are those processes determined by a project’s context? 
 
The questions are deliberately open-ended, and are selected for their potential for 





At this point it is appropriate to clarify certain aspects of terminology expressed 
by the questions. 
 
Process. In strategy process literature a common meaning of process is ‘a 
sequence of events which describes how things change over time’ (Pettigrew, 
1992: 7). In the field of operations management, and in the growing body of 
literature on ‘business process re-engineering’, process is generally viewed in 
terms of the transformation of inputs into outputs. The processual approach 
adopted in this research uses a meaning which differs from both these views. 
The perspective of process which underlies the analysis in this study is 
management process, conceived as the actions and intentions of managers who 
drive planned organizational change. 
 
Projects of organizational change and project management process. Because 
the central concern of this study is management process rather than the content 
of change or its success or failure there has been an implicit need to separate 
the content of the projects studied from the processes by which they were 
managed. The following definitions, refined over the course of the study, make 




The need to make such a distinction between projects and their management is 
central to the study, and to the conceptual framework for the analytical process 
which will be explained in Chapter 3. The problematic nature of making a clear-
cut conceptual distinction, and its partial resolution in this study by appealing to 
the dimension of level, is discussed in Chapter 9. 
 
Change drivers. Ottaway (1983) presents a historical review of the term change 
agent, tracing the use of the term from its original conceptualization as ‘outside 
agent’ by Lewin (1952) to its more recent uses in behavioural science literature 
which make less of the insider/outsider distinction. Concluding his review of ‘35 
reports of defining and research on change agents’, Ottaway presents a taxonomy 
of change agents which addresses their order of appearance in the change life 
cycle, their tasks and their characteristics. The taxonomy consists of: 
 
1 Change generators 
 (a) Key change agents 
 (b) Generators 
 (c) Patrons 
 (d) Defenders 
2 Change Implementors 
 (e) External Implementors 
 (f) External/Internal Implementors 
 (g) Internal Implementors 
3 Change Adopters 
 (h) Early Adopters 
 (i) Maintainers 
 (j) Users 
 (Ottaway, 1983: 375-376) 
 
Here, the unit of analysis in a case study of a project is the set of change drivers. 
Borrowing from Ottaway’s taxonomy, and adopting notions of project 
management and sponsorship described in Section 2.3.2, the meaning of change 
driver specifically excludes External Implementors (typically consultants, whose 
use is viewed as a key management process) and all three classes of change 
Adopters (seen as the subjects or recipients of change). It also excludes patrons 
A project of organizational change is a series of actions legitimated and 
implemented by or on behalf of one or more members of the top 
management team with the purpose of bringing about a preconceived and 
pre-articulated structural and cultural change. This is the ‘what’. 
 
Having decided to proceed with the implementation of the project, and 
having planned, to a greater or lesser extent, the series of actions, the 
management process is the adopted approach to the implementation of its 
scope. This is the ‘how’. 
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and defenders, unless they are active drivers of change. The term change drivers 
was defined in Section 1.2.1 as ‘the set of individual managers identified within 
the organization as having been responsible for conceiving and implementing the 
project’, with the members of a ‘set’ being determined from the change drivers’ 
own observations. The obvious potentially problematic aspect of this definition 
arises from the possibility that different sets of individuals may be named by 
different members of the set. It will be seen in the presentation of the case studies 
that this phenomenon does indeed arise, and that its occurrence is itself an 
important component of management process. The development of one of the key 
elements of management process as role definition, defined as ‘the clarity of 
definition of the respective project management roles and responsibilities of the 
change drivers and their delegates’, reflects this issue. 
 
Context. The final concept appearing in the research questions and requiring 
clarification is context. The lack of clarity surrounding the term in the literature 
provides an opportunity to extend more general theories of context in change 
literature. Apart from Pettigrew’s (1987a) appealing, if broad, separation of 
context into inner and outer, other more or less vague conceptualizations of 
context exist. These include Burns and Stalker’s (1961) distinction between the 
conditions giving rise to mechanistically and organismically structured 
organizations, and Buchanan and Boddy’s (1992) conception of context as high 
or low ‘vulnerability’. By orienting the lens of the researcher towards specific 
organizational characteristics this study aims to bring into focus the fuzzy 
contextual backdrop typified in change management and organizational 
development literature by, for example, Carnall’s (1995) studies of managerial 
power and organizational politics, in which the context is simply ‘change’. 
 
Aims of the thesis 
 
Up to this point the aims of the thesis have been to provide, in Chapter 1, an 
overview of the origins, scope, approach and findings of the study, and to 
review, in Chapter 2, relevant areas of literature in order to establish the 
research questions and to clarify their terminology in relation to published 
work. The aims of the rest of the thesis may be expressed in terms of what it is 
hoped the reader will learn. The specific objectives of the thesis are to provide 
answers to the following questions. 
 
1 How can a researcher build theories of management process in context 
from qualitative data using the constant comparison approach and a 
simple conceptual framework? 
 
2 What forces and directions of change are prominent in an NHS Trust 
hospital, in a newspaper group, in a multi-national construction 
contractor, and in a low-technology manufacturing environment? 
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3 What case-specific and general choices are faced by change drivers in 
the way they approach the implementation of planned change? 
 
4 How could the concept of personal control be dimensionalized and used 
to analyze and understand the cognitive processes which mediate 
between environmental stimulus and managerial response? 
 
5 What specific features of organizations and their sectors attract the 
scarce attention of change drivers, and how can these be expressed as a 
set of generic contextual characteristics? 
 
6 What is the general relationship between the three core constructs of 
context, personal control and management process? 
 
7 How can an integrated model of context/personal control/management 
process be applied as an analytical tool by practicing change drivers to 
enhance their personal control over their changing environment? 
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3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter has three purposes. First, it puts forward an argument for a 
methodological approach which fits the overall research aim, expressed in 
Chapter 1, and the research questions, set out at the end of Chapter 2. The 
second purpose is to build on that methodological approach to develop a 
suitable research design. The third is to explain the data collection, coding and 
analysis procedures. 
 
The chapter is presented in three sections. Section 3.1 explains how the 
research questions developed in Chapter 2 are a methodological starting point. 
Section 3.2 builds on the nature and role of the research questions by 
addressing a number of methodological issues. These form the basis for a 
network of choices and assumptions from which conclusions about the 
foundations of the research design follow. The research design outline is 
presented in Section 3.3, with general details of the case selection, data 
collection and data analysis procedures. The section concludes with a 




The two overwhelming conclusions of the literature review of the project 
management of organizational change presented in Chapter 2 were, first, that 
the management of projects of organizational change is an important and 
under-researched topic, and second, that approaches to change management are 
strongly context-dependent. 
 
One of the issues which will be discussed in this chapter is the respective roles 
of lay language and researcher-defined constructs. It is clear that managers’ 
perceptions of projects and their management are relevant in attempts to 
understand management processes of projects of change, but to what extent, if 
at all, should concepts and variables be pre-defined by researchers? Silverman 
(1985) warns that prior definition by researchers of concepts and hypotheses 
may divert attention away from participants’ meanings. However, Silverman 
(1993) also warns: 
 
The attempt to define things ‘as they are’ is doomed to failure. 
Without some perspective, or, at the very least, a set of animating 
questions, there is nothing to report. Contrary to crude empiricists, 
the facts never speak for themselves. (Silverman, 1993: 36, 
emphasis in original) 
 
Eisenhardt supports the need for an initial perspective, pointing out the 
importance of the initial definition, at least in broad terms, of research 
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questions, without which the researcher would become ‘overwhelmed with 
data’ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 536). The methodological starting point for this 
research is that the research will benefit from the articulation of questions. The 
need for questions, which were posed at the end of Chapter 2, is the first step in 
a methodological argument which will be further developed in Section 3.2. 
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3.2 Methodological choices 
 
This section considers a number of further methodological issues which 
provide the foundations from which the research design may be developed. The 
need for the researcher to address certain philosophical issues is first outlined 
in Section 3.2.1. Five central issues are discussed, and conclusions relating to 
the research design drawn. The appropriateness of a ‘transcendental realist’ 
perspective is argued in Section 3.2.2, and reinforced in Section 3.2.3 by 
considering the position in relation to the purpose of the research. In Section 
3.2.4 the potential advantages of a theory-building approach are considered. 
The role of lay language is identified in Section 3.2.5, with the desired 
relationship between the researcher and the researched clarified in Section 
3.2.6. The conclusions of the literature review presented in Chapter 2 and of 
this discussion of methodological choices are combined and summarized in 
Section 3.2.7. 
 
3.2.1 The need for choices 
 
Writers on management research, and on social enquiry in general, draw 
attention to the need for researchers to address certain philosophical choices. 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1991), for example, suggest three reasons 
why an understanding of philosophical issues is beneficial. First, it helps clarify 
the research design - what data to collect from where, and how that data can be 
interpreted to provide good answers to the research questions. Second, it leads 
to an understanding of the practical limitations of particular approaches. Third, 
it can enable researchers to develop designs which are outside their experience. 
Blaikie (1993) describes how the pragmatic matching of research strategies to 
the nature of a particular research project may be tempered by unconscious 
preferences arising from ontological assumptions and ideological and religious 
beliefs and values. Similarly, epistemological assumptions may result from 
personality factors such as a preference for linearity over flexibility and the 
attendant possibility of ambiguity. Further, approaches may be directed or 
constrained by professional norms imposed by the researcher’s discipline or 
academic institution. Nevertheless, although choice may effectively be reduced 
in these ways, Blaikie (1993) agrees that, in order to justify a particular 
research strategy, attention must be given to a range of issues which underlie 
the researcher’s position on methodology, including notions of how theories 
are generated and tested.  
 
3.2.2 Ontology and epistemology 
 
Ontological choice has been variously represented as a dichotomy between 
positivism and phenomenology (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1991), 
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between external reality and the product of individual consciousness (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979), between objectivism and subjectivism (Morgan and 
Smircich, 1980), and between realism and constructivism (Blaikie, 1993). 
 
The polar extremes of each pair are essentially the same: 
 
(1) Reality exists externally and independently of the observer, and 
knowledge of reality is obtained by the measurement of its properties 
using objective methods. The researcher’s task is to ‘identify causal 
explanations and fundamental laws’ (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 
1991: 23). 
 
(2) Reality is socially constructed, and consists of individuals’ interpretation 
of their circumstances. Knowledge comes from the penetration by the 
researcher of the meanings that make up the individuals’ views of 
reality. The researcher’s role is to reinterpret and reconstruct those 
meanings. 
 
For social enquirers, the purely positivist (objectivist, realist) ontology has its 
origins in the empirical methods of the natural sciences. For positivists, access 
to reality is via the senses, as opposed to reflective or intuitive processes. 
Research is conducted in a way which is theory-neutral, objective and without 
bias. Thus, in the positivist epistemology, knowledge may only be based on 
observation, which either confirms or falsifies theories. 
 
In its pure form this position is ill-suited for studying the complexity of 
organizational change projects, their management processes and the 
relationships of the latter with context. It is inappropriate because neither of 
these constructs - management process and context - is necessarily observable 
in an objective way. It is true that some elements of management process or 
context may be sufficiently predefinable, measurable and accessible by the 
researcher in the form of objective observation of events and activities, and 
may be capable of corroboration by archival data. However, quite apart from 
the obvious incursion of researcher bias in such predefinitions and the fact that 
managers’ own ideas about the processes in which they engage are excluded 
from the account, this position ignores the possibility that not all organizational 
processes or contexts are directly observable. 
 
Bhaskar (1975) argues that reality exists in three overlapping domains: the 
empirical - experiences or observed events, the actual - events whether 
observed or not, and the real - the underlying tendencies or mechanisms which 
may in a given situation give rise to events or may lie dormant, being cancelled 
out by other forces. For this study, adopting a multi-level ontological 
perspective allows the assumption that processes and contexts are real, and that 
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while some of their elements are revealed as observable events, some may be 
accessible only through the subjective accounts of managers and other 
organizational actors, and still others may only be uncovered through 
researcher speculation over observed tendencies, demanding further enquiry 
and verification. 
 
Thus researcher interpretations are ‘hypotheses, in the sense that they are 
potentially corrigible by further discoveries’ (Outhwaite, 1987: 20). Bhaskar 
(1975) sums up this ‘transcendental realist’ philosophy of science as follows: 
 
Roughly the theory advanced here is that statements of laws are 
tendency statements. Tendencies may be possessed unexercised, 
exercised unrealized, and realized unperceived by men [sic]; they 
may also be transformed (Bhaskar, 1975:18). 
 
The three domains may be represented as follows (Bhaskar, 1975:13): 
 
 Domain of real Domain of actual Domain of empirical 
Mechanisms 9   
Events 9 9  
Experiences 9 9 9 
 
Outhwaite provides a simple example of the three domains and the distinctions 
between them: 
 
My watch has a mechanism in virtue of which it has the power to, 
as we say, tell the time. But for this to happen there are three main 
conditions. First, the mechanism must have its causal powers 
intact: It must not be, for example, ‘broken’. Second, the 
mechanism must be activated: I must remember to keep my watch 
wound up and set to the correct time zone. And third, although the 
watch will, if these conditions are satisfied, ‘tell the time’ 24 hours 
a day whether or not I observe it, it will only tell me the time if I 
observe the event of the hands pointing to 11:15, an event produced 
by a latent structure or mechanism (Outhwaite, 1983: 322, 
emphasis in original). 
 
In this example the mechanism is there, whether or not it is activated to 
produce the event of the watch indicating the time, whether or not this is 
experienced. This logic may be extended to the context of research into 
processes of purposeful, intended projects of organizational change 
management. The mechanism is the existence of external and internal forces or 
stimuli which, provided they or their effects are attended to, may lead to a 
purposeful response. Without such attention the mechanism lies dormant. With 
it, a process is enacted in the form of a series of events, whether or not these are 
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experienced by the researcher. Tsoukas (1989) suggests that, through repeated 
speculation and enquiry, the researcher’s job is to merge the real and the actual 
domains. 
 
At the other extreme from the purely positivist perspective, the purely 
phenomenologist (subjectivist, constructivist) ontology takes the position that 
the reality to be investigated is internal to the individual actors in the research 
setting. All reality is therefore hidden, requiring a correspondingly subjectivist 
epistemology which emphasizes the importance of understanding how people 
construct their relationship with the world. At its extreme, the constructivist 
position denies or ignores the realist view that ‘people and organizations exist 
as relatively concrete entities’, which, as Pugh (1983: 46) has asserted, is a 
‘necessary assumption for the advancement of knowledge of the functioning of 
organizations’. However, by relaxing the ontological assumption that the world 
is a concrete structure which may only be objectively observed, and accepting 
the relevance of human subjectivity, the researcher effectively accepts the role 
of human consciousness as a mediator between stimuli (social reality) and 
responses (human action) (Gill and Johnson, 1991). The philosophical position 
implied by acceptance of this cognitive view underlies the very existence of 
management as an academic discipline. The consciousness of managers 
mediates between the reality they perceive (the mechanisms) and the actions 
they take (the events), or do not take. 
 
To summarize, the view taken here is that (a) reality exists externally, both to 
the researcher and to organizational actors, whether or not it is directly 
observable or realized in the form of experiences or events, and (b) the 
consciousness of managers determines their response to that reality. This 
combination implies that neither the purely subjective nor the purely objective 
extreme is likely to lead to a satisfactory methodological basis for dealing with 
the subtlety and complexity of change management processes and their 
relationships with change content and context. The approach will be to use the 
accounts of managers to access the actual domain and to enable the generation 
of speculative propositions about possible underlying structures and 
mechanisms that give rise to phenomena. 
 
3.2.3 Purpose of research 
 
Whether the aim of a research endeavour is described as technical, practical or 
emancipatory (Stablein, 1996) it could be argued that the ultimate purpose of 
all formal enquiry into the functioning of organizations is to benefit society. 
Taking this view implies the notion that improved understanding of 
organizations will in some way lead to some form of progress other than the 
purely academic. In turn, this latter premise presupposes the possibility of 
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‘progress’, or at the very least of limiting decline by updating existing 
knowledge to meet changed historical circumstances. 
 
Much management research is clearly driven by the often unstated aim of 
progress through the provision of prescriptive solutions intended to lead to 
improved managerial effectiveness and increased efficiency or prosperity of 
organizations and societies. There is often a tacit assumption that the desired 
output of research is, to borrow Gouldner’s (1970: 491) phrase, ‘knowledge 
conceived as information’, where what is ‘useful’ is what makes money. This is 
particularly true in relation to contributions from within the functionalist 
paradigm, where the emphasis is on prediction and control (Morgan, 1990). 
 
Despite the essentially practical, applied nature of this underlying purpose, Daft 
and Lewin ponder the apparent practical uselessness of much organization 
theory, and ask whether the field of organization studies is not irrelevant. They 
report the lack of relationship in theories of organization between usefulness 
and validity, observing that ‘the body of knowledge published in 
[organizational] academic journals has practically no audience in business or 
government’ (Daft and Lewin, 1990: 1). They suggest that, if progress is to be 
made, the needs of practitioners must not be ignored. 
 
Silverman (1993) argues that uncritical belief in ‘progress’ in society is 
dangerous, because even obvious examples of the phenomenon may, on closer 
examination, reveal themselves to be paradoxical. Further, he asserts: 
 
We should not determine our research topics in accordance with 
administrative or managerial interests. (Silverman, 1993: 7) 
 
This statement implies a purity of intent which is at odds with the practical 
needs of managers. Even if it were desirable, however, it may not be so easy 
for a researcher to stand aloof of managerial interests. Kuhn (1970) has shown 
that both the choice of research questions and the methods which are used to 
answer them are heavily influenced by notions of what constitutes ‘acceptable 
science’. Given that most management research is conducted in a business 
school context, acceptance of the influence of managerial interests is perhaps 
inevitable, and should, arguably, be embraced. 
 
Working, then, from the premise that improved knowledge of processes of 
change in organizations is desirable, one may consider the purpose of a 
particular piece of research at another level. Blaikie (1993) places research 
purposes on a continuum which relates broadly to the existing level of 
understanding of the topic and the pre-existence of theories. From the most 
basic level of exploration of a phenomenon which is not at all well understood, 
purposes range through description, understanding, explanation and change to 
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evaluation of change. The positivist view is that through description of 
observed regularities the researcher can make explanatory generalizations, 
within certain defined limits, of relationships between variables. The purpose 
of the generalizations then becomes prediction. The position taken in this 
research aligns with that of Bhaskar (1975), for whom the social world cannot 
be experimentally closed and does not operate according to a set of scientific 
laws, and therefore predictive certainty is not possible. In the social world, 
observed regularities can do no more than to express tendencies caused by 
underlying generative mechanisms which may or may not be brought into play 
in a given situation. It is argued that the management processes which are 
adopted for a particular project in a particular context are generated by 
tendencies which link those management processes to their context. The 
exploration and description of processes, and the discovery of those tendencies 
or underlying mechanisms are the aims of this research. 
 
3.2.4 Theory construction 
 
One of the fundamental methodological issues concerns the respective roles of 
theory and data. Which comes first? Should data be used to test theories or 
build them? Should a-priori constructs be used or should a ‘clean slate’ 
approach be adopted to allow theoretical flexibility in emerging research areas? 
Parkhe makes a case that, in organizational research, there is too much 
emphasis on testing existing theories. He describes the dominant approach in 
management research as ‘theory testing-deductive-objective-nomothetic-
quantitative-outsider’ (Parkhe, 1993: 236). He asserts that research into 
organizational processes is ‘pre-paradigmatic’, that there is no well established 
research tradition which should claim dominance, and that it is therefore 
appropriate to build new theories from empirical data, to break out of current 
conceptual boxes and build new logic. Criticizing the tendency for social 
enquirers to adopt too readily the dominant research paradigm of natural 
science, Gouldner (1954) warns that sociology ‘may miss a good deal if it tries 
to be too quantitative too soon’. Daft and Lewin (1990: 2) echo the idea that 
there is a danger of trivialization ‘when convergent thinking overtakes a field 
before it has matured’. Burrell mocks the very idea that the field of 
organization theory will ever ‘mature’ in this sense. He asserts that the pre-
paradigmatic status of the field does not mean that it is ‘awaiting its normal 
science phase with bated breath’ (Burrell, 1996: 648). This view is implied by 
Morgan (1986) who argues that the efforts of managers are attempts to meet 
particular historical circumstances, not the ultimate or most highly developed 
form. 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) too observes that most empirical studies are of a deductive, 
hypothesis-testing nature, and lead from theory to data. She calls for greater use 
of theory-building, inductive case study research in situations where research is 
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in early stages and existing theories seem inadequate. Mintzberg states that the 
complexity of organizations calls for exploratory methodologies, adding that 
researchers have ‘paid dearly for an obsession with rigour - too many results 
have been significant only in the statistical sense of the word’ (Mintzberg, 
1979b: 583). Swamidass (1991) comments on the unbalanced research 
emphasis in the field of operations management, with too much deductive 
research, the aim of which is prescription, and too little descriptive, empirical 
investigation. He too argues in favour of theory-generating research, both in 
under-researched topics and in providing new perspectives in over-researched 
topics. 
 
The general argument expressed by these writers is that too much of 
management research is deductive and theory-testing, characterized by the 
premature application of quantitative methods, and not enough is inductive and 
theory-building, using more qualitative approaches. The literature review 
described in Chapter 2 confirms the relevance of this view to the subject matter 
of this research. A theory building approach is adopted, with the integrated 
processes of data collection, coding and analysis described in Section 3.3 
guided by the methods of Glaser and Strauss (1967). The constant comparative 
method of these researchers is adopted, whereby concepts generated in one 
setting can be progressively explored and evaluated in other settings, enabling a 
level of generality to be established. 
 
This research takes the stance that even in theory-building mode a researcher 
must have a starting framework. As Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1991) 
have argued, ‘there is no such thing as presuppositionless research.’ Apart from 
the obvious impossibility of complete theory-neutrality organizational 
researchers attempting to operate from a ‘clean slate’ would be ‘confronted 
with a potentially-infinite number of attributes to operationalize’ (Downey and 
Ireland, 1979). Thus it is important to start with a framework (Miles, 1979), 
with broad constructs specified a-priori (Eisenhardt, 1989), and without regard 
for discipline boundaries (Pugh, 1983). Following this reasoning a simple 
conceptual framework was found to be vital in giving direction and rapid 
advancement to the analytical process. The framework is presented in Section 
3.3. 
 
3.2.5 Lay language 
 
Another basic methodological issue is the role of lay language. In a theory 
building study, what managers have to say about how they manage change is 
clearly an important source of data, if for no other reason than it allows the 
possibility of access to domains of reality beyond the immediately observable. 
However, even among those who do accept that lay language has a role, views 
differ in three important ways. 
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First, to what extent should the researcher’s ‘foreign’ concepts be allowed to be 
imported into the manager’s account before it loses its integrity and ceases to 
be authentic and useful (Blaikie, 1993)? The common answer to this question is 
that, by gaining the agreement of the organizational actors, the researcher’s 
account is, for this purpose, validated (Gill and Johnson, 1991). Mintzberg 
(1979b) takes a more ‘researcher as expert’ view, pointing out that it is the 
researcher’s job to measure or categorize things that are really happening in 
organizations, and that the researcher should not expect the manager to do the 
abstracting. This view aligns with the approach of Glaser and Strauss (1967) 
for whom concepts are not necessarily strictly derived from lay language, but 
are simply labels constructed by the researcher to organize the data. Thus 
theories are both acceptable and desirable provided they are plausible and 
understandable to the managers from whose words they have been developed. 
 
Second, generalization means decontextualization. To what extent is it 
permissible to go beyond the organizational actor’s account to some form of 
generalization (Blaikie, 1993)? Pugh puts forward the positivist view, stressing 
that ‘generalizable knowledge is based on systematic, comparable and 
replicative observation and measurement’ (Pugh, 1983: 48). For Pugh, 
therefore, as long as generalization meets these criteria it is permissible. This 
common ideal, that to generalize beyond one’s data is an ‘intellectual 
immorality’, is scorned by Mintzberg, who claims that, on the contrary, ‘not 
generalizing beyond one’s data is an intellectual immorality’ (Mintzberg, 
1979a: 584), since only by doing so can the ‘creative leap’ be made. This 
research is not, at least at present, concerned with the discovery of statistically-
significant relationships between variables. It cannot therefore depend on 
adherence to the highly developed rules of the scientific tradition for any 
claims to generalizability. It is concerned with the generation of theories, 
within the limits of generalizability defined by the contexts of the study. 
Following Bryman (1988), cases are generalizable to theoretical propositions 
rather than to populations or universes. 
 
Third, are lay accounts open to interpretation or correction? Views on this issue 
range from a straight denial (the position of ethnomethodology) to a claim that 
social enquirers should be able to give a different account of reality than that 
presented by social actors (Blaikie, 1993). The approach of this research may 
be described by Giddens’ (1987) notion of ‘double hermeneutic’, whereby 
informants’ concepts and meanings must first be translated into descriptions, 
with those descriptions then being further translated into theories. 
 
3.2.6 The researcher and the researched 
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Views on the desired relationship between the researcher and the researched 
range from fully detached observer to fully engaged participant. Questions of 
whether it is possible or desirable for researchers to remain independent of 
events have ethical and political, as well as methodological aspects (Blaikie, 
1993), all of which may affect the choice of research strategy. Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe and Lowe (1991) explain how the action research strategy has 
developed as a way of avoiding the problem of whether complete independence 
can be maintained in organizational research. If the researcher’s involvement in 
a process of organizational change is seen as the best way of learning about the 
organization the question of independence is irrelevant. Given the nature of this 
study complete detachment is clearly impossible, but also control over events is 
limited. Although this is not an action research intervention, it is acknowledged 
that most managers do not freely give their time to talk to researchers unless 
they feel they have something to learn from the experience or its outcome. The 
‘involved’ position of Feminism, described by Blaikie (1993) provides a useful 
position from which partial-involvement studies of organizations such as this 
may be considered. In this view: 
 
Social scientists should not be detached and impersonal but should 
use their thoughts, feelings and intuitions as part of the research 
process. Social research should mediate the experiences of the 
researcher and the researched; it should facilitate understanding 
and change in their lives and situations. (Blaikie, 1993: 210-211) 
 
If the aim is progress through improved understanding, therefore, 
opportunities for researcher and researched to learn at all stages in the 
research process, not just on the publication of finished findings, should 




The theory of organizations, which includes the field of this study, is in 
an evolutionary stage, and therefore advancement of theory will benefit 
from research which moves from exploration through description to 
understanding. 
 
The strategic choices and assumptions which have derived from a review 
of literature on project management and the management of projects of 
organizational change (Chapter 2) and from a review of methodological 
issues (Chapter 3) are listed below. 
 
The literature shows that: 
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1 There is a lack of empirical case studies of projects of 
organizational change which allow for the comparative analysis 
of processes between industries. 
 
2 There is a need for more studies to be theory-building and 
interdisciplinary. 
 
This research is based on the following assumptions: 
 
3 Reality exists externally in three overlapping domains, each of 
which is accessible via different processes: the recording of 
observable events (the empirical domain), archival data and the 
subjective accounts of organizational actors’ conscious responses 
to their reality (the actual domain), and creative speculation about 
underlying tendencies or mechanisms (the real domain) which 
must be supported by data from the empirical and actual domains 
or otherwise modified or discarded; 
 
4 Improved knowledge of organizational change management 
processes will ultimately be of potential benefit to society; 
 
5 Managerial influence in the selection of the research topic and in 
the identification of cases is both necessary and desirable; 
 
6 A degree of researcher involvement in the change process is 
inevitable and should be welcomed as an opportunity to facilitate 
the understanding of both researcher and researched; 
 
7 The starting point of theory-building research is a set of research 
questions. It should be supported by the a-priori specification of broad 
constructs in a preliminary conceptual framework, but not researcher-
imposed detailed variables or connections. 
 
In the next section it will be explained how these conclusions were 
developed into an operationalizable research design. 
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3.3 Research design and methods 
 
This section builds on the choices and assumptions of Section 3.2 to develop 
details of the research design and methods. In Section 3.3.1 it is argued that, for 
the purposes of this research, the case study approach offers advantages over 
other strategies. The broad parameters of the research design and 
considerations of case selection are presented in Section 3.3.2. Issues of data 
collection are discussed in Section 3.3.3. Details of the data analysis procedures 
which were developed and refined over the course of the study are described in 
Section 3.3.4. Finally, in Section 3.3.5 there is a discussion of issues of quality 
and rigour. 
 
3.3.1 The case study approach 
 
Accepted ways of doing research into organizational processes include 
experiments, action research, surveys, histories, the analysis of archival 
information, case studies, and ethnographies (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 
1991; Yin, 1989). Within each approach are various ways of collecting and 
analysing data. Each strategy has its own inherent strengths and weaknesses. The 
choice of an appropriate strategy and its development into an operationalized 
research design will depend on variety of inter-related technical and practical 
issues. 
 
The research strategy selection process is far from clear cut. Attempts by writers 
to classify and arrange strategies show that there is considerable overlap between 
the different approaches and their purposes. Phillips and Pugh’s (1987) 
categorization of approaches into exploratory research, testing-out research or 
problem-solving research, for example, tends to overlook the possibility that some 
research designs will contain elements of all three of these types. Yin (1989) 
points out the common misconception that case studies should be used for 
exploration, surveys and histories for description and experiments for explanation. 
He argues that it is wrong to arrange strategies hierarchically according to their 
purpose in this way, since each approach has been used for all three purposes. 
Other social enquirers warn that it is not simply a question of selecting and 
applying a prescribed method. Weick (1989: 519) asserts that theory development 
is not a mechanistic process, but is ‘intuitive, blind, wasteful, serendipitous and 
creative’. Mills (1959: 20) warns against conceptions of social science ‘as a set of 
bureaucratic techniques which inhibit social enquiry by ‘methodological’ 
pretensions’. Morgan (1983) suggests a similar attitude when he points out the 
danger that excessive preoccupation with labelling and classifying the various 
research methods can have the effect of constraining or diverting the imagination 
away from the actual research territory and from ‘the logics of engagement that 
link researcher and researched’. 
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Nevertheless, a broad classification of approaches is helpful to the extent that it 
enables the early elimination of unsuitable strategies. In Section 3.2 it was argued 
that the research questions are concerned with exploration, description and 
understanding. This implies that a survey approach using researcher-defined 
constructs would, at least initially, be inappropriate. There is little or no control 
over events, which rules out experimental and action research strategies. There is 
a need to focus as far as possible on contemporary events. This would tend to rule 
out histories, although given the time constraints and the long durations of many 
projects of change the inevitability of at least partial retrospection and the need to 
attempt to reconstruct the past must be acknowledged. This broad elimination 
leaves a narrower selection of defined methods or approaches, including the 
analysis of archival information, ethnographies and case studies. The problem of 
classification is further illustrated by the lack of a clear distinction between each 
of the first two of these approaches and the third, since both archival and 
ethnographic data may be used in case studies. 
 
Miles and Huberman define a case as ‘a phenomenon occurring in a bounded 
context’ (1994: 25). Consideration of Yin’s more specific definition tends to 
confirm the potential suitability of the case study approach for this study: 
 
 A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context; when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used. (Yin, 
1989: 23) 
 
The contemporary phenomenon is the process by which a project of 
organizational change is managed. Its real life context is the project, which is part 
of the organization, which in turn is part of the organization’s sector or external 
environment. The boundaries between a project and its organizational setting 
(which together form the context) and its management process (the phenomenon 
of interest) will be particularly indistinct in cases of organizational change. Taking 
the last part of Yin’s definition it may be argued that a case study could include 
diaries, interviews, archival data and ethnographies. 
  
Other researchers into context-bound processes of organizational change claim 
that an interdisciplinary case study approach offers attractive advantages over 
other research strategies. Child and Smith (1987), for example, reason that the 
dynamic complexity of organizational change and the plurality of possible 
perspectives from which to study the phenomenon make the case study 
approach suitable, since: 
Other types of investigation are unlikely to furnish sufficient 
insight into the complex interrelationships between factors 
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identified by the various contributory theoretical perspectives or 
to deal with the dynamics involved. (Child and Smith, 1987: 565) 
Further support for the case study approach to research into change processes, 
this time in the context of project management, is provided by Morris and 
Hough (1987). In a study of factors affecting performance on eight major 
projects, they chose the case study approach for two reasons. First, it allows a 
longitudinal perspective, which, as others have argued, is the best way to study 
change (see for example Pettigrew, 1987b; Van de Ven and Poole, 1990; 
Pettigrew, Ferlie and McKee, 1992). Second, it does not confine the 
researchers’ attention to a narrow, single-discipline perspective but enables the 
full complexity of organizational, managerial, political and other dynamics to 
be appreciated and compared across cases. 
 
3.3.2 Research design 
 
Having selected the case study approach as appropriate to this study it is 
necessary to define certain broad parameters of the study’s design. Yin (1989) 
lists five important components of a case study research design, considered 
below. 
 
1 The study’s questions. The research questions, developed in Chapter 2, 
are concerned with exploring, describing and understanding what 
management processes are enacted and how they arise. The what 
question implied by this statement is not concerned with ‘how much’ or 
‘how many’, but with exploration and the development of theories and 
propositions for further enquiry. The how question is similarly 
exploratory. These types of question confirm the suitability of the case 
study approach (see Yin, 1989: 17). The questions themselves form the 
first important component of the study’s design. 
 
2 The study’s propositions, if any. Exploratory studies have a legitimate 
reason for not having initial propositions, since the development of 
propositions is the aim of the research. Yin argues, however, that even 
propositionless exploratory studies should have a purpose, and that 
instead of propositions the research design should be clear about the 
study’s purpose. Here, the purpose is to develop a plausible 
classification of the categories of organizational change project 
management process which is sufficiently robust to be applicable in a 
variety of contexts, in the sense that extent of employment of each 
category of process in a particular instance can be understood in relation 
to its circumstances. 
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3 The study’s unit(s) of analysis. Yin observes that failure adequately to 
define exactly what is ‘the case’ is a problem which has plagued many 
investigators. Is the primary unit of analysis the individual manager? Is 
it the decision, or the management process, or the project, or the 
organization? In a multiple case design, where the aim is cross-case 
comparability, defining the boundaries of the case is particularly 
important. Lofland and Lofland (1971) offer a comprehensive list of 
possible units of sociological analysis including meanings, practices, 
episodes, encounters, roles, relationships, groups, organizations, 
settlements, worlds and lifestyles. Given the study’s focus on change 
driver perspectives the unit of analysis is the group of managers who 
were responsible for initiating and driving the project of change (the 
change drivers). Clearly it is possible that the composition of the group 
will change over time. There is a further issue that some individuals will 
perceive a different group of change drivers from others. These 
considerations need to be taken into account in defining, for the 
purposes of data collection, which individuals in an organization are the 
change drivers of a particular project. 
 
 The approach taken here is to allow the change drivers themselves to 
identify the members of their group, with any anomalies or 
disagreements among them investigated as a phenomenon of interest 
which is relevant to the study. In addition, in two earlier cases a wider 
selection of organizational actors is allowed to contribute to the data, in 
order to see whether this makes possible any substantial additions to the 
understanding of the management process. 
 
4 The logic linking the data to the propositions. This component of the 
research design is concerned with what is to be done after the data have 
been collected. In the absence of pre-existing propositions (see point 2 
above) the component may be considered as the relationship between the 
research aims, the data and the emerging propositions which will be the 
output of the research and which will offer the possibility of further 
investigation. The theory building approach and the use of the constant 
comparison method is described in detail in Section 3.3.4. 
 
5 The criteria for interpreting the findings. In quantitative studies the 
criteria for interpreting findings are highly developed, and are based on 
well established tests of statistical significance. Such tests are able to 
conclude, for example, that a particular coincidence of occurrence of 
two or more variables in a particular sample is unlikely to have 
happened purely by chance and is likely to have arisen as a result of an 
inherent correlational relationship between the variables. In qualitative 
studies such as this, where quantification of variables is not an aim, there 
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can be no such precise way of setting criteria for interpreting findings. 
Nevertheless, Yin reasons that an exploratory research design should be 
clear about the criteria by which the exploration will be judged 
successful. These criteria are as follows: 
 
(a) The classification of management processes should as far as 
possible be mutually exclusive, complete and parsimonious. 
 
(b) The classification should be capable of describing the 
management process in a variety of organizational contexts. 
 
(c) The extent of employment of each component of process at any 
time should be capable of comparative description (as opposed to 
absolute measurement). 
 
(d) The extent of employment of each component of process at any 
time should be capable of a descriptive relationship with context. 
 
(e) Each written case study should be understandable, plausible and, 
ideally, informative, to the organizational actors from whose 
accounts it was taken. 
 
Having defined the underlying components of the research design, including 
the unit of analysis, it is necessary to consider a number of technical and 
practical issues of case selection before beginning the process of data 
collection. These issues are posed as four questions, discussed below. 
 
1 How many case studies should there be? Yin (1989) describes how 
single case designs are appropriate when the case represents a critical 
opportunity to test a well formulated theory, or when the case is unique 
or extreme, or when it presents an extraordinary opportunity to study a 
phenomenon. Multiple case designs, on the other hand, are used for 
comparing different instances of the same phenomenon, the aim of this 
study. Yin (1989) distinguishes between the sampling logic which is 
applied to survey designs, wherein statistical significance is related to 
sample size, and the replication logic of multiple case study designs, 
which is analogous to a series of experiments. With multiple case studies 
cross-experiment, rather than within-experiment design and logic is 
called for. 
 
 The question of the ideal number of cases is complex. At the practical 
level it relates to the time and other resources of the researcher which 
must be used in a trade off between the depth of analysis made possible 
by studying fewer cases and the possibility for replication and 
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theoretical saturation offered by more cases. Yin (1989: 58) describes 
how researchers should be guided by their ‘sense of the complexity of 
the realm of external validity’. In other words, in relation to this study 
the less likely it is that the context of a project will affect its 
management process the more explicitly the relevant conditions of 
context should be articulated and the more cases should be needed to 
confirm or disconfirm propositions. In Chapter 2 it was seen that such 
cross-industry comparisons as exist in the literature suggest that the 
opposite should be the case. Context-bound variation between cases is 
expected, and therefore only a few cases should be needed to make 
explicit the presence or absence of processes, their dimensions, and their 
links with context. 
 
 Another issue which must be addressed as part of the overall question of 
number of cases is whether the design should be multiple-case holistic 
or multiple case embedded (Yin 1989: 46). For the purposes of this 
study the latter implies studying more than one case in the same 
organization. To the extent that this is possible it would clearly be a 
desirable feature of the study, since it allows the researcher to take 
account of the effect of variations in process arising from the nature of 
the project as well as from the nature of the organization. It is therefore 
argued that the ideal design should be of the embedded kind. 
 
 Taking into account these considerations the initial conception of the 
research design was to conduct eight case studies in all, with two studies 
in each of four widely different organizations. Thus contextual 
considerations from the literature such as private/public sector, 
service/manufacturing sector could be explored, with the possibility of 
taking into account variations within an organization arising from 
differences between specific projects. 
 
2 To what extent should the cases be preselected at the start of the 
study? The case selection choice facing a researcher in a multiple case 
design is, at one extreme, to define in advance every specific 
organization and every project of change to be studied and to conduct 
the studies either simultaneously or sequentially. At the other extreme is 
the alternative of selecting only the first case, which is completed before 
selecting the second, and so on. This second option has the advantage 
that important but unforeseen features of each successive case are 
allowed to steer the course of the study. The data collection is thus 
controlled by the emerging theory. Miles and Huberman (1994) 
acknowledge the advantage of such flexibility, but point out that 
research designs which are too ‘loose’ can be unfocused and 
unmanageable. Designs which are too unstructured run the risk of 
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leading nowhere, particularly when there is no clear conceptual 
framework. Miles and Huberman suggest that both extremes should be 
avoided. The approach of this study has been to provide the binding 
structure of clearly defined questions and a common analytical 
framework, and to allow the theoretical sampling process to operate 
within that structure. As will be shown in Chapters 4 to 7 the approach 
was successful in that, in practice, findings from earlier cases had 
important consequences for selection of later ones. 
 
 There are two practical considerations which anyway limit case 
preselection. First, the limited resources of a lone researcher are likely to 
restrict the feasibility of conducting simultaneous multiple case studies. 
Second, over the course of a two-year programme of fieldwork it would 
be difficult to negotiate and plan access to organizations more than a few 
months in advance. The longer term instability of personnel and 
business plans in any organization is unlikely to allow such a strategy. 
 
3 How should the first case be selected? During the first year of the 
research pre-study interviews were conducted with six individual 
managers at different levels in a variety of organizations with diverse 
functions and sizes, ranging from 100 to more than 10,000 employees in 
an organizational unit. Each manager was in some way concerned with 
the project management of current or proposed organizational change 
initiatives. The interviewees included a project manager in Midland 
Bank plc’s information systems department, the deputy CEO of 
Computervision (CAD/CAM software developers), the general manager 
of BA Engineering, a project manager in National Rivers Authority, the 
human resources director of Glaxo UK, and a senior officer in Thames 
Valley Police. 
 
 The intended purpose of these interviews was, first, to practice the skill 
of open-ended interviewing, second, to clarify the aims of the study by 
directing attention to managers’ perceptions of issues of managing 
projects of change, and third, to help identify the kind of organization 
which might be suitable for the main part of the study. 
 
 As far as case selection issues were concerned the conclusions of the 
pre-study interviews were: 
 
(a) There appeared to be no shortage of suitable opportunities for 
research access. This suggested a degree of flexibility of choice in 




(b) The change projects in the larger organizations were clearly far 
more complex and wide-ranging and would require a proportional 
increase in the number of informants to be interviewed, and in the 
overall time required for the study, than the smaller organizations, 
where the projects were relatively straightforward and self-
contained. 
 
(c) The higher up the organizational hierarchy the informants the 
more information about the change processes they seemed to 
possess1. 
 
 It was therefore decided to aim the main part of the study at medium-
sized organizations or sub-organizations (around 1000 employees) 
which were involved in projects of organizational change and where 
access at or near the top level was available. This choice of organization 
size was intended to ensure that the projects would be neither 
unmanageably large nor insignificant. These were some of the guiding 
principles behind the selection of Ealing Hospital NHS Trust as the site 
for the first studies (see Chapter 4 for further details of how it was 
selected). 
 
4 How should further cases be selected? From the outset of the study it 
was decided that the second and subsequent organizations would be 
selected for their dissimilarity from the previous cases, guided by the 
emerging theoretical considerations arising from previous cases, and for 
their overall similarity of size. The extent to which this policy was 
successful is explored in the results chapters, Chapters 4 to 7. 
 
3.3.3 Data collection 
 
Case data could include diaries, interviews, archival data and ethnographies, 
involving either overt or covert observation over time. A longitudinal 
ethnographic approach is, in theory, particularly attractive, offering depth in an 
established way of accessing ‘the meanings that give form and content to social 
processes’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 2). However, because of the need to 
study multiple cases of change projects, each one of which could span many 
months and involve several individuals the ethnographic approach was ruled out 
as infeasible early in the research process. 
 
Diaries offer the significant advantage of a longitudinal approach to 
participants’ perceptions without the need for the researcher’s prolonged 
                                                          
1  Research by Ashburner et. al. (1996) and by Ketchen et. al. (1996) supports this observation. 
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presence. However, their use was discounted for similar practical reasons. It 
was felt that it would be unreasonable to expect several groups of senior 
managers independently or collectively to record their thoughts, either in 
writing or on audio tape, over a period of months for a doctoral student project. 
 
The main source of data was therefore interviews, supplemented by archival 
data. Interviews were held in each of the six cases with the individual members 
of the identified group of change drivers over the course of part of the project. 
This allowed a certain degree of longitudinality, although it should be made 
clear that this was not a longitudinal study in the true sense of allowing the data 
collection period to extend over the full course of each project. The form of the 
interviews was designed as far as possible to avoid what Gill and Johnson 
(1991) describe as the constraining of the respondent by the prompts of the 
interviewer. Prompts were kept to a minimum, and were used simply to probe 
interesting avenues of thought and to steer the course of the interview if it 
strayed too far from the subject. To this extent, therefore, the interviewees were 
allowed to influence the course of the research. Their words not only provided 
the data of each particular case but also influenced the theoretical sampling 
process which shaped the choice of later cases. 
 
Detailed information about the processes of gaining research access, selecting 
respondents and conducting interviews is provided in the introduction to each 
case study. Generally, however, a preliminary interview was first held with the 
most senior manager possible in each of the four organizations. In three of the 
four this was the chief executive. The purpose of the preliminary interviews 
was to explain the broad purposes of the study, to establish the existence of 
current or recently completed projects of change as perceived by the informant, 
to make a preliminary identification of the projects’ boundaries and the list of 
individuals comprising the group of change drivers, and to confirm the 
possibility of access to interview them. Each change driver was subsequently 
interviewed one or more times, with the researcher remaining open to the 
possibility that the identities of further key informants would emerge from the 
interviews. 
 
All interviews were recorded on audio tape and fully transcribed by the 
researcher. The tapes were kept for repeated listening to verbal clues such as 
voice tone and emphasis. There was no reluctance on the part of any of the 
interviewees to be recorded. It was apparent that, for many managers, being the 
subject of an open-ended interview was a new and enjoyable experience. Some 
even expressed thanks at the end of the interview. The tape recorder was not 
produced immediately at the beginning of the interview, but after the 
respondent had been responding for one or two minutes to a preliminary ‘warm 
up’ question about their background. With this approach, developed in the pre-
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study interviews, the tape recorder’s introduction and use seemed scarcely 
noticed. 
 
Further details of the interviewees and the interview process, and of archival 
data, are given in each of the case studies, presented in Chapters 4 to 7. 
 
3.3.4 Data analysis 
 
Building on the argument developed in Section 3.2.4 (Theory construction) the 
starting point for data analysis was a simple theoretical framework. Following 
Pettigrew’s (1987a) influential work on strategic change processes the 
framework consisted of four broad constructs - external and internal context, 
content and process - which could be used to provide an initial structure for the 
purpose of data coding. The four constructs have been represented both as the 
axes of a three-dimensional grid (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991) or arranged 
around a triangle, as in Figure 3.1 below (Pettigrew, 1987a; 1987b). 
 
      external context 
 
 




  content     process 
 
Figure 3.1: Pettigrew’s (1987a; 1987b) conceptual framework for 
analyzing organizational change 
 
A further possible inter-relationship between these underlying constructs was 
developed which provided an intuitively-appealing initial conceptual 
framework for development of data. The framework (Figure 3.2) shows a 
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Figure 3.2: An alternative representation of the constructs in Pettigrew’s 
(1987a; 1987b) conceptual framework for analyzing organizational change 
 
In this alternative representation the inner context (the organization) exists 
within and is part of the outer context (the organization’s environment). The 
change content (the project), exists within and is part of the organization. The 
management process is part of the project. 
 
The approach which was used to develop from this initial framework to the 
conclusions of the study was informed by the constant comparison approach to 
generating grounded theory. The basis of the method is joint coding and 
analysis, in four stages (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 105-113): 
 
1 Comparing incidents applicable to each category. By comparing each 
incident with previous incidents in the same category, theoretical 
properties of the category were generated. An example was the category 
labelled formality, concerned with the formal definition and 
communication of project plans and controls. Three properties of this 
category were generated by the constant comparative process. The 
dimensions of each property reflected the spectrum of formality. 
 
 Management process category: formality 
  Property  Dimensions 
  level of detail broad ... detailed 
  flexibility  flexible ... rigid 
 pre-definition emergent ... predetermined 
 
 By considering the range of properties and dimensions, the conditions 
under which they were pronounced or minimized, their major 
consequences and their relation to other categories, writing memos as 
thoughts occurred, theoretical properties were developed. It emerged, for 
example, that one of the reasons for high levels of predetermination was 
the desire to objectify the project. 
 
2 Integrating categories and their properties. As the study progressed the 
focus developed ‘from comparing incident with incident to comparing 
incident with properties of the category that resulted from initial 
comparisons of incidents’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 109). Continuing 
the formality example, later incidents were compared with the property 
that formality was avoided under certain circumstances, and that willful 
avoidance was a property which then became integrated into the 
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analysis. By the end of the study the properties themselves had become 
integrated. The properties for formality were combined into a single 
property relating simply to its extent of enaction, with avoidance being 
linked to dimensions of personal control. 
 
3 Delimiting the theory. As the analysis progressed, what started as a 
seemingly overwhelming mass of qualitative data became reduced, 
familiar and manageable. This compaction occurred at both the levels of 
the theory and the categories. 
 
 The theory solidified, as modifications became fewer and fewer and the 
process of integration progressed. The cross-case analysis took this 
process to its conclusion as the task became one of accounting for 
exceptions and building these into the propositions, which were both 
close to the data and generalized to all cases. Thus two major 
requirements for theory, parsimony of variables and formulation and 
wide scope of applicability (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 110) were 
approached. 
 
 As theoretical saturation occurred the list of categories and properties 
was reduced, allowing the analysis to become more focused and 
selective. Towards the end of the last case it was apparent that further 
incidents were only adding bulk to the coded data and little to the 
theory. 
 
4 Writing theory. The coded data, memos and theory were written in the 
form of the six case studies, progressively refining the analytical focus. 
The major themes of the theory were expressed in the propositions. 
 
The constant comparative method has been applied in a variety of research 
settings. One example, which follows closely their original conception, is 
Glaser and Strauss’s own research on status passage (Glaser and Strauss, 
1971). More recent organizational studies have used the approach in a more or 
less rigid or explicit fashion, including Rothschild-Whitt (1979), Kram and 
Isabella (1985), Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991), Gersick (1994) and Brown and 
Eisenhardt (1997). Each of these studies adapts the basic grounded theory 
constant comparative approach to the researchers’ specific purposes, 
confirming Bogdan and Taylor’s (1984) observation that all researchers 
develop their own ways of analyzing qualitative data. 
 
The position of constant comparison as a general approach in relation to other 
qualitative methods is made explicit by Glaser and Strauss (1967), and may be 
summarized as follows: 
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1 Content analysis approaches (quantification of qualitative data). 
  
2 No coding, merely inspect data for new properties of theoretical 
categories. This is the approach of phenomenology as described by 
Miles and Huberman (1994). 
  
3 Constant comparison, which combines the explicit coding procedure 
of content analysis with the style of theory development of 
phenomenology. 
  
4 Analytic induction, which uses the approach of constant comparison but 
goes a step further by both generating and testing theories of causes by 
seeking to account for specific behaviour. 
 
Turner (1981: 226) observes that published studies using the constant 
comparison approach tend to lack ‘detailed information on exactly how 
qualitative data should be processed in order to develop grounded theory’. This 
issue is addressed below, with an explicit description of the use of the 
conceptual framework and the process of data analysis, condensed into a series 
of eight steps, with examples. Although the process is presented linearly it 
should be remembered that the entire process was highly iterative and ‘messy’, 
both within and between cases.  
 
1 Interview transcripts were done as soon as possible after each interview 
to allow the theoretical sampling process to operate within, as well as 
between, cases. Transcripts were reviewed and all examples of the four 
core codes of the conceptual framework were entered in the transcript 
word processor file2. The four codes are listed below with examples of 
data from Case 1. 
 
 [EXCON] (External context) ‘... the concept of business planning is 
relatively new to the health service, but is now a vital and fundamental 
process in terms of managing in the market.’ 
 [INCON] (Internal context) ‘The culture as it was before was very much 
a case of widespread delegation upwards of problems...’ 
 [PROJ] (Project) ‘...we have formulated a new set of arrangements which 
came into place on the first of October...’ 
 [MP] (Management process) ‘... so we brought in a couple of people who 
had a long track record of working with clinical directors...’ 
 
                                                          
2  Use of a proprietary qualitative data analysis software package ‘NUD.IST’, was tried in the early 
stages of analysis. It was found to place unwanted constrictions on the analytical process and was 
abandoned in favour of the comparative freedom and flexibility offered by conventional word 
processing software. 
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2 Each occurrence of a code was attributed a category which characterized 
its nature and which closely fitted the data. The coding and 
categorization scheme was developed and modified until all relevant 
data from all sources in the case and in previous cases were accounted 
for. Data categories, including the six core categories of management 
process, were developed as comprehensive and yet parsimonious 
expressions of each concept, using the following criteria: 
 
 (a) centrality 
 (b) frequent appearance in data 
 (c) relate easily to other categories 
 (d) clear implications for more general theory 
 
 An example of an early category from Case 1 was the hospital 
clinicians’ possession of power of veto over management decisions. This 
internal context category, originally coded [INCON-SUBJECTS-
EXISTING POWER] clearly met the criteria. 
 
2 Each category was given an operational definition in the form of a 
specification for putting further instances in the category. 
 
3 To aid the process of understanding the relationship between categories 
chronologies were developed for each project and key events shown on 
a time-scaled diagram. 
 
4 Each specific instance of a category was numbered and summarized in 
the form of a freehand entry in the appropriate code section of the 
theoretical framework sketched on a large sheet of paper. Links were 
traced between instances in different codes. The inverses and opposites 
of categories were considered, with each instance of core categories (i.e. 
those related to management process) further coded (+) or (-). 
 
5 ‘Memos’ (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Miles and Huberman, 1994) 
were entered into the transcript as they occurred during the process of 
transcription, coding and categorizing data. Memos were developed 
supporting or refuting emerging propositions regarding connections or 
relationships between categories. An example of a passage from one of 
the final analytical iterations of an interview to which codes, categories, 
instances and memos have been added is as follows: 
 
 I’m married as well, and what happens is my wife starts to write 
down a list of things I should do, and, you know, there’s 
plumbing, you know, perhaps the radiator’s leaking or 
something... and in the end, the list becomes so long I get so 
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daunted by it that, you know, I almost lose heart, you know, I feel 
that she’s adding things on the end of the list faster than I’m 
knocking things off the beginning of the list. I think that if we 
start to say to people that these are all the things that we’re going 
to do, people will say it’s... oh, forget it, you know [KH13 
FEELING-COMPETENCE (-) MP-FORMAL (-) NOTE: 
REASON FOR LOW FORMALITY, PEOPLE WILL BE 
FRIGHTENED BY WHAT THE DRIVERS WANT TO 
ACHIEVE. ANOTHER REASON IS THAT IF YOU WRITE IT 
DOWN AND THEN DON’T ACHIEVE IT IT’S SOMEHOW A 
FORMALIZATION OF FAILURE.], KH14 we’ll never do that. I 
think what we have to do is focus on each thing at a time [MP-
FORMAL (-) PREDETERMINED SEQUENCE A DIMENSION 
OF FORMALITY] 
 
6 Using the word processor’s capacity to search, retrieve and change 
character strings, codes and categories were grouped together to verify 
their usefulness and to establish properties and dimensions of each one. 
In the early stages there was a great deal of change to the coding 
structure and to the emerging concepts and themes. Inadequate codes, 
categories, properties and dimensions were discarded or combined. 
Instances were accumulated to the point of saturation, at which it 
became clear which future instances would be located in a category. 
 
 A list of current codes and categories was maintained, with the 
operational definition of each one and a list of its properties and 
dimensions. The extent to which the coding structure evolved over the 
study may be seen by comparing an early version, made at the end of the 
first four cases (Appendix A) with a later version as it existed as the 
study approached its conclusion, but before the condensing of 
dimensions into a single ‘extent’ for each category (Appendix B). 
 
7 Part of the iterative process involves the building of connections to 
existing theory. Lists of references relating to emerging core categories 
and their links with other categories were maintained. Part way through 
the process a literature review was undertaken in relation to managerial 
control, a key emerging construct (see Section 5.4). At the end of the 
process a further review was carried out of literature relating to each of 
the six elements of the core code: management process. 
 
8 The method of constant comparison of categories and instances within 
and between cases (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) was used to stretch each 
emerging concept as far as possible in an effort to ensure the integration 
of concepts and theories and to test emerging links. The final cross-case 
analysis completed the process. 
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The results of the analytical process are described in full in Chapters 4 to 8, 
where the case studies are presented and compared. 
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3.3.5 Quality and rigour 
 
The growth in application of qualitative research methods has been 
accompanied by a concern that reports based on such methods should be of 
good quality (Argyris, 1979; Van Maanen, 1979; Huber and Power, 1985). 
Miles and Huberman (1994: 277) state that the concern is not just that of 
convincing positivists that ‘naturalistic enquiry is no more biased or inaccurate 
or imprecise than their methods’, but that issues of quality in qualitative studies 
deserve attention on qualitative researchers’ own terms. Miles and Huberman 
(1994: 278-280) offer 50 helpful pointers, or ‘practical guidelines in the form 
of questions’ for judging the quality of qualitative research. These are grouped 
into four sets, listed below, with section references linking them to this thesis. 
 
1 Issues of objectivity/confirmability, including the explicit description of 
methods and procedures (see descriptions and examples in 3.3.3 and 
3.3.4), and of assumptions (see list of underlying assumptions in 3.2.7), 
as well as a clear linking of conclusions to condensed data displays (see 
condensed data displays in 4.2.2, 4.3.2, 5.2.2, 5.3.2, 6.2.2, 7.2.2, 8.1.2, 
8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.1.5, 8.1.6, and 8.1.7, each of which is summarized in the 
conclusions which follow). 
 
2 Issues of reliability/dependability/auditability, including the clarity of 
research questions (see 2.4.2), of the researcher’s role (see 3.2.6), and 
the specification of basic paradigms and analytic constructs (see 
discussion of methodological issues in 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.5, 3.2.6, 
and 3.2.7, and analytic framework in 3.3.4, as well as evolving 
definitions of constructs made explicit in 4.2.3, 4.3.3, 5.2.3, 5.3.3, 6.2.3, 
and 7.2.3). 
 
3 Issues of internal validity/credibility/authenticity, including the 
comprehensiveness and plausibility of the account (see three stage 
analytical process in each case supported by specific quotes from first 
stage), the use of triangulation or the existence of a coherent explanation 
for not using it (see 9.4), the seeking of negative evidence and rival 
explanations (see explicit search for exceptions and their incorporation 
into propositions in 8.1.2, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.1.5, 8.1.6, and 8.1.7), and the 
agreement by informants of essential facts and evidence (see 4.1, 5.1, 
6.1, and 7.1). 
 
4 Issues of external validity/transferability/fittingness, including the 
explicit identification of informants (see 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, and 7.1), the 
diversity of cases (see explicit application of theoretical sampling in 
4.4, 5.4 and 6.3), the consistency with readers’ experiences, the 
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‘thickness’ of description, the generic nature of processes and 




4 RESULTS FROM EALING HOSPITAL NHS TRUST 
 
This chapter contains the results of the first stage of the study, in the form of 
case studies of two projects of organizational change in Ealing Hospital NHS 
Trust. Section 4.1 begins by describing the overall climate of change in the UK 
National Health Service (NHS) at the time of the study. Some background 
details of the organizational setting are provided, with an explanation of how 
access was gained and how the two case studies were identified and their 
boundaries determined. Processes of data collection and analysis are outlined. 
 
Section 4.2 contains Case 1, the first of the two projects of change. The case is 
presented in three sub-sections which progressively refine the analysis of the 
management processes enacted by the change drivers in their management of 
the project. These management processes represent the main focus of the study. 
The whole case is first presented in narrative form in Section 4.2.1. In Section 
4.2.2 specific instances of management process are then drawn from the case, 
categorized and tabulated. Six categories of process are identified, each with 
one or more dimensions. The categorization is presented as a complete way of 
describing the variety of processes employed. Section 4.2.3 summarizes the 
conclusions of the case. Preliminary definitions of the six categories are given. 
 
Section 4.3 deals with Case 2, the second of the two projects of change. It is 
presented in a format similar to that of Case 1. The Case 2 analysis results in a 
refinement of the categorization of management processes identified in Case 1. 
At the end of Section 4.3 the aggregate conclusions from both cases are 
summarized and implications for selection of the setting for the next stage of 




With around 800,000 directly employed staff and a budget of around 5% of the 
UK’s Gross Domestic Product (Appleby, 1995) the NHS is, by any standards, a 
major organization. At the time of the study the NHS was in the middle of a 
programme of reforms described by Ham (1991) as more fundamental than any 
experienced since its inception in 1948. The reforms1, which took effect from 
April 1991, entailed fundamental changes to the organization of the NHS. 
Their aim was to move the NHS towards a free-market system of contractual 
funding, with separation of the responsibilities for the funding and provision of 
services. Purchasers of health care - mainly fund-holding General Practitioners 
(GPs) and health authorities - would negotiate contracts or service agreements 
with providers - hospitals and other units. 
 
                                                          
1  Set out in ‘Working for Patients’ (Cm555) (1989) HMSO. 
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With the implementation of the reforms individual hospitals could, if they 
chose, apply to the Secretary of State to become trusts, each run by its own 
Board of Directors. Trust Boards would be directly accountable to the 
Secretary of State via the NHS Management Executive (NHSME) without 
intervention from District or Regional Health Authorities. Trusts would be free 
to determine their own management structure, and, within certain restrictions, 
the range and extent of services they offered. Trusts would own their assets 
(land, buildings and other property), on which they would be required to 
generate a specified financial return. 
 
Ealing Hospital, a large general hospital in west London directly employing 
around 1200 staff, was among the first of the nation’s hospitals to apply for, 
and, in 1991, be granted trust status. Its active response to its changing 
environment made the organization a likely candidate for the first case studies. 
Further, its public status meant that access was unlikely to be denied on the 
grounds of commercial sensitivity. As a potential research site the organization 
also had the advantage of being near the researcher’s home. The first point of 
contact for access to the organization was a business graduate who had been 
taught by the researcher at Thames Valley University, and who was employed 
by Ealing Hospital NHS Trust (hereafter referred to as ‘the trust’) as a general 
manager. She arranged for the researcher to conduct a preliminary, exploratory 
interview with the trust’s chief executive. At the interview the aims of the study 
were briefly outlined. The chief executive was then asked whether any internal 
organizational change projects were in progress in the trust at the time. Without 
further prompting he identified three such projects. He then proceeded to 
describe their origins, their aims and their scopes. 
 
The chief executive named himself as ‘sponsor’ of all three projects and named 
three other individuals as their respective project managers. The chief executive 
and the project manager on each project were identified by the chief executive 
as the principal change drivers. The first project (Case 1) consisted of a 
restructuring of the trust’s approach to business management through the 
adoption of ‘clinical directorates’. The second project (Case 2) was the 
upgrading of the hospital’s information systems. The third project was 
concerned with devising and implementing a radically new trust-wide staff 
performance appraisal system. The nominated project manager of the third 
project was the trust’s director of human resources. Unfortunately she was not 
available for interview. She nominated a deputy, the trust’s training manager, 
as a replacement interviewee. Although he proved to be a willing and 
knowledgeable contributor it became clear that, without the input of the project 
manager, the data were, for the purposes of this study, insufficiently complete. 
The new appraisal system was clearly controversial and its implementation was 
apparently highly problematic. The training manager was not sufficiently close 
to the full implementation process which was being driven by the project 
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manager with the close help and support of the chief executive. The first two 
projects were therefore selected for the study. 
 
Some outline comparative characteristics of the two selected projects are 
summarized in Table 4.1: 
 
Table 4.1: Comparison of the two Ealing Hospital NHS Trust 
project characteristics 
 
 Case 1 Case 2 
Title Introduction of clinical 
directorates 
Updating of hospital 
information systems 
Origin Response to threats to the 
trust’s existence arising 
from structural 
deficiencies 
The many routine 
opportunities for hospitals 
to take advantage of 
advances in information 
technology 
Nature of scope Cultural, structural, non-
technical 
Structural, technical 
Drivers identified Project sponsor and project 
manager  
Project sponsor and project 
manager 
Main driver Project sponsor (chief 
executive) 
Project manager (director 
of business development) 
Status 8 months duration. Started 
February 1994, went live 
October 1994, on 
schedule. 
4 years duration. Started 
December 1991, due for 
completion late 1995. 
Modular. Partially 
successful. 
Budget None £2m, mainly for prime 
contractor (AT&T) 
 
Interviews were conducted with the trust informants nominated as change 
drivers by the chief executive, including a further interview with the chief 
executive himself. The roles of the sponsor of the two selected projects and of 




Table 4.2: Ealing Hospital NHS Trust interviewees 
 
Title Ref. Role on first project 
(Introduction of clinical 
directorates) 
Role on second project 
(Upgrading of hospital 
information systems) 













Recipient of changes, 
interested party 
Project manager, main 
driver 
 
The interviews took place between November 1994 and January 1995, two 
months after the clinical directorate structure had been introduced (Case 1) and 
three years into the four-year programme for the systems upgrade (Case 2). 
Guided by the research questions (see Section 2.4) the interviews were highly 
open-ended and exploratory. Each interview was loosely structured around the 
informant’s background and that of the organization, their perception of the 
objectives of the project, and of its scope and management process, including 
their role in that process and the role of the other change driver. Each interview 
lasted about one-and-a-half hours. Interviews were audio-taped and fully 
transcribed by the researcher. Follow-up questions to resolve queries which 
arose during transcription were made by telephone. 
 
In both cases, wherever there was an overlap in content between data from the 
chief executive and data from the project manager there was agreement 
between the two managers’ accounts. In Case 2 there was little such overlap, 
however, as the ‘hands-on’ involvement of the chief executive was 
significantly less than in Case 1, where he had been the main driving force 
throughout the project. 
 
In addition to the interview tapes and transcripts, copies of the following 
relevant documents were provided and used as sources of data: 
 
* The trust’s 1994/95 business plan. 
* The trust’s management structure. 
* Milestone plans and action schedules for the clinical directorates project. 
* Workshop briefing for clinical directors. 
 
Transcription of the interview tapes and the first stages of analysis took place 
immediately after each interview. The process of transcription on a word 
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processor, although slow, was found to be an effective way of achieving a high 
level of immersion in the data, and many valuable memos were generated 
during transcription. A data coding and analysis process, described in Chapter 
3, was followed until all relevant data were accounted for. The trust cases were 
refined and twice rewritten over the course of the whole doctoral project, as 
different aspects of process emerged from later studies. The final versions of 
the trust cases, presented here, are unembellished by the new analytical 
directions which emerged in the later studies. In that sense they are close to the 
earlier versions of the cases, although the analytical focus is considerably more 
refined than that of the first attempts. The categories of management process 
developed in the first case changed subtly and progressively over the course of 
the study. For reasons of cross-case comparability they are presented 
throughout the thesis in a format close to their final development. Some minor 
examples of their gradual refinement as the study progressed are given in this 
and subsequent chapters, as the trust cases are revisited after the studies from 
each of the other three organizations.  
 
An early version of each case narrative was sent to its respective change drivers 
for verification of their agreement with its content, and followed up a week 
later by telephone. The chief executive took the opportunity to make some 
factual corrections and embellishments. 
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4.2 Case 1: Introduction of clinical directorates 
 
This case study is concerned with the first of the two projects of change in 
Ealing Hospital NHS Trust. The case study is presented in three sections. 
 
Section 4.2.1 presents the results of the first stage of analysis. Salient case data 
are presented in narrative form, broadly structured around the elements of the 
simple analytical framework described in Section 3.3: change context, change 
content and change management process. 
 
Section 4.2.2 takes the management process data to a second level of analysis, 
showing how each project management process described by the change 
drivers may be considered a response to specific considerations. The processes 
are condensed into six categories, each of which has one or more dimensions. 
 
Section 4.2.3 summarizes the findings of the case and draws interim 
conclusions. 
 
4.2.1 Case narrative 
 
In this first stage of analysis the case data are presented in three sections. Using 
the data analysis processes described in Section 4.1 the data have been broadly 
synthesized into the context, content and management process of the project. 
The first section outlines events leading up to the decision by the chief 
executive and the other members of the trust board to implement the change, 
combining data categorized as external and internal context. The second 
section gives details of the scope, or content of the project. The third section 
contains data which were categorized as project management processes 
employed for the implementation of the project’s scope. The project was partly 
complete at the time of the data collection, and the third section ends with the 
change drivers’ views and concerns for the project’s future course. 
 
Interview quotes are labelled PM (project manager) or CE (chief executive). 
The predominance of quotes from the latter reflects his commitment to driving 





In the 1993/94 financial year, under its former chief executive, the trust had 
experienced significant difficulties in adjusting to the new NHS Trust regime. 
These difficulties were attributed by both change drivers to its then executives’ 
lack of experience of operating as a trust, and of adjusting to the new 
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administrative demands. Three problems in particular had shown senior trust 
staff that there was a need to adopt a new management structure which would 
be more appropriate to meeting the trust’s emerging challenges and objectives. 
 
The first difficulty was patient bed shortages brought about by the trust 
managers’ attempts to generate income. The requirement for revenue had led to 
the trust actively marketing some of its services outside the region in an attempt to 
get ‘ECRs’2. The resulting shortage of available beds for local patients had 
strained relations with local purchasers. 
 
 ‘The waiting times for local patients grew very fast. This was a 
disastrous series of events. It in the end generated quite a lot of 
money for the trust, and to that extent it was successful, but my 
goodness, it alienated the local GPs.’ (CE) 
 
Because of bed shortages the trust was at the centre of the so-called ‘trolley 
ward’ scandal. Tabloid newspapers reported patients dying on trolleys in the 
hospital whilst waiting in corridors outside full wards. An independent report 
was commissioned3. It concluded that the root of the trust’s problems was a 
failure to involve clinicians in crucial resource decisions. The ‘catalytic’ quality 
of the independent report was acknowledged by the project manager. 
 
 ‘that was number one I think, the Higgins report, and that really was 
the catalyst for saying something has to be done to address those 
recommendations.’ (PM) 
 
The second difficulty concerned the new government-imposed obligations on 
NHS Trusts to balance their financial books. The implications of these 
obligations for budgetary management were summed up by the chief executive: 
 
 ‘The financial (obligations) are very explicit and well understood, 
and that applies to every trust in the land. Meeting your six per-cent 
return on your assets, so in other words generating a surplus over 
and above your costs that meet that six per-cent return. You have to 
do that every year. That means you have to balance your income and 
your expenditure every year, and you have to keep within your basic 
cash limit.’ (CE) 
 
In the financial year to end-March 1994, through ineffectual business 
management, the trust had failed to operate within its new statutory financial 
                                                          
 
2 Extra-Contractual Referrals. Patients from outside the region may be used as a source of income.  
 
3  The Higgins Enquiry, conducted by the eponymous professor on behalf of the central National 
Health Service Management Executive. 
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constraints. In that year the trust had suffered a budget deficit of more than 
£1m on a turnover of £46m. Under the new rules governing the operation of 
NHS Trusts, the deficit had the consequence that contracts were lost to other 
hospitals and the trust’s capacity to operate was reduced. Staff reductions 
through natural wastage were allowed to take place, relieving the immediate 
threat of redundancies. 
 
The third difficulty which had arisen as a result of the trust’s structural inadequacy 
was the dissatisfaction of purchasers of the trust’s services due to the diffused 
contractual responsibilities within the trust’s flat senior management hierarchy. 
 
 ‘The (former) chief executive had maybe twenty, thirty people 
directly reporting to him, and that wasn’t a very satisfactory 
situation either... purchasers never felt that there was somebody 
that they could talk to about particular services, because there were 
so many disparate heads of department, different people involved. 
They wanted one contact person, they didn’t want twenty of them.’ 
(PM) 
 
Pre-trust hospital management structures were concerned with day-to-day 
management, with financial accountability resting with the District Health 
Authority. Hospitals were able to operate with a higher degree of separation of 
clinical responsibilities from business responsibilities. The new rules for trusts 
meant that this hierarchical duality was no longer as viable. At Ealing, the 
‘trolley ward’ scandal, the dissatisfaction of purchasers and the budget deficit 
had combined to highlight a new and urgent need, summed up in the Higgins 





The trust’s difficulties had called into question both its credibility as a self-
managed unit and its viability as a business entity. The problems had helped the 
Trust Board to see that the status quo was unacceptable, and that change was 
needed in the structure of the trust’s executive. In February 1994 the chief 
executive resigned and was replaced by a new man from a position as general 
manager at another NHS Trust hospital. The new chief executive saw his task 
as ‘changing the culture from one of widespread delegation upwards of 
problems’ to one in which a selection of the trust’s leading clinicians accepted 
responsibility and accountability for defined areas of planning and 
development, including producing and delivering against business plans. The 
structural solution to the problems was initiated by the new chief executive 
immediately upon his appointment. The solution, which had already been 
adopted by some other NHS Trusts, was the introduction of ‘clinical 
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directorates’, consisting of a small number (in Ealing’s case, six) of senior 
clinicians with clear commercial accountabilities reporting directly to the chief 
executive and working closely with a commercially-orientated business 
management team. Whilst the chief executive had no direct experience of 
personally managing the introduction of clinical directorates he claimed to have 
‘seen through massive change within an established clinical directorate 
structure’. 
 
The chief executive’s reasoning behind the decision to introduce and support 
clinical directorates was based on his perception that the problems of the recent 
past were directly attributable to two closely related structural deficiencies. 
First, a lack of management ‘machinery’ to demonstrate the trust’s financial 
objectives and accountabilities and monitor their achievement.  
  
 ‘There was no machinery, no wherewithal to build up a picture of 
what the trust wanted to do, involving the people that were going to 
be responsible for delivering the business plan at the end of it. And 
that caused huge structural - operational problems of meeting the 
contract last year.’ (CE) 
 
The second deficiency was the possession by senior clinicians of power 
without formal business management responsibility. 
 
 ‘... crucially the senior clinical staff had very limited responsibility. 
They still had quite a lot of power and influence, inevitably in a 
hospital such as this, but they have in formal terms very limited 
responsibility for some small budgets, and a very ill-defined set of 
responsibilities in relation to service planning and development. 
This historically led to major difficulties in the trust.’ (CE) 
 
By getting the clinical directors to accept their responsibilities, at the same time 
clarifying their understanding of the trust’s corporate objectives, the clinical 
directorate structure would provide the foundation for harnessing the 
clinicians’ power to those objectives. 
 
 ‘So there was really no sense of giving people the power and 
responsibility to make the difference to their working lives, and to 
contribute to the trust corporate objectives. At the same time there 
was remarkable lack of clarity about what the trust was at.’ (CE) 
 
The restructuring, identified by the chief executive as a project of change, was 
set in motion in February 1994 with a target ‘go live’ date of 1st October 1994. 
Its scope was simply to devise and implement the new management reporting 
structure. This involved establishing and gaining acceptance of the new 
structure in time for the clinical directors to produce their input to the 1995/96 
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business plan, and the adjustment of budgetary systems which would enable the 
trust’s financial performance to be monitored. 
 
The interviews with the chief executive and his project manager, which 
provided the bulk of the data for this study, were conducted between November 
1994 and February 1995, not long after the October 1st target date for 
devolving budgets under the new structure had been officially met. 
 
Change management process 
 
On his arrival in February 1994 the chief executive wasted no time in 
formalizing and setting out his intentions for change in the trust’s 1994/95 
business plan, issued in March 1994. The plan stressed the trust’s obligations to 
the National Health Service Management Executive for financial performance. 
It contained a detailed exposition of how the trust would redress the 1993/94 
legacy of under-performance, including an analysis of financial risks. The 
plan’s internal role as a legitimating device for management action was 
expressly stated: 
 
 ‘... it is also the intention to use this document as a means of 
focusing management effort in achieving our overall goals. It can 
therefore be considered as a management manifesto for the trust 
for the coming year.’ (1994/95 Business Plan) 
 
The empowering aims of the new structure were set out as one of the trust’s 12 
‘overall corporate priorities’: 
 
 ‘More closely integrating senior medical staff in the management 
of the Hospital and devolving more power and responsibility to 
front-line staff.’ (1994/95 Business Plan) 
 
The chief executive was aware that attempting to bring about fundamental 
changes to the roles and responsibilities of senior hospital staff with a lot of 
power to resist unwanted change presented a considerable personal challenge. 
He cited recent events at another NHS Trust where the chief executive had lost 
both the confidence of his senior clinicians and his job. 
 
 ‘The thing about hospitals that’s endlessly fascinating is that you’ve 
got... it is a complex business, and you have actually a large number 
of people with the power of veto, particularly senior clinicians. I 
mean, the awkward squad is very large in potential... anybody in the 
senior management position, if they’re seen to lose the confidence of 




The chief executive was therefore concerned to proceed with caution. 
 
 ‘So I can’t turn the place upside down just because I want to, even 
though there may be extremely good reasons for doing so, and at the 
same time lose the confidence of my colleagues... So it really is a 
question of judging the pace, and leading people through that 
change.’ (CE) 
 
However, the recent difficulties encouraged the chief executive to take the view 
that an opportunity for change existed immediately on his arrival as a ‘new 
broom’, which enabled the clinical directorates project to go ahead. 
 
 ‘In February this year, there was insight. Broadly speaking there was 
insight across the trust. This was an unsatisfactory state of affairs, 
which as you know is actually quite an important prerequisite for 
change. So there was dissatisfaction with that state of affairs, and as 
such it was simply a question of building on that and putting 
together an approach that would be acceptable in terms of making 
some changes.’ (CE) 
 
This opportunity was echoed by the project manager: 
 
 ‘Genuinely people realized that they weren’t in a very good situation 
and things had to move forward . You have to realize the benefits of 
it, and market those, and just get people aware of it.’ (PM) 
 
The chief executive was quick to take advantage of centrally-funded NHS 
consulting resources. He enlisted the help of the local ‘change management 
team’, a mobile band of change facilitators with experience of NHS Trust-related 
change. One of the team was retained by the chief executive as his clinical 
directorates ‘project manager’, seconded from the change management team on a 
long-term basis and given a position as business manager of one of the clinical 
directorates. The chief executive appealed to industry norms to stress his austerity 
in the face of financial constraint: 
 
 ‘... the first thing I did was to engage the support of the change 
management team from the region. The reason why I chose them 
was for a very simple reason, they were free. And I wasn’t in a 
position at that stage to institute or bring in an expensive 
management consultancy, which is in many respects the sort of 
normal thing to do.’ (CE) 
 
In May 1994 the thinking behind the new structure was spelled out to the 
senior clinicians at a special ‘away day’ workshop, held off-site and facilitated 
by the project manager. Attendees were primed by a paper sent out in April 
1994 by the chief executive. The paper set out his views on the trust’s 
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‘strategic environment and current weaknesses’ and his objectives for ‘moving 
forward’. The promise of power shifts was seen as an opportunity to get 
people interested in the change at the workshop. 
 
 ‘We took them away and we thrashed out the criteria that we were 
going to use for determining the shape of the clinical directorates, 
because they, the subtext here - the issue that was getting people 
excited was what the clinical directorates would look like, who 
therefore would be working to whom, who previously had been 
peers, who would be reporting to whom as clinical directors.’ (CE) 
 
At the workshop external experts with directly relevant experience were used 
to facilitate the event and promote the new agenda. 
 
 ‘... we brought in a couple of people who had a long track record of 
working with clinical directors, and they were able to speak with 
some authority about that.’ (CE) 
 
Paid organizational development consultants were brought in to hold further 
workshops with the clinical directors, to facilitate the change at certain key 
points. However, the chief executive pointed out that when consultants cost 
money they were used sparingly. 
 
 ‘... this change is absolutely fundamental, and we’re not exactly 
throwing a fortune at it. We’ve employed consultants on very 
specific things, really on daily rates just to hold the workshops, just 
to get that bit right. And then we do something else ourselves and 
then we may bring someone else in to do one specific thing. We 
don’t have a standing resource there.’ (CE) 
 
After the new structure had been defined one of the challenges still facing the 
change drivers was to convince the clinicians that with power and authority 
comes responsibility.  
 
 ‘... one of the other key processes that took place with the 
introduction of the directorates was a fairly interesting 
headbanging session, for want of a better term, with the clinical 
directors, where I think for the first time it was spelt out in words 
of one syllable that they had the power and that they had the 
authority to get on and run the business. They also had a share of 
the problems.’ (CE) 
 
The budget deficit and the implied threat of job losses were used as a way of 
focusing that discussion. 
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 ‘... nothing focuses the mind around that sort of discussion more 
than a juicy savings target, about £1.5m to £2.3m next year based 
on the money we think we’re going to lose from our purchasers.’ 
(CE) 
 
The problems, including the budget deficit, caused by the old structure were 
both real and recently-experienced by the senior clinicians. Nevertheless the 
chief executive felt that talks of a merger with a neighbouring trust had 
encouraged some clinicians to believe that trusts were mere management 
devices and that their financial performance would not ultimately affect the 
existence of Ealing Hospital as a clinical entity. In order for the clinical 
directorates to have credibility the clinicians had to be convinced that this was 
not so. 
 
 ‘... part of the process of managing this project was to get a basic 
acceptance among the key people that, no trust, no hospital.’ (CE) 
 
The project manager saw the uncertain political environment surrounding the 
NHS at the national level as a reason for staff having not previously taken 
seriously the commercial reality of the hospital’s future, and for having failed in 
the past to see the need for formal business planning processes. 
 
 ‘... which is probably why people haven’t taken it seriously before: 
what’s the point in doing all these business plans with projections 
and estimates and costings and resources if it’s just going to be 
completely turned on its head because there’s a general election? I 
think people probably don’t believe that services really are at risk...’ 
(PM) 
 
The interview data show that political issues surrounding the NHS reforms 
formed an important part of the context of change. These included the ‘white 
coats versus grey suits’ issue which, since the mid-1980s, had been the subject 
of much impassioned public debate. The Tory government was trying to move 
the health service towards a ‘free market’ system based on providers competing 
for work. This had led to the imposition of new requirements for increased 
administrative controls. At the same time national funding for the NHS was 
being reduced. Opponents of the change drew attention to evidence that less 
money was being spent directly on health care, and that the proportion of 
spending on administrative systems and salaries was on the increase. Manning 
(1995) attributes the critical public scrutiny of NHS management partly to the 
‘identification of management with change’ and partly to the view that, 
uniquely in service industries, management in health care is seen as ‘an 
expensive, unnecessary cost’. 
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The change drivers were highly sensitized to this issue. The chief executive, in 
particular, was anxious to portray his prudent intent not to waste scarce money. 
He was especially keen that his structural changes would not be seen as 
increasing management costs. 
 
 ‘... the other great danger was that in delegating what was 
centralized power and responsibility you’d increase costs in 
management terms. This is always a problem when you move 
down this track. I was determined not to do that, for all sorts of 
reasons. I wanted to - well first of all couldn’t afford it, and 
secondly in terms of giving credibility to the process, in the eyes of 
the average clinician, it was important not to be seen to be 
increasing overall management costs.’ (CE) 
 
He stressed the need to reconcile the issue by promoting the idea that he was in 
a supporting role and that the new structure would bring clinical benefits by 
protecting patient services: 
 
  ‘There was also a very important process to go through, to make it 
clear that moving to a clinical directorate system brings with it a 
whole range of responsibilities, a lot of which are very difficult to 
reconcile in a modern hospital straddling the gap between working 
with colleagues and protecting - seen to be protecting - patient 
services in the face of financial stringencies, and at the same time 
supporting the trust in pursuing a corporate agenda, which inevitably 
involves doing the same thing cheaper.’ (CE) 
 
The chief executive was at pains to point out that business management 
resources (as opposed to clinical resources) were spread thinly but effectively. 
He made repeated references to the way in which business managers’ jobs 
under the new structure were big and their responsibilities broad. Referring to a 
diagram of the new organizational hierarchy4 he described his own position: 
 
 ‘ I mean it’s a fairly flat structure in the sense that I have got a very 
wide band of responsibility. My span of control is wide, and these 
aren’t small jobs, and these jobs are not very similar to each other, 
so it’s a serious responsibility of mine to hold all of these people 
accountable and give them support.’ (CE) 
 
The broadness of the new role of one business manager was a source of mild 
humour: 
 
 ‘Then again you see he’s got (laughs) in terms of spreading the overhead, he’s 
now got responsibility as business manager for three directorates. He’s 
                                                          
4 The diagram shows 12 positions reporting to the CEO. 
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responsible for A&E [Accident and Emergency], maternity and child health.’ 
(CE) 
 
As well as spreading the overhead, however, the broadness of the new 
responsibilities of senior business managers were justified in terms of providing 
‘meaningful’ jobs: 
 
 ‘Deborah’s an interesting person because for instance under the new 
structure she has a dual responsibility. One as corporate head of HR, 
the other as General Manager for one of the directorates of 
medicine, and that’s again a symptom of my determination to keep 
management costs down. But also to try and give wide, meaningful 
jobs.’ (CE) 
 
A good example of a new job was one which was broad and yet focused and 
meaningful: 
 
 ‘So it was a question of refocusing people’s jobs, giving them 
meaning in the terms of the new delegated structure.’ (CE) 
 
The project manager felt that, for some cynics, the new business planning and 
monitoring processes would be a waste of time. His own view was that, because 
of the complexity of the operation, planning and achieving a planning ethos 
were important. 
 
 ‘Cynics would say [planning]’s a waste of time. I’m of the opinion 
that with all of these variables you really do need to do your 
planning so that if you are put off course you know exactly by how 
much. I think that’s why you need business planning processes. It’s 
very important that it’s embedded here. (PM) 
 
The chief executive expressed his view that the new administrative systems and 
procedures which accompanied the introduction of the clinical directorates would 
help avoid further difficulties. He also pointed out their enriching and 
empowering qualities: 
 
 ‘So we have a number of, if you like, new checks and balances. Not 
only to make sure we don’t boo-boo, but also to enrich the decision 
making and make sure that it takes account of people’s viewpoints.’ 
(CE) 
 
The chief executive had experience of what he termed ‘classic project 
management’ on previous structural changes at other hospitals, where there 
were ‘steering groups, project managers and regular reports’. He was 
determined that planning and control formality on the clinical directorate 
project would be low-key. Nevertheless, the project manager was keen to 
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impose some sort of planned structure to the project, particularly since one of 
his concerns was cynicism and lack of understanding about the benefits of 
formal planning. The project manager had produced a schedule of milestone 
dates for 11 key activities leading up to the devolution of budgets to directorates 
on 1st October 1994. These included the agreement of various categories of job 
description and the writing of training needs analyses. In addition the project 
manager used a bullet-point one-page status report of key issues such as 
meetings planned and documents under review, structured around the 
McKinsey ‘7S’ framework5. The purpose of the status report was simply to 
demonstrate the planning behind the project. 
 
 ‘I don’t think it was particularly important the model we used, as 
long as we had some framework from which we could show people 
what it was we were trying to do, where it was we were coming 
from.’ (PM) 
 
For the chief executive one of the project manager’s tasks was scheduling. 
 
 ‘... he was the project manager, and made sure that things happened 
in a relatively logical sequence.’ (CE) 
 
The milestones and key issues were monitored and reviewed at informal, 
unminuted, irregularly-timed progress meetings between the chief executive 
and the project manager. 
 
At the time of the interviews the new structure had just been formally 
introduced. However, the chief executive recognized that the combination of 
ingrained ways of thinking and a wide-reaching agenda for change called for 
caution in claiming success. 
 
 ‘I’m not sure that it’s a hundred and eighty degrees yet, I mean it’s, 
this is an ingrained way of thinking, amongst a number of people; 
it’s going to take some time.’ (CE) 
 
The chief executive was aware that the effectiveness of the new structure could 
not be judged simply by its implementation: 
  
 ‘You have to be very careful about diagnosing progress here. I think 
you can get carried away with looking at the new mechanisms 
you’ve created. But the underlying change, improvement in 
performance, takes a very long time to come through the system, 
and there are still huge gaps in what the hospital is doing. Huge 
gaps.’ (CE) 
                                                          
5 A checklist of seven management domains beginning with the letter S, as originated by the McKinsey 
consulting group: Strategy, Structures, Systems, Staff, Skills, Style and Shared values.  
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He was sensitive to the fact that the project could not be taken in isolation from 
the overall affairs of the trust, and that there was still a lot to be done in the way 
of further changes which would have to accompany the new structure in order for 
it to work.: 
 
 ‘I mean for instance we haven’t sorted out yet some vital policies of 
income, on moving money around, giving people real power to 
change the way they want to work, and allowing resources to be 
reflected in that. We haven’t agreed policies on that . We haven’t 
decided how we’re going to treat, in real terms, each of the 
directorates as cost centres... all of that is down the track.’ (CE) 
 
The danger of trying to move too fast was acknowledged by the chief 
executive, who favoured a phased approach to change which would allow time 
for new management controls to be set up. He was wary of political pressure 
for NHS Trusts to introduce customer-driven quality initiatives. 
  
 ‘There’s a huge danger that we take one step forward and two back 
by pushing things too fast... What we’ve discussed already 
represents a very significant set of change processes. People around 
here are working like billy-o and I’m very conscious of that. And to 
then say we’re going to move into a TQM approach6 across the trust 
is I think folly at this stage. I even worry about doing it next year.’ 
(CE) 
 
It was felt that, for some, the new responsibilities would take some getting used 
to. 
 
 ‘... all of a sudden someone who had only a very vague planning 
role, who could influence thinking and be listened to, sure, but not 
necessarily have any real power or responsibility to change things, 
are being asked to write a business plan which basically specifies 
their service next year. And furthermore are being expected to front 
up the discussions... to actually represent the trust in discussions 
with the purchasers about what that contract is going to look like in 
service next year. Now that is a whole new range of exposures and 
responsibilities that will feel very strange and new.’ (CE) 
 
Also worrying was the possibility that others would fail to understand their 
new roles. 
 
 ‘I think a number of them feel quite uncomfortable about that. It’s 
the ones that don’t feel uncomfortable I worry about, because 
                                                          
6 Total Quality Management approaches driven by ‘customer charters’ were popular with the 
government. 
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they’re going to take slightly longer to appreciate how difficult their 
job is.’ (CE) 
 
The importance of an empowering approach to quality management was 
perceived. 
 
 ‘we need our own approach to quality, and we’re taking a few steps 
to create a mechanism and a structure for doing that. But I’d like to 
see that emerge naturally from what people feel they want to do.’ 
(CE) 
 
Nevertheless, if the success of the new approach were to be threatened by 
clinicians slowness to grasp issues the chief executive remained poised to step 
in and over-ride this empowering intent. 
 
 ‘We’re learning as we go along, and in many respects, although I 
want to be careful as chief executive, I don’t want to be seen to be 
spoon-feeding the organization. It’s very important that people 
throw up these issues themselves, see them as important for 
themselves and then tackle them themselves. They can be prompted 
on one or two occasions, and on one or two occasions clearly gaps 
emerge that clearly I have a responsibility to ensure I fill quickly, 
and if nobody else sees it then I have to say... seize it.’ (CE) 
 
The planning cycle placed certain limits on the extent to which an 
evolutionary, participative approach could be tolerated. The production of a 
business plan was itself a statutory requirement. One of the responsibilities of 
the clinical directors would be producing the 1995/96 plan. This would force 
them to get involved with purchasers: 
 
 ‘We started (the new structure) on the first of October and within a 
month or two they’ve got to produce a business plan and get thrown 
into discussions with purchasers.’ (CE) 
 
The deadline imposed by the planning cycle and the need to balance the budget 
in the light of past failures were together seen as forcing the pace of the 
introduction of the new structure and reducing the ‘settling in’ period for the 
clinical directors: 
 
 ‘It would be nice perhaps to have had them into their roles a bit 
longer, but unfortunately the world isn’t like that. We can’t stand 
still, we have to keep up, and we have to plan for next year in the 
light of a very serious resource gap. So the heat is on and they don’t 
have a chance to settle very long.’ (CE) 
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Looking to the future, the chief executive was conscious of the continuing nature 
of the financial threat. There were signs that meeting the trust’s financial and 
contractual obligations, as expressed in his own business plan, was outside his 
control: 
 
 ‘... we’re in a precarious situation. Although we have a balanced 
budget this year, next year is going to be enormously difficult. 
Hence keeping the change processes going in a positive sense, 
whilst at the same time having to save quite unreasonable amounts 
of money, because our purchasers seem to require that of us at the 
moment.’ (CE) 
 
Both change drivers expressed the view that hospitals were being asked to do 
more with less, and both were acutely aware of the government’s announced 
plans progressively to reduce central funding for the NHS in the coming years. 
They stressed the limits to their own resources. The project manager criticised 
change overload and management bureaucracy at national level. 
 
 ‘There’s too much going on... limited resources. I mean the 
bureaucracy... You get piles of stuff through that you simply have 
to deal with.’ (PM) 
 
For the chief executive, one of the roles of the Executive Board of the trust was 
to act as project steering group, and full advantage would be taken in future of 
its over-riding authority over the trust’s affairs. 
 
 ‘... the Executive Board could be seen as a natural project team for 
seeing through this change, and certainly we’re going to use it... So 
as the organization develops and throws up issues of policy, we will 
use that as if you like the steering group, if necessary bounce it into 
the Board to get it approved at the highest level.’ (CE) 
 
Nevertheless, the chief executive recognized his own mandated authority, and 
saw the clinical directors’ responsibilities as too important to allow them to 
accept with wantonness their responsibilities or to discharge them with 
incompetence. There were signs that one clinical director in particular was not 
performing in his new role, and his replacement was already anticipated as 
signal to others: 
 
 ‘I have concerns, and it’s quite possible in the next few months, 
maybe we’ll have to have a change, and in a sense I won’t worry 
about that because that might be an important signal at that point 
that if people can’t do the job they don’t stay, we agree that they go 
back to doing what they did before and we get somebody else in 
who can, that it isn’t the automatic right of the senior clinician to 
 97
assume responsibilities, they’re {the responsibilities} too important.’ 
(CE) 
 
The chief executive enjoyed a strong sense of his own power in his role as 
implementer of agreed policies. 
 
 ‘I have power. I have a very strong sense of power insofar as I am 
seen to implement a policy which is agreed on a corporate basis by 
the trust Board or the Executive Board, particularly the Executive 
Board. If the Executive Board agree that something should happen 
in terms of matter of policy, then I am... I am mandated , I am 
empowered to do that, and I can get very heavy about that.’ (CE) 
 
4.2.2 Further analysis of management process 
 
The case narrative presented in the previous section shows that the data 
contain several specific, identifiable instances of change project management 
processes employed by the change drivers in response to specific 
considerations. The instances of considerations and processes are listed and 
the processes are categorized and dimensioned, as shown in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: Case 1 considerations, processes, process categories and 
process dimensions 
 
Ref. Consideration Process Category Dimension 
1.01 1994/95 Business plan 
required to be issued 
March 1994 
Use plan to stress 
difficulties, intent to 







1.02 Need to maintain 
confidence of awkward 
squad 
Caution not to turn the 
place upside down 
Pace slower 
1.03 Trust staff dissatisfied 
with status quo 
Build on 
dissatisfaction to make 





1.04 Staff will be asked to take 
on more responsibility 
Stress change for the 
better to the working 
lives of individuals 
Selling more 
1.05 Regional change 
management team 
available and free 
Use them, stressing 





1.06 Need to differentiate 
project sponsor and 
project manager 
Second project 






1.07 New clinical directors 
must be actively 
committed to change 
Hold away-day to get 
people excited about 
establishing new roles 
Participation more 
1.08 Need to secure 
commitment to change 
Send out paper setting 






and purpose for away-day requesting preparatory 
work 
Formality more 
1.09 Clinicians may doubt that 
clinical directorates is the 
right solution 
Hold workshops using 







Table 4.3 cont./ 
 
1.10 Management will be seen 
to be spending excessive 
money on consultants 
Use paid consultants 
as sparingly as 






1.11 Merger talks undermining 
credibility of trust entity 
Stress that no trust, no 
hospital 
Selling more 
1.12 Need to compromise 
between PM’s wish for 
structured project 
planning process and 
CE’s desire to minimize 
bureaucracy 
Use simple milestone 
schedule and 7S 




1.13 New structure might be 




resources spread thinly 
and clinical benefits of 
new structure 
Selling more 
1.14 Managers’ jobs might be 
seen by them as too big 
Stress meaningfulness Selling more 
1.15 People will lose sight of 
the seriousness and 
enormity of the task 
Be cautious in 
claiming success; 
stress phased approach 
Selling more 
1.16 Pressures for change will 
cause change overload 
Resist simultaneous 
introduction of quality 
initiative 
Pace slower 
1.17 Empowered clinicians 
might fail their 
responsibilities 
Be ready to step in if 
things show signs of 
going wrong 
Participation cautious 
1.18 Clinical directors must 
meet the deadlines of the 
annual planning cycle. 
Officially introduce 
the new structure in 
good time 
Pace faster 
1.19 Externally imposed 
financial requirements 




imposed from without. 
Sell more 
1.20 Change will be resisted 
internally. 
Use the legitimating 









One way of summarizing, categorizing and dimensioning the management 
processes is that shown in Table 4.3. The grouping of processes into six 
categories has been derived from the data using an iterative ‘grounded’ data 
coding and mapping approach. It represents a categorization structure which is 
both concise and complete, in the sense that all identified processes are 
accounted for. The six categories are defined below, and a summary is given 
of the application of each category on the clinical directorates project. 
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1 EXTERNAL AGENTS  
 




External agents were used briefly at specific points in the project. Their role 
was to provide specific expertise (for example in organizational development 
facilitation and training) and to give credibility to the notion of clinical 
directorates. Full advantage was taken of the free services of the regional 




Definition:  The formal documentation and communication of project plans 
  and controls. 
Dimensions: More... Compromised... Less 
 
The rationale, objectives and scope of the project were formally communicated 
and reinforced via the business plan and the away-day preparation paper. 
Formal project management plans and controls in the form of milestone plans 
and the application of the McKinsey ‘7S’ framework provided a simple, non-
bureaucratic structure to the project. There was a suggestion of compromise 
between the project manager’s desire to promote the planning ethos and the 





Definition:  The pace of an aspect of the project at a particular time. (Relative 
to other aspects or to the same aspect at other times, rather than 
absolute). 
Dimensions: Faster... Slower 
 
The chief executive was wary of moving too quickly and losing credibility but 
wanted to take advantage of the dissatisfaction of the status quo and his own 
unblemished record. The project started quickly, helped by the timing of the 
1994/95 business plan and the need to have the new structure in place in time 
for the 1995/96 plan. The overall result of the competing demands on pace was 
that the clinical directorate project was nominally completed on time, but 





Definition:  The involvement of staff other than change drivers in scope  
  decisions. 
Dimensions: More... Less 
  Bold... Cautious 
 
Because of the empowering objectives of the project and the need to secure the 
clinicians’ commitment to the change a tentative process of participation in 
determining the details of the new structure was followed. However, the chief 
executive was prepared to use his own authority, legitimated and supported by 
the Trust Board, if the newly empowered clinicians showed signs of 




Definition: Educating and selling to staff the idea that the change was 
inevitable and that its organizational and individual benefits 
outweighed its costs. 
Dimensions: More... Less 
 
The change drivers took several opportunities to emphasize the problems that 
had arisen under the old structure and the threat of their recurrence. They sold 
the notion that not only were they empowered to make the change but that the 
organization as a whole and the individuals in it would benefit from a clinical 
directorate structure, which had been successfully implemented in other NHS 
Trusts. Their approach was to build on the widespread dissatisfaction within 
the trust, using the business plan and the away-day to reinforce that problems 
existed and that the trust had the ability and the power to put things right. They 
stressed the low cost, even by NHS standards, both of consulting resources for 
the change itself and of the sparse, economical management structure that 
would exist after the change. They used the idea that managers’ jobs after the 
restructuring, though very broad, would be more meaningful, and that 
clinicians’ empowered working lives would be better. Recognizing the need to 
maintain a momentum of change they emphasized the incomplete nature of the 
restructuring and the inadvisability of claiming success. 
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6 ROLE DEFINITION 
 
Definition: The clarity of definition of the respective project management 
roles and responsibilities of the change drivers. 
Dimensions: Clearer... Less clear 
 
The chief executive named himself as project sponsor and named another man, 
seconded from the regional change management team, as project manager. The 
two worked closely together in an informal way. However, the strategic 
importance of the project, and the consequent overwhelming extent of the chief 
executive’s day-to-day involvement was such that the role of the project 
manager was largely limited to scheduling tasks and milestones, and planning, 
organizing and facilitating development workshops. The chief executive was 
aware that he would need to maintain full involvement, making use of his 
mandated power. Both change drivers expressed a degree of fatalism given the 
wider context of change within the NHS as a whole. 
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4.3 Case 2: Updating of hospital information systems 
 
The subject of this second case study is the project of updating hospital 
information systems in Ealing Hospital NHS Trust. The case study is presented 
in three sections. 
 
In common with Case 1 the case data are first presented in Section 4.3.1 in 
narrative form, broadly structured around the three major elements of the initial 
framework: change context, content and management process. In Case 1 the 
clinical directorates structure was introduced as a response to specific 
problems. It therefore seemed right to describe the project’s context before 
describing its content. In Case 2 a slightly different approach is taken. Despite 
its strategic objectives a significant part of the content of the project is of a 
more technical, routine nature than that of Case 1. It seemed more appropriate, 
in the interests of clarity, to summarize the content first. Important aspects of 
the context of change are then identified and illustrated by taking one part of 
the content and describing in detail the unfolding contextual circumstances 
under which it was developed and implemented. As with Case 1, different 
aspects of the management processes are then described. 
 
In Section 4.3.2 the management process data are then further analyzed and 
presented in the same tabular format as Case 1, with specific considerations and 
responses synthesized into their categories and dimensions. 
 
The final section, 4.3.3, summarizes the case around the different process 
categories and sets out the conclusions from Cases 1 and 2. Implications for the 
next stage of the study are discussed. 
 




The project was concerned with the implementation of the trust’s ‘Information 
and Technology strategy’. The strategy’s aims were stated in the 1994/95 
business plan: 
 
 ‘The current Information and Technology strategy is a plan... that 
aims to meet the business needs of the trust whilst keeping in step 
with the national IM&T7 strategy. In essence it aims to: 
 * Encourage better use of information to make efficient use 
 of resources. 
 * Make information available when and where it is required. 
                                                          
7  Information Management and Technology 
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 * Provide systems that allow timely and accurate  
 communication with GPs. 
 * Collect ‘event’ data to facilitate costing at the patient 
 level.’ 
 (1994/95 business plan). 
 
The £2m initiative began in late 1991 and was scheduled for completion at the 
end of 1995. It was a staged programme of progressive upgrading or 
replacement of the trust’s information systems, excluding finance systems. 
The new systems were intended to be up-to-date, fast, flexible and integrated. 
By providing on-line access to clinical information and by taking advantage of 
newer information technologies (for example bar-coding of patients) there 
were potential advantages for the hospital. Most of these advantages related to 
cost and time savings for clinical and administrative staff. The integrative 
aspect also reflected the change drivers’ longer term desire to make the 
hospital more ‘patient-focused’ rather than function-focused. 
 
The identified change drivers of the project were the chief executive as self-
titled ‘sponsor’ and the director of business development as his nominated 
project manager. At the time of the interviews, in late 1994, the project had 
been progressing through the various departments and functions on an 
incremental, modular basis for the previous three years. The chief executive, 
who had only been in post for ten months, claimed a relatively minor 
involvement in the day-to-day management of the project. This is reflected in 
the prevalence of quotes in the case study from the project manager, who had 
held that role from the start. 
 
The trust had a policy of contracting out systems development work rather 
than doing it ‘in-house’ using trust employees. AT&T were prime contractor 
for the project, much of which used standard Unix-based AT&T hospital 
systems written in a programming language8 specially designed for hospital 
applications. The language was relatively low-level and ‘non-compiled’, thus 
allowing rapid coding modifications. The AT&T standard software modules 
required extensive ‘tailoring’ by AT&T to cater for the evolved idiosyncrasies 
of the hospital. 
 
The project’s expected cost of around £2m consisted mainly of software and 
programming by AT&T, including five years maintenance of the systems. It 
also covered the purchase of a new Unix processor, rewiring the hospital and 
replacing its existing obsolete desk-top terminals with ‘dumb’ terminals or 
PCs. 
 
                                                          
8  ‘MUMPS’ (Massachusetts University Medical Programming System) 
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The status of the various modules was reported by the project manager as 
follows: 
 
Central Master Patient Index (MPI). The new MPI was a core patient 
database to which all hospital patient-based systems would be linked. This 
would reduce the need for multiple entry of patient data and would improve its 
accuracy by allowing data entry at the point nearest the patient. Because of its 
centrality to other systems this was the first module to be implemented, 
starting in December 1991. 
 
Radiology. The old McDonnell Douglas system (installed in 1988) was being 
replaced by an AT&T module linked to the MPI. Implementation started in 
mid-1994. 
 
Pathology. The stand-alone patient index of the existing Cerner system would 
be upgraded and linked to other systems during 1995. 
 
Maternity. Development of a new AT&T system was in progress and would 
go live in April 1995. 
 
Case Note Tracking. A new system to allow tracking of the historical and 
current location of the 300,000 sets of patients’ notes had been installed. 
 
Theatre. A new system would be installed in mid-1995 which was intended to 
enable maximum patient throughput by effective forward resource booking 
and patient tracking. 
 
Communication with GPs. The ability for GPs to access hospital systems 
directly would be extended during 1995 using electronic data interchange and 
the existing GP link system. 
 
Executive Information Systems (EIS). EIS had been developed to provide 
business managers with information about inpatient and outpatient activity and 
contracts, waiting lists and other key indicators. These would be expanded 
during 1995 to allow wider access. 
 
Nursing. A new McDonnell Douglas nursing system was intended to help 
rostering of nurses and day-to-day ward management. It had been piloted 
unsuccessfully on one ward early in 1994 and was to be the subject of an 
‘impact assessment’ (a review of why it was unsuccessful). 
 
Ward/Service Ordering. A new system would be installed in 1995 which 
would allow goods and services to be ordered for individual patients or for 
departments from any terminal. 
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Completion of the whole project was expected by November 1995. Thereafter 




A significant feature of the data is the project manager’s repeated stressing that, 
because of the financial constraints on the NHS and the consequent demands on 
people’s time, the business process ‘reengineering’ side of IT projects in the NHS 
is difficult. 
 
 ‘... that is terribly difficult to change... If you just take the X-ray 
department, to go in there and actually do a bit of process 
reengineering is terribly hard work, partly because all these 
departments are terribly stretched...The ability to take an overview 
of the department, to say well look chaps, this is crackers, you 
should be doing it this way or that way because they haven’t got the 
time to take that.’ (PM) 
 
Another aspect of the NHS which was perceived as making the project 
manager’s job difficult was the calibre of low-paid clerical staff, and their lack of 
incentive or desire to change their way of working. 
 
 ‘... you get what you pay for. And a lot of the people in the NHS, 
especially the clerical end, they aren’t paid much, they’re currently 
paid - a lot of clerical staff on a salary which starts at about £8,000... 
You wonder how someone can live on that. And, you know, if 
they’ve been doing that job for the last ten years, training and 
rethinking about how you do your work is hard work.’ (PM) 
 
The project manager’s candid description of the failed attempt to implement the 
new nursing system illustrates the difficulties themselves and his own admission 
of his project team’s inability to foresee or surmount them. Because it provides a 
revealing insight into the problems of IT projects in the context of an NHS 
hospital, this particular part of the project is described in some detail. 
 
The new nursing system required nurses to change the way that they worked to 
using a computer. The system was intended to bring benefits to three distinct 
aspects of ward operation. The first was in the area of care planning. When a 
patient was admitted to a ward, a nurse would systematically discuss with the 
patient their particular case. The nurse and patient would together develop and 
agree an individual care plan. This was traditionally written out by hand by the 
nurse. However, since care routines were heavily proceduralized and 
standardized there was thought to be scope for computerized synthesis of the 
 107
problems or features of each particular case, and the generation by the 
computer of detailed, itemized care routines. 
 
The second area of intended benefit was working out how many nurses would 
be needed on a ward on the basis of the level of dependency of its patients. 
There were four recognized levels of dependency. These were described by the 
project manager as ‘ranging from reasonably fit and well to requiring a full 
nursing service’. The expected patient occupancy on a ward could theoretically 
be computer-processed and used to decide whether more or less nurses of 
which grades would be needed over the foreseeable future. 
 
The third area of intended benefit was rostering of nurses. This was done on a 
four-week block for each ward by a ward sister. Done manually, the task 
typically took a sister three or four hours of concentrated planning. It was a 
complex operation which required attention to nurse grades and levels of 
experience, including the right mix of mentors and students. It needed to take 
account of the days on which lots of patients were likely to be admitted, nurses’ 
holiday entitlement and which nurses worked best together. 
 
The project management team acquired the new nursing system from McDonnell 
Douglas. They then attempted to introduce it one ward at a time. On the first 
ward it was found to be a complete failure and was abandoned. The project failed 
to deliver the intended benefits on all three counts. First, the team failed to 
appreciate that nurses do care planning at the bedside. To expect them to then 
enter all the data into a terminal in the corner of the ward was a mistake. 
 
 ‘So what would have to have happened is, the nurse would have 
spent forty minutes or so assessing them and gone back to the 
computer, done it all again, and then taken it back and said this is all 
right isn’t it. It is supposed to be agreed, you’re supposed to 
understand what is going to happen to you. And on certain days of 
the week there may be ten or fifteen admissions to a ward, so all of a 
sudden you’ve got a terminal and fifteen nurses who want to use it.’ 
(PM) 
 
Second, because numbers of nurses are predefined and fixed at a bare minimum 
level there would be no point in having a computer system which recommended 
more nurses, since no more were available. The computer system could only 
recommend reduction of the number, already at minimum level. 
 
 ‘... the realities are such that, at the beginning of the year, our 
income is set for the whole year, and therefore the nursing structure 
is effectively set for the whole year. So the only thing the nurses 
could end up demonstrating is that we could take nurses away. They 
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weren’t getting any more. So there wasn’t much of an incentive for 
them to do this.’ (PM) 
 
Third, they found that the expected benefits of the computerized rostering system 
would not be achieved since sisters did the rostering task at home, in their own 
time, not in the ward. To the project manager, this meant that when the sisters 
were required to use the computer system the hospital was effectively losing half 
a day of the sisters’ time each month. 
 
 ‘... we thought that this would be a great benefit to the ward, and the 
sisters who do it, and what happened is they then spend half a day 
rostering their four weeks... they used to sit down and do it in our 
time. We found out afterwards in practice it was such a horrific task 
they actually took it home and did it, and so they ended up doing 
this task on our time rather than unpaid time at home.’ (PM) 
 
The project manager pointed out that, in addition to the three operational reasons 
why the project had not been a success, there was a further insurmountable 
implementation difficulty which meant that, even if the system had been a 
potential success, it could never have been implemented satisfactorily across the 
hospital. The problem was that the project team had assumed that nurses would 
be able to take time off to be trained in the use of the new system. Because wards 
were staffed at a minimum level, however, nurses were not able to take time off 
to be trained unless replacements could be provided. The prohibitive cost of this 
had not been considered. 
 
 ‘You staff the ward at the absolute minimum. If you take two nurses 
off, someone says, er, excuse me... someone has to pay for two extra 
shifts to put nurses back in , and the cost of that... it’s an absolute 
direct cost, which hadn’t been anticipated because we had assumed 
that if the department manager is reasonably keen for the project to 
proceed then normally, in a normal department, which they can 
facilitate letting people off for three hours to do some training, 
whereas in nursing we fell over; it really wasn’t possible.’ (PM) 
 
Neither had the project team allowed for the fact that the hospital’s central 
training resources would only allow training of one nurse at a time. 
 
 ‘... the numbers of nurses, the sheer numbers of them, I don’t know 
how many nurses there are, let’s say there are 500, that’s a lot of 
nurses, an awful lot of people to train... the central resources don’t 
spread around that much... if you could only release one nurse at a 
time, and there are let’s say 30 or 40 nurses on a ward, by the time 
you’ve taken into account every possible shift, just releasing each 
one at a time in terms of the training period... horrifically long... so it 
was a complete cock up basically.’ (PM) 
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The general scarcity of resources for training meant that business process 
improvements were sometimes sub-optimized at the departmental level, as well 
as at the level of the hospital as an integrated whole. 
 
 ‘You still go on doing it the way that you know because the cost to 
you in retraining and rethinking is enormous, even though it might 
ultimately save you time and money, but if you haven’t got the time 
to take out to do that process, process reengineering is horrifically 
expensive, even if you do it department by department rather than 
considering how the radiology department should work in the light 
of how every other department should work.’ (PM) 
 
Change management process 
 
There is a requirement in the NHS for managers of capital projects to follow 
certain prescribed, formally documented project management processes. Such 
procedures are common on government information technology projects. 
Through a defined system of sanctions and controls by an official project 
steering committee, procedures such as PRINCE9 are intended to help avoid 
the kind of project mismanagement which has plagued many large-scale 
publicly visible IT projects in the past. 
 
Nominally following such a procedure, the information systems project was 
being approached on an incremental basis. The project management process 
had followed a cyclical pattern: 
 
 ‘We had to write an operational requirement. And then we had to 
procure against that operational requirement, negotiate the contract, 
effectively sign on the dotted line and then go through this 
implementation, project management, training, go live, go round 
again.’ (PM) 
 
At the beginning of this cycle there was a formal requirement for a cost/benefit 
analysis. Throughout, because the project involved spending public money, it 
was subject to formal internal and external audit. 
 
Much of the imposed formality was seen by the project manager as difficult 
and undesirable. The questionable value of predicting and measuring benefits 
was one example: 
 
 ‘... actually putting a pound sign against that is incredibly difficult, 
and you can end up doing a vast amount of work on benefit analysis, 
                                                          
9  PRINCE (PRojects in a Controlled Environment) is a project management procedure or 
‘methodology’ which was developed especially for large scale government IT projects. 
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and actually at the end of the day it’s difficult to know if the benefits 
outweigh the cost of measuring them.’ (PM) 
 
Because of the unquantifiable nature of the benefits of information systems in 
general the benefit analysis was seen as a waste of time. The project manager 
explained why benefits analyses were an aspect of project management to 
which little time was devoted. 
 
 ‘... we aren’t terribly good at doing everything, for example the 
benefits analysis are a major pain in the ass because there aren’t 
many (benefits). I’ve never yet seen a computer project that 
delivered much in terms of the cash-releasing benefits people 
always say they’re going to deliver. Most of the benefits are 
qualitative, or they are... in terms of quality or... or they do release 
people’s time, but there’s no way you recover that, they just go on 
and do something that they should have been doing but haven’t had 
time to do.’ (PM) 
 
In practice, the project manager was able to bypass much of the required 
formality, claiming that he had not got the time. 
 
 ‘... in theory we follow the PRINCE methodology... In practice we 
don’t because we’d never get the project done if we did.’ (PM) 
 
 ‘... we don’t do all the quality assurance. We just haven’t got the 
time. I mean we do have the formal structure in that we have an IT 
project board and we have a project team. But we don’t do all the 
documentation. We don’t follow all the quality assurance.’ (PM) 
 
The project manager had access to the kind of project management planning 
and control software ‘tools’ which are normally applied to projects of this 
kind. Like PRINCE, these were dismissed as a waste of time. 
 
 ‘Project Manager’s Workbench10 is a wonderful tool... you know, 
who’s got the time to use it ?’ (PM) 
 
The whole approach to project management formality was summed up by the 
project manager: 
 
 ‘It’s exceedingly non-bureaucratic, and very little is committed to 
paper which drives the auditors scatty... we do the minimum 
necessary in that we produce project plans, we take notes of formal 
project meetings which take place every two weeks.’ (PM) 
 
                                                          
10  A project scheduling and monitoring software tool. 
 111
The content of the notes taken at the formal project meetings reflected this 
non-bureaucratic approach. Issues with cost implications, such as changes in 
project scope, should in theory have been dealt with through the formal 
processes. In practice they were often dealt with in an informal way between 
the trust project manager and the AT&T project manager, who had established 
a mutual understanding over time. Thus the project manager tried to keep 
contentious issues away from the formally minuted meetings. 
 
 ‘... although (AT&T) are the prime contractor, we’ve been working 
with them now for quite a long period of time, it’s almost as if we all 
work for the same people, so there is the common end. And whilst 
occasionally you do bump into conflicts, inevitably you will be 
saying, well we want this, and they say, I have a problem with that 
either it’s not in my agreed project, or they simply just can’t do it or 
it’ll cost you money then we would normally take those sort of 
issues outside of that meeting and that would be dealt with really 
just by sort of myself and AT&T’s project manager and if necessary 
the account manager, the salesman agreeing whose responsibility it 
was and a way forward. So, yes we try and keep anything 
contentious out of these project meetings.’ (PM) 
 
Clearly the project manager was able to get away with interpreting the 
imposed formality with some licence. He was able to exclude certain 
significant internal project costs, such as training costs, from the reckoning. 
 
 ‘One of the... we try not to count it because it’s so big, the cost of 
training people is very considerable. Internally there would be a 
cost... we shut our eyes and pretend we don’t know what that is.’ 
(PM) 
 
In Ealing the compactness of the site and the all-embracing nature of the IT 
management structure were cited as enablers of management control and the 
informal ‘direct action’ approach. 
 
 ‘... in a larger organization you wouldn’t have had direct control 
over some of the resources and therefore some of the controls that 
PRINCE builds in would have been more useful. But because it’s a 
relatively small community, if the project starts to run off track, fall 
apart, it’s easy to go in and take direct action.’ (PM) 
 
Many of the internal human resources for the project had to come from 
people’s normal working day, and did not therefore involved additional costs 
to the project. Under such circumstances, it seemed appropriate to do the 
project management on a shoestring, with little documentation. 
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 ‘I think what’s important to say is that, as a result of this project we 
are actually only employed two people, we’ve employed a very 
junior person to help with the networking and we’ve employed 
somebody to help train. And all the rest of the resources come from 
people... part of their normal work, and as a result of that... we’ve 
tried to do it on a shoestring... because effectively I’ve had to do it 
on the back of an envelope, most of it is held in people’s brains 
rather than being documented.’ (PM) 
 
Ironically, the contractor (AT&T) was allowed indirectly to impose formality 
on their client (the trust). The trust’s project manager could not fully stop 
AT&T from following the rules (thereby generating more work for 
themselves). AT&T had recently become accredited users of BS5750 quality 
standards. The resulting increased costs and erosion of the project manager’s 
informal relationship with AT&T were offered as an example of the expensive 
and undesirable consequences of quality assurance bureaucracy. 
 
 ‘... what has been noticeable is that they take longer to do things 
than they used to, and there is no noticeable improvement in quality. 
I’m not saying that they’re bad, I’m just saying that they’re probably 
as good as they were before, but it just takes them longer because 
they’ve got to go through these extra quality assurance steps, 
which... and from my point of view it just pushes the cost up 
because, whereas before, they would do little jobs for me, they say 
ah, unfortunately I’ve now got to document that, produce a training 
guide, do all the internal documentation, have it QA’d, and this half-
day job has turned into a week’s work, and so all that’s happened is, 
instead of costing me £250 it’s cost me two and a half grand. So it’s 
a major pain in the ass.’ (PM) 
 
Examples cited have shown how the cost/benefit analysis which was part of 
the project manager’s formal procedures was considered by him to be a waste 
of time, and that attempting to quantify the benefits of IT projects was thought 
futile. Nevertheless, there are instances in the data which show that both 
change drivers were sensitive to the issue that the new IT systems were known 
to be costing millions of pounds of real money and were supposed to be 
delivering real, positive benefits to the trust, along the lines of the aims set out 
in the 1994/95 business plan.  
 
The chief executive described how these benefits were realized or anticipated, 
not in terms of hard cash, but in softer, qualitative terms. He praised the Ealing 
approach to systems projects, and cited his own experience of two 
‘complications’ which he had had in another hospital, and which he had not 
seen repeated at Ealing. These complications were, firstly, adopting a ‘big 
bang’ radical approach rather than a slow, incremental one, and, secondly, 
developing systems ‘in-house’ rather than using a contractor. He talked 
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positively about the undisruptive simplicity of the incremental strategy and about 
the success of the systems themselves. He stressed that the cost had been 
modest, and that the trust’s own resources had been used. He drew attention to 
NHS expenditure norms. 
 
 ‘For a hospital of this size, we have invested a relatively modest 
amount of money. We have not at any stage been a pilot site for 
resource management or anything else. We’ve had the absolute 
minimum level of investment that any hospital of this size would 
expect within the health service.’ (CE) 
 
The project manager emphasized the project team’s efforts to keep capital costs 
to a minimum. 
 
 ‘This is the National Health Service you know. It’s not a lot of 
money, and wherever possible we keep the costs down to an 
absolute minimum. You know, we trawl the world for the cheapest 
terminals possible.’ (PM) 
 
The project manager perceived that his management control over the project 
was limited by the fact that he was dealing with medical professionals. There 
were difficulties in translating into systems the technical complexities of how 
these specialists worked. 
 
 ‘... radiology is a good example. Whilst I can put the wiring frame 
in, and I can provide them with terminals that work, I don’t know 
anything at all about radiology... they have to come up with the 
expertise... we have to go and enlist people from that department to 
work with the central project team... then of course we have no 
direct management control.’ (PM) 
 
The same lack of control was not seen to apply to the installation of the master 
patient index, where all the necessary expertise was possessed by the project team. 
 
 ‘It was certainly noticeable that, where you’re putting in a central 
hospital master patient index where I have virtually complete control 
over the whole process from top to bottom.’ (PM) 
 
The project manager had learned that when the project’s success depended on 
technical input from outsiders to the project team he should be sceptical about 
their promises of completing tasks.  
 
 ‘... from bitter experience we’ve found that people won’t do the 
things they’d say they are going to do when they are going to do 
them by. Probably quite oblivious to the effect it has on your 
project... and it is difficult to deal with that, and some of it only 
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comes from the school of hard knocks, you learn that - don’t believe 
what anybody tells you.’ (PM) 
 
The project manager had also learned to question the experts’ claims about the 
technical requirements of systems. In one department, for example, an 
entrenched practice was wrongly thought by the department to be a legal 
requirement, which caused the project manager a lot of frustration. 
 
 ‘... in blood transfusion they won’t do anything at all without a 
signature on a piece of paper, because historically they never have 
done. Now, converting that into an electronic signature is terribly 
difficult and they say legally you’ve got to and you say well why, 
show me... these are crucial elements because the whole system 
won’t bloody well work if you have to still sign a piece of paper, it’s 
terribly terribly difficult.’ (PM) 
 
Apart from the necessary reliance on clinicians’ technical know-how a second 
source of limitation to the change drivers perceived control over the project 
was the knowledge that dealing with autonomous medical staff was in itself 
difficult and highly sensitive. If the medical professionals saw no personal 
benefits from the systems they could flatly and finally refuse to use them, 
despite whatever hospital-wide benefits they might bring. The chief executive 
admitted his own powerlessness in this regard. 
 
 ‘... the chief executive is completely powerless to do anything about 
that really. If the doctor says I ain’t gonna use it, they ain’t gonna 
use it.’ (CE) 
 
For the project manager this knowledge was founded in experience. An 
example of the undesirable consequences of insensitive dealings with clinical 
staff was provided when an inexperienced AT&T analyst attempted to 
introduce a new system in the Accident and Emergency department. 
 
 ‘... this person managed in less than five minutes to get up the nose 
of the A&E staff... He went in there and told them the way it was 
going to be, which was just completely inappropriate... He just said 
this is the system, this is how you’re going to use it, this is what you 
need to do. And they said fuck off basically.’ (PM) 
 
On that occasion, through a diplomatic intervention the project manager was able 
to retrieve the situation. 
 
 ‘... a quiet word in somebody’s ear and he was changed, completely 
different attitude from them and it steamed ahead. But you do need 
people who are sensitive in their dealings with people’s feelings and 
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expectations, that’s the most important thing in any project 
manager.’ (PM) 
 
The experience reinforced the project manager’s belief that IT professionals 
could cause difficulties through their general inability to communicate with 
users. Unlike AT&T’s staff, many of the people in his own department were 
not necessarily IT professionals. 
 
 ‘In this department very few people have a solid IT background... 
we have found that genuine IT people are a major pain in the ass. 
They can’t communicate.’ (PM) 
 
The difficulties of getting departments to accept new systems were not always 
directly caused by senior people. In one case a junior member of staff who was 
expected to change her way of working was perceived as possessing power 
over her clinical superiors. She could effectively have resisted the change. 
 
 ‘... for example in maternity you’ve got the director of obstetrics and 
you’ve got the director of midwifery. And you would have thought 
that between them they’re the people who are going to decide about 
which maternity system to have. No. There’s a little clerk called Eve 
who runs it, does all the paperwork. And if she doesn’t want to use it 
she’ll just tell the other two to piss off. And that will be the end of 
the project because the clinical director will then come up with some 
excuse for saying I’m sorry we can’t use this.’ (PM) 
 
Junior staff were not always seen as having this kind of ability to make things 
difficult for the project manager. 
 
 ‘Sometimes you find the real users don’t have any power. The 
medical records clerks really don’t have very much power to... if the 
medical records manager says this is it, we’re going to use it, you’re 
going to have to get on with it, then that’ll happen.’ (PM) 
 
However, the project manager saw a need to be aware of the importance of 
giving attention to people in situations where his power was limited. The fact 
that he had been prepared to make some last minute adjustments to the 
radiology system, removing one of its irritating features, had helped its smooth 
introduction. 
 
 ‘And magically, the attention, because you have been prepared 
sufficiently to help them, they are prepared to go the extra little bit 
to make sure the system works. And people definitely like to be 
stroked... that’s incredibly important, especially in a hospital where, 
very often, you don’t have much power over certain groups.’ (PM) 
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One of the ways in which the project team tried to overcome resistance to change 
from professional experts was to be careful to consult widely and to try and find 
out who the real decision makers were. 
 
 ‘... you do have to be very careful about making sure the right 
people are there to make a decision, you must find out who the 
decision makers really are. They’re not always the people you think 
they are.’ (CE) 
 
Difficulties were experienced in training people in the use of new systems. 
Sometimes the problem was ‘technophobes’ who did not want to admit their 
ignorance of the technology. A more difficult situation could arise, however, 
when the clinicians themselves possessed computer programming skills. With 
such people the project manager had to go to a lot of trouble to stress the 
integrated nature of the systems. 
 
 ‘... you get them who say this is a load of rubbish , let me rewrite it 
for you, and we’ve got several of those here, who know something 
about FoxPro or something, and who think that they can rewrite 
hospital systems in one afternoon, and they’re the most difficult to 
deal with...’ (PM) 
 
Sometimes, because of the professional nature of the systems, specialist trainers 
were brought in to make sure that systems were explained in a way which was 
understandable and which took care not to offend professional sensitivities. 
 
 ‘...whilst anybody can train a secretary or a clerical officer... if you 
want to train nurses if you talk to them in a way that they don’t 
understand, they don’t respond terribly well. The same is true of 
doctors. You have to be careful about their sensitivities and their 
professional issues. And it was effectively a professional system. It 
was always going to better to have a nurse trainer.’ (PM) 
 
The project manager felt that, as well as being sensitive to the needs of 
individuals and the real sources of decisions within departments, there was a need 
for systems implementers to understand how inter-departmental politics placed 
limitations on possibilities. 
 
 ‘... you have to take into account the internal politics... a hospital is 
filled with people with their own professional niches, everyone from 
physiotherapists to consultants, and you have to be acutely aware of 
what is going to be possible and what isn’t... how you have to 
approach things.’ (PM) 
 




 ‘Getting two departments to work with each other is often terribly 
difficult because they’ve got completely different cultures within the 
same organization. And increasingly we want to look at the hospital 
as effectively a factory... more patient focused rather than 
professionally focused.’ (PM) 
 
4.3.2 Further analysis of management process 
 
Examples in the data of change project management processes employed as 
responses to specific considerations are listed in Table 4.4, with the categories 
and dimensions of each process element. 
 
Table 4.4: Case 2 Considerations, processes, process categories and 
process dimensions 
 
Ref. Consideration Process Category Dimension 
2.01 ‘Big bang’ approaches to 
systems implementation 
are risky. 






2.02 Hospitals are not in the 
business of developing 
computer systems. 





2.03 The chief executive has 
an experienced, trusted, 
technically-competent 
project manager. 
Distinct separation of 
the project sponsor and 
project manager roles. 
Role definition clearer 
2.04 Need to fulfill legal 
requirements for public 
sector capital projects, 
even though approach is 
modular. 





2.05 Cost-benefit analysis is of 
dubious value, especially 
on IT projects 
Put little effort into it. 





2.06 Fulfilling all the 
requirements of PRINCE 
takes too much time. 
Ignore the more time-
consuming aspects such 





2.07 Using project 
management tools takes 
too much time. 




2.08 Committing yourself on 
paper makes it easier for 
the auditors to find faults. 
Commit as little as 
possible to paper. 
Formality  less 
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Table 4.4 cont./ 
 
2.09 Dealing with changes of 




agreements with AT&T 
and deal with 
contentious issues 





2.10 It is possible to ignore 
certain significant areas of 
cost such as training. 
Draw attention only to 
external capital costs 
such as equipment 
purchases. 
Formality less 
2.11 Desire to self-justify the 
non-bureaucratic ‘direct 
action’ ‘back of an 
envelope’ approach. 
Stress that (a) the site is 
compact; (b) the 
management structure is 
unified; (c) most internal 
resources are people’s 
normal work. 
Justification more 
2.12 AT&T want to apply their 
newly-acquired quality 
assurance accreditation to 
the project. 
Because quality 
assurance is, nominally, 
a legal requirement, 
reluctantly accept 
AT&T’s increased 






2.13 Failure to involve users 
and think things through 
led to the nursing system 
being ‘a complete cock-
up’. 
Adopt a more cautious 
approach to defining 
how users will work 







2.14 Desire to be seen to be 
keeping costs low. 
Appeal to NHS norms 
and stress minimal level 
of investment. Be seen 
to be ‘trawling the 




2.15 Project team has lack of 
clinical know-how. 
Second members of 
clinical departments to 
project team. 
Participation more 
2.16 People from clinical 
departments contributing 
to the project make 
wanton promises and 
false claims of legal 
requirements. 





Table 4.4 cont./ 
 
2.17 Clinical departments 
which are dealt with 
insensitively can 
unilaterally refuse to use 
new systems. 
Use members of the 
internal project team 
rather than AT&T IT 
professionals to install 





2.18 Project team members 
who deal with user 
departments must 
understand departmental 
politics and sub-cultural 
issues in order to know 
the limits of possibility. 
Use members of the 
internal project team 







2.19 Junior staff in clinical 
departments sometimes 
have the power to refuse 
to use new systems. 
Find out who effectively 
makes the decisions 
concerning the use of a 






2.20 Some clinicians are 
accomplished designers of 
small computer systems, 
and will want to design 
their own systems. 
Stress the benefits 
arising from the 
integrated nature of the 
new systems. 
Justification more 
2.21 Trainers of nurses and 
doctors in the use of 
systems must take 
account of their 
professional sensitivities. 








The same six categories developed from Case 1 were found to be appropriate 
for the data from Case 2, although one category, selling, was renamed 
justification. This proved to be a more complete way of describing processes 
associated with promoting or defending the reasons for the change and for the 
processes employed. The change drivers in both cases were justifying their 
actions, both to themselves and others. 
 
In addition it was found necessary to add some new dimensions in order to 
account for and describe every process element. It was also found necessary to 
make certain adjustments to the definitions of some categories to 
accommodate the data from both Case 1 and Case 2. 
 
A summary is given below of the application of each of the six categories on 
the hospital information systems project. The latest definitions and dimensions 
of the categories are also listed. 
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1 EXTERNAL AGENTS  
 
Definition:  The use of change consultants, project contractors and other 
‘experts’ from outside the organization. 
Dimensions: More...Less 
 
Development of the computer systems was ‘outsourced’ to AT&T. The project 
manager was content to allow AT&T to deal with the detailed design and 
technical project management of the various integrated elements of the project. 
He was, however, careful to keep control over AT&T’s activities where these 
required them to communicate with users, either establishing and defining 
users’ requirements or installing the new systems in the various clinical 
departments. 
 





Definition:  The formal documentation and communication of project 
requirements definitions, cost-benefit analyses, quality assurance 
measures and other project plans and controls. 
Dimensions: More... Compromised... Less 
 
Certain procedural rules govern the management of public sector systems 
projects. The procedures were intended to reduce the likelihood of project 
mismanagement. In particular, spending organizations were nominally required 
to follow detailed formal organizational ‘methodologies’ for sanctioning and 
controlling expenditure and assuring quality. One of the project manager’s 
main concerns was to keep project bureaucracy to a minimum, to allow him to 
get on with the projects with as little unnecessary paperwork and as little 
interference from auditors as possible. He complied with some of the 
requirements for documented plans and controls, although in a somewhat 
careless, perfunctory fashion. Other requirements, including the management 
of internal costs, he was able to ignore. He tried to keep his dealings with 
AT&T as informal as possible, although there were signs that AT&T were 





Definition:  The pace of an aspect of the project at a particular time. (Relative 
to other aspects or to the same aspect at other times, rather than 
absolute). 
Dimensions: Faster... Slower 
 
The incremental, modular approach to the project was a significant feature of 
its pace. In addition, the experience with the nursing system led to a slower, 




Definition:  The involvement of staff other than change drivers in scope 
decisions. 
Dimensions: More... Less 
  Bold... Cautious 
 
The project manager was aware of two reasons why he would need to involve 
users in defining and designing systems. First, he and his team lacked the 
specialist knowledge possessed by the clinicians about the workings of their 
departments. Second, he perceived the need to develop systems that users 
would actually want to use (a perception reinforced by the nursing system 
failure). This applied to the clinicians themselves and sometimes to the more 
junior staff whose jobs would change as a result of a new system. He learned, 
however, to mistrust some of the users’ technical demands and their promises 




Definition: Justifying the content and process of the change both to the 
change drivers themselves and to others. Includes educating and 
promoting to staff the idea that the change was inevitable and 
desirable, that its organizational and individual benefits 
outweighed its organizational and individual costs. 
Dimensions: More... Less 
 
The project manager was keen to justify his informal approach to project 
management and cited several reasons why such an approach was appropriate. 
Both change drivers stressed the (nominal) low cost of the project by 
comparison with systems development costs in the NHS generally. The chief 
executive claimed that the benefits to the hospital were already becoming 
apparent. The project manager described his formally-demonstrated efforts to 
minimize expenditure on capital equipment. 
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6 ROLE DEFINITION 
 
Definition: The clarity of definition of the respective project management 
roles and responsibilities of the change drivers. 
Dimensions: Clearer... Less clear 
 
Several factors led to the two change drivers operating with clearly-defined 
responsibilities. Although the chief executive claimed to have experience of 
systems development projects in other hospitals he was new in relation to the 
project life cycle and saw no need to become involved in the detail, as he had 
on the clinical directorates project. His role was simply to support the project 
manager. The project manager, on the other hand, had been there since the start 
and had become experienced at operating within the constraints imposed on the 
project management role by external requirements for formality and internal 
resistance to change. 
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4.4 Learning and implications for next stage 
 
1 In Chapter 4 two projects of change in the same organization but with 
some fundamentally different characteristics have been analyzed using a 
constant comparative approach structured around the initial conceptual 
framework: context, content and management process. The analytical 
process in both cases was the same. It involved immersion in the data 
and the application of repeated, iterative comparative coding, memoing 
and diagramming techniques. These led to a level of understanding 
which enabled the case to be presented in a way which explained the 
change drivers’ perceptions of why, what and how the changes were 
introduced. 
 
2 Slightly different formats of description were found to be appropriate for 
the two cases. The subject of Case 1 was a swift and extraordinary 
restructuring of the trust’s senior management. The aims of the change 
were to realign the structure and the culture of the organization in 
response to specific problems. There was little direct technical content. 
The internal and external environmental issues (context) set the scene 
for the change (content), and the two aspects were presented in that 
order. Case 2 was a relatively routine four-year incremental programme 
of updating the hospital’s computer systems. The overall scope of the 
new systems (content) set the scene for a description of significant 
features of the organizational environment (context), with a more 
detailed description of one element of the programme illustrating 
interplay between content and context. 
 
3 With some minor enhancements to their titles, definitions and 
dimensions, the six management process elements were consistent 
across the two cases. 
 
4 The importance of interviewing both identified change drivers in each 
case was confirmed. In Case 1 the chief executive was the principal 
change driver, with the project manager handling some of the more 
routine tasks. In Case 2 the chief executive played a peripheral, 
supporting role to the project manager, who maintained a deep 
involvement in day-to-day aspects the project. 
 
 A third project had been identified by the chief executive. Interviews 
were conducted with the chief executive as project sponsor, with notable 
involvement, and the project manager’s deputy, who was also involved, 
but at a lower level than the project manager, who was unavailable for 
interview. It was apparent that, had the case been written up, its quality 
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would have been undermined to a significant extent by the ‘missing’ 
data from the project manager. 
 
5 Two issues arise from the research design and from Cases 1 and 2 which 
have implications for the next stage of the study: 
 
(a) Cases 1 and 2 were conducted in a London-based public hospital 
employing 1200 people. The management processes enacted by 
the change drivers of the two projects could be described in 
summary in very similar ways, even though the projects had some 
markedly different characteristics. A reason for this may have 
been that the changes were being described by managers within 
the same organization. Many of the significant context issues 
arose from the fact that the organization was in the public sector, 
and more specifically in the NHS. How would the kinds of 
conclusions concerning management process be affected if the 
projects of change were in a private sector service organization of 
a similar size and geographical location? 
 
(b) The importance of interviewing both the change sponsor and the 
project manager was confirmed. The effectiveness of an open-
ended approach to the interviews was also confirmed, since a 
preconceived framework of processes would have laid the 
research open to missing subtle and critical aspects of the 
processes which were discovered and which would not have been 
accessible through existing theoretical frameworks. The 
opportunity will be taken in the next stage of the work to discover 
whether data from a wider range of organizational actors could 
prove useful in producing a richer analysis of management 




5 RESULTS FROM ASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS 
 
At the end of Chapter 4 it was argued that the setting for the next stage of the 
study should be a private sector organization in which the interpretations of a 
wider range of informants than the identified change drivers should be sought. 
 
An opportunity to address these issues was presented by the London editorial 
office of Associated Newspapers Limited (ANL), where research access was 
granted. Two recently-completed projects of organizational change were 
identified by the group’s Information Systems (IS) director. He named the 
change drivers, including himself, of the two projects. He also identified a 
number of other individuals in the company who were connected with the 
projects, either as subjects of the changes or as contributors to the change 
management process from other parts of the organization. The two projects are 
the subject of Cases 3 and 4, presented in this chapter. 
 
Section 5.1 introduces the recent far-reaching changes in the UK newspaper 
industry, and outlines their effect on ANL. Some relevant details of the 
organization are given. The processes of gaining research access and 
identifying projects of change and informants are described, with details of the 
collection and analysis of data. 
 
Case 3, the first of the two small internal restructuring projects in ANL is 
presented in Section 5.2. The case format is similar to that of Cases 1 and 2. 
With some refinements to their definitions and dimensions the same six 
categories of management process were found to be appropriate for describing 
all the data. 
 
Case 4, the second ANL project, is presented in Section 5.3 in the same form, 
with little change to the categories. 
 
Section 5.4 summarizes the interim conclusions from the first stage of the study 
and explores the common origins of the management processes employed on 
all four of the projects studied so far. With reference to the literature on 
managerial control a possible explanatory mechanism is identified, linking 
contextual factors to management processes. Implications for the next stage of 





The study in ANL took place early in 1995, a few years after the whole 
industry had gone through rapid and fundamental change. In the words of one 
informant: 
 
 ‘... we’ve gone from the nineteen-thirties to almost the twenty-first 
century in about six years, and that is mainly because of IT.’ 
 
In that relatively short time UK national newspaper producers had seen radical 
technological change accompanied by the redundancy, almost overnight, of 
many traditional and well-paid skills. Despite violent (and well-publicized) 
efforts to resist radical change, in London’s Fleet Street and in east London, the 
swift transition from ‘hot metal’ to electronic processes had revolutionized the 
industry. 
  
Associated Newspaper Limited (ANL) produced The Daily Mail, The Mail on 
Sunday and the Evening Standard, with their various magazines and supplements. 
During the recent industry-wide changes ANL’s total workforce had been de-
unionized and reduced from 9000 to 3000. 
 
The company had a joint editorial office for its three main titles. Editorial staff, 
who numbered around 1500, were based in a modern block off London’s High 
Street Kensington. The office had been occupied by ANL since 1988, when it was 
first built. In the traumatic times of the mid-1980s there was a constant threat of 
disruption of the company’s operation by disgruntled production workers. The 
extreme importance to the company of avoiding loss of newspaper production, 
even for a single day, was reflected in the existence on another site of an entire 
mirror-image back-up editorial facility which could be immediately brought 
into use if, for whatever reason, the Kensington site were damaged or 
threatened. The newspapers were printed by ANL’s allied company, Harmsworth 
Quays Printing Ltd., elsewhere in London. The Daily Mail was also printed at 
various sites around the country. 
 
As with Ealing Hospital NHS Trust, access to ANL was gained through a 
former Thames Valley University business student. The former student worked 
in the newspaper group’s central Information Services (IS) department. She 
arranged an introduction to the head of the department, the IS director. 
Although he was not at the very top of the organizational hierarchy he was a 
main board director with substantial responsibilities throughout the group. He 
reported to the managing director. At an initial meeting the IS director was 
briefed on the broad aims of the doctoral study and asked whether there were 
any current or recently completed projects of internal change in his part of the 
organization. He identified two projects of internal restructuring in his 
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department and described their origins and scope. Characteristics of the two 
selected projects are summarized in Table 5.1: 
 
Table 5.1: Comparison of the two Associated Newspapers Ltd. 
project characteristics 
 
 Case 3 Case 4 
Title Amalgamation of 
Photoservices and 
Optronics 
Transfer of the NEAT 
Project 
Origin Opportunity to save space 
and staff costs, and to offer 
a better photographic 
service to the group’s 
newspapers. 
The need to move a 
software development and 
implementation project to 
a department in which it 
could be better managed. 
Nature of scope Staff redundancies; 
equipment installations. 
Structural reorganization. 
Drivers identified Project sponsor and project 
manager  
Project sponsor and project 
manager 
Main driver Project sponsor (IS 
director) 
Project sponsor (IS 
director) 
Status 4 months duration. Started 
April 1994, substantially 
complete August 1994. On 




Budget £200,000 none 
 
The IS director named himself as responsible for initiating both projects and 
identified the other members of the organization who had partial managerial 
responsibility for each project. He was then asked to name several others in the 
organization who were involved in the projects and who, in his opinion, could 
provide a broader perspective of the management process of one or both of the 
projects. He did so, and offered his help in setting up a schedule of interviews. 
During the study one other individual was named by an interviewee and was 
added to the schedule. The complete list of interviewees is shown in Table 5.2. 
The change drivers are marked *. 
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Table 5.2: Associated Newspapers Ltd. interviewees 
 




Role on second project 
(Transfer of the NEAT 
project) 
Group IS director* ISD Initiator, main driver of 
staff changes 
Initiator, main driver 
Photoservices 
Manager* 
PSM Driver of physical and 
staff changes. Manager 




PS1 Participant in design of 
new department layout. 
Increased responsibilities 




PS2 Participant in design of 
new department layout. 
Increased responsibilities 




BSM Internal advisor and main 
driver of physical 










GSSM None Manager of department 




GCSM None Manager of department 





NAM None Member of department 
giving up transferred project 
and team 
Head of Personnel HP Implemented staff 
changes 
Implemented staff changes 
IT Facilitator ITF Internal advisor to IS 
director 
Internal advisor to IS 
director 
 
Interviews were conducted between March 1995 and June 1995. Each lasted 
between forty five minutes and one-and-a-half hours. Interviews were, without 
exception, tape recorded and fully transcribed. The IS director and some of the 
others were interviewed twice, over the period. The interviews were loosely 
structured around the informant’s background, the reasons for the project(s), 
their role on the project(s) and the roles of others. Both projects were relatively 
small and self-contained and, in keeping with the IS director’s declared 
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preference for verbal communication, had involved hardly any written material. 
Archival data provided was limited to an outline project plan and layout for the 
equipment installation and a set of organization charts showing reporting 
responsibilities after the two changes. 
 
The data were analyzed in the same way as Cases 1 and 2, starting with the 
outline framework of inner and outer context, content and management process 
and building from scratch a coding structure which was able to account for all 
the data within the framework. 
 
There was considerable overlap between informants’ accounts. Some 
additional information was provided by the additional informants, although this 
was limited to factual details and information about each individual’s position. 
There was also some disagreement. This took the form of differing opinions 
about who had been responsible for managing the changes. This point is further 
explored in Section 5.4.1. 
 
A report of the analysis was sent to the IS director for his verification. He 




5.2 Case 3: Amalgamation of photoservices and optronics 
 
The first project of change in ANL concerned the amalgamation of two of the 
departments in the IS director’s managerial domain. The case is presented in three 
sections. In Section 5.2.1 the case narrative is given, in which the change context 
and content set the scene for details of the management processes employed. In 
Section 5.2.2 the management processes are summarized in the same tabular form 
as in the previous chapter. Finally, in Section 5.2.3 the use of each category of 
process is summarized, with refinements to their definitions and dimensions. 
 




Several significant forces for change formed the background to this project of 
downsizing and internal restructuring. The advance of digital technology, 
increased use of colour pictures in newspapers, the trend towards 
decentralization of newspaper production facilities and de-unionization in the 
industry had all combined to determine and enable the strategic direction of the 
organization, of which this project was a part. 
 
The central photographic services (photoservices) department issued film to 
photographers and processed photographs for the newspapers’ picture desks. 
The department was rapidly becoming an anachronistic intermediary in an era 
where digital photographic images could be sent electronically direct from 
photographers to editorial desks. In ANL’s chief rival, Express Newspapers, 
the photoservices department had already been made redundant by digital 
technology. Staff in ANL’s photoservices department were acutely aware of 
the growing threat to their jobs. They already had direct experiences of being 
bypassed by new technology in the company, with image scanners being made 
directly available to picture desks. Nevertheless, for the time being at least, 
digital images were not yet a full scale reality. 
 
In parallel with technological advances the intense newspaper ‘circulation war’ 
had led to ever fatter papers with ever more magazines and supplements1, all 
with pictures. Despite this growing demand for pictures, however, the 
photoservices department was widely considered to be in terminal decline. A 
net fall in demand for its services, together with the release of floor space 
previously occupied by redundant black and white processing equipment, 
provided the IS director with an opportunity to cut costs. He would move 
                                                          
1 In ANL The Daily Mail had Week-End Magazine, The Mail on Sunday had You Magazine, Night and 
Day, and The Financial Mail. The Evening Standard had ES Magazine and Classified Week. 
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another department - optronics2 - from another floor of the building into the 
area occupied by the main part of the photoservices department, geographically 
uniting the two departments under their joint manager. 
 
Before describing the scope of the departmental merger, it is worth considering 
an aspect of the context of change within the organization which was of central 
importance to the IS director, the position of his IS group in relation to the rest 
of ANL. He summed up the relationship between the role of his department as 
a service provider and that of the company as a whole, as a producer of 
newspapers: 
 
 ‘... in essence if we fail to do our job properly they fail to do their 
job properly.’ (ISD) 
 
For the IS director doing his job properly meant providing the best quality 
support service for as low a cost as possible. The needs of the department’s 
customers were an important determinant of his approach to the departmental 
merger: 
 
 ‘The main constraint with it were the customers. Not constraint in 
the sense of them not wanting it to happen, but doing it in such a 
way that they got a better service from a lower resource than they 
had from a higher resource.’ (ISD) 
 
The IS director declared himself ‘a strong believer’ in service level agreements3 
with his internal customers, both for internal control of his workforce and for 
demonstrating benefits. For this reason work measurement was seen as an 




There were three main areas of intended benefit from the amalgamation of 
photoservices with optronics. First, it would release the space occupied by the 
optronics section. Second, the merger would save money by using a combined, 
reduced staff for both sections. Third, it would bring the two sections together 
into the physical domain of their manager, allowing better control. The 
photoservices department had 23 staff. Many of these were experienced 
photographic process professionals who were under-worked and, as a legacy 
from the old days, in the words of the head of personnel, ‘incredibly highly 
                                                          
2 Optronics are electro-mechanical devices for producing film which is then used to produce plates for 
magazines. 
 
3 Formally documented internal ‘contracts’ quantifying the services offered by the department in terms 
of time, cost and quality. 
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paid’4. The eight optronics staff, by contrast, were younger, less experienced, 
much lower paid and on fixed term contracts. Another benefit anticipated by 
the IS director was that, by keeping the more experienced photoservices staff 
and training them to operate the optronics equipment, a better quality of 
optronics output and a more professional service to their internal customers 
would be ensured. 
 
The project had a budget of £200,000. Its scope included rearranging the layout 
of work stations and equipment in the photoservices department and moving in 
the optronics equipment from its location on another floor of the building. 
These changes required electrical work, heating, ventilating and air 
conditioning changes, fire services modifications and other building works to 
be carried out. Another part of the scope of the project was to reduce the total 
number of staff for the two sections from 31 to 15. The remaining staff were to 
be trained where necessary by the departing staff. Some new capital equipment 
purchases were included with the project works but were outside its budget. 
 
The IS director’s own pay was linked to his achievement of costs savings. One 
of his aims was to reduce the number and cost of staff in his department to a 
minimum. 
 
 ‘... we had a department which in essence was, 31 people, we’ve 
now got it down to 17. I actually hoped to get it to 15. But we’re at 
17 at the moment it’s the best I’ve been able to go.’ (ISD) 
 
With annual cost savings of £200,000 from salaries the project would have a one-
year payback period. 
 
Change management process 
 
One of the features of the project management process was that the project 
management role was ill-defined. This was reflected in the change drivers’ 
multiple and overlapping perceptions of their own role and that of others. 
 
The IS director identified himself as ‘the brains behind it’, and said of the 
photoservices department manager ‘he was the project manager of this’. The IS 
director saw his role as providing ‘PR and guidance’ while the project 
manager’s was to ‘do the biz’. Despite his identification of the department 
manager as project manager the IS director named two other individuals as 
having responsibility for ‘part of it’, including the building services manager 
and his pre-press manager. The latter had since left the company. 
 
                                                          
 
4 Some skilled technicians on a four-day week were earning £38,000 a year in 1995. 
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The department manager did not see himself as project manager, but named 
three others as being project manager ‘some of the time’, including the pre-
press manager, the building services manager and a technical draughtsman who 
was ‘in charge of the project’ who reported to the building services manager 
but whom neither the IS director nor the building services manager had 
mentioned. The technical draughtsman was later interviewed, and it emerged 
that his role had been simply to translate the requirements for the floor layout 
of the new section into a documented plan. 
 
The IS director was free to achieve the aims of the project in whatever way he 
chose, provided the service to the newspapers was not jeopardized. He declared 
an autocratic style. 
 
 ‘Before we started I had all of the employees together and told 
them what was going to happen, including the fact that there would 
be redundancies, and the reasons why it was going to happen. 
That’s not democratic that’s just me telling them.’ (ISD) 
 
Because of his concern that the department manager and the two supervisors 
reporting to him should be happy with the arrangement he sought their 
contribution to the details of the department’s physical layout and the timing of 
the staff reductions. 
 
 ‘There was I think quite good discussion, communication about 
what the changes were to be... I required that the three of them were 
happy with the plans before they were implemented. That was my 
protection... not protection, that’s the wrong word, I don’t need 
protecting... that was my quality assurance.’ (ISD) 
 
The IS director knew that the older, higher paid photoservices staff were in a 
weak position. He had not given them a routine pay rise in the latest annual 
round. He emphasized the fact that they were overpaid, especially when 
compared with the younger, low-paid operators who were losing their jobs. His 
reason for keeping the higher paid staff was that the older ‘professionals’ were 
more experienced, would look after the equipment better and would provide a 
better service. 
 
 ‘... these guys are professionals with film, and I expected to get, 
and I did get, a more professional handling of the physical 
equipment, and a much better understanding of the quality of 
output which came from the machines.’ (ISD) 
 
The position was further justified by the notion that the photoservices and 




 ‘Customers prefer a more experienced person to a younger person. 
That’s the way life is.’ (ISD) 
 
The IS director saw two potential sources of staff demotivation which threatened 
maintenance of a high level of service during the change. First, some of the 
younger staff knew they were being made redundant, and second, the older 
people were being told they were overpaid. The latter could be mitigated by 
promoting to the photoservices professionals the cv-enhancing benefits of 
learning optronics skills: 
 
 ‘... there’s always the risk of demotivating people, either when you 
have redundancies available but also when you tell people that 
they’re already overpaid... what we were able to do here was by 
adding in the optronics work we’re putting in a new area, a new 
skill, keyboard training, all of the things that enhance the cv of the 
individual, so we’re able to add that in, and it has to be better for an 
individual.’ (ISD)  
 
The IS director expressed his pleasure at being able to help photoservices staff in 
this way. 
 
 ‘they are in a business which is dying. Now it takes a long while to 
die, but it is dying. With the optronics they had a chance to learn 
some skills which will be more appropriate to them, in an electronic 
world. So there’s a ‘sub’ thing there which is of benefit to them as 
individuals rather than necessarily to me. I’m very happy to have 
that situation occur.’ (ISD) 
 
As far as the optronics staff were concerned the IS director was not only 
making some of them redundant, but was having to rely on them to teach their 
skills to the photoservices professionals who would remain. A policy of 
openness was adopted, and two optronics staff were promised jobs elsewhere in 
the organization. No staff were made redundant until the IS director was 
satisfied that the skill transfer had taken place. 
 
 ‘I ran with double staff, to make sure there was enough time for the 
skills to be transferred.’ (ISD) 
 
Apart from potential difficulties with staff, many of the risks of lack of continuity 
were seen to come from the physical aspects of the project, such as equipment 
moves and building works. 
 
 ‘... we had to do all of the work and keep all of the work going at 
the same time. So the risk was the possibility that we would move 
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equipment and not have it available when we needed it to be 
available.’ (ISD) 
 
The department manager was particularly worried about moving the optronics 
scanners. Thanks to a combination of luck, careful preparation and phased 
planning the scanners were moved without trouble. 
 
 ‘... we dealt with that largely by pre-preparing, having the 
receiving area fully prepared for the machines, and then planning 
to move them over two different weekends... we were very lucky 
and we didn’t have any real problems.’ (DM) 
 
The moves were done over as short a time as possible. Much of the riskier work 
was done at night, when the department’s work load was lowest. This ploy paid 
off on one occasion. 
 
 ‘... we had a chemical leak on one occasion, which caused an 
evacuation, caused us to have to evacuate the floor, by fire brigade 
requirements... So that was at four o’clock in the morning... it 
didn’t have any effect on (service).’ (ISD) 
 
A no-expense-spared approach was adopted in contracting for the building and 
equipment moving works. A single external firm which specialized in 
photographic work, and which had originally built the department when ANL 
moved into the building in 1988, was invited to do the work. The firm used 
several sub-contractors (for example electrical work, air conditioning and fire 
services). All of the sub-contractors were paid directly by ANL to avoid the 
possibility of contractual disputes through non-payment by the main contractor. 
 
An unexpected problem arose during the building work. 
 
 ‘... when the ventilation systems were being played with up in the 
ceiling, we were getting dust down during production time... for 
two days that was a very difficult period, but we couldn’t stop.’ 
(ISD) 
 
The photoservices and optronics staff were financially rewarded for coping with 
this disruption during difficult times. 
 
 ‘I gave them a bonus at the end, because they had worked through 
very difficult conditions and had given an excellent service to the 
customers. And bearing in mind that two of them were being made 
redundant at the end of the exercise, and possibly a third one, and 
also that I’d told them they would not be getting any increases 
because they were already overpaid in relation to the marketplace, 
I thought they did superbly well. ‘ (ISD) 
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For the building services manager the project was ‘extremely carefully planned’. 
This meant much verbal liaison between the parties involved but, apart from an 
early issue of an outline bar chart, little of the project schedule was committed to 
paper. The building services manager said he ‘would have liked to do a detailed 
programme’ but there was not enough time, so they planned the detail as they 
went along. 
 
The success of the project was affirmed by the lack of criticism by the 
department’s customers. The new concern over staff levels reflected the 
conflicting aims of cost reduction and service continuity at all times. 
 
 ‘I measure a lot of these things on what people say to me. I have no 
problem, I publish a report every month on optronics and 
photoservices, I’ve not had a single critical statement other than that 
there is concern that we are too... we have too low a staff to deal with 
emergencies.’ (ISD) 
 
The manager of the merged department claimed that the project had already 
proved to be a success on the grounds that the more experienced photoservices 
staff were able to avoid certain problems which had existed before the change. 
 
 ‘... this shows a success there because we don’t have the problems 
that we had at that stage where films would go through to the papers 
that they weren’t clean and had an obvious error on them and things 
like that, now they get picked up.’ (DM) 
 
Completion of the project and the achievement of the full staff reduction was 
slightly delayed by another part of the organization on whom the change 
drivers were dependent. This had slowed the reduction in staff numbers to its 
anticipated level. The IS director was seeking to use work measurement to 
convince the manager of the merged department that the further reduction of two 
staff was achievable. 
 
 ‘I’m now trying to find ways of measuring the work so that I can I 
can prove to him that actually he could have a little more re-
organisation and get down to 15.’ (ISD) 
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5.2.2 Further analysis of management process 
 
The various considerations and the resulting management processes are listed 
in Table 5.3: 
 
Table 5.3: Case 3 Considerations, processes, process categories and 
process dimensions 
 
Ref. Consideration Process Category Dimension 
3.01 A small, self-contained 
project which could be 
handled using the 
normal informal, face-
to-face style. 







3.02 Desire to stress 
inevitability of change, 
including redundancies. 
Initial open verbal 
briefing. 
Justification More 
3.03 Need to ensure physical 
and process 
functionality of new 
arrangement 
Get photoservices 
staff to contribute to 
and agree design 
details 
Participation More 
3.04 Need to reward 
tolerance of, and 
emphasize temporary 
nature of physical 
disruption during 
change. 
Provide bonus for 
working in messy 
conditions.  
Justification More 
3.05 Need to maintain 
motivation of overpaid, 
no-pay rise 
photoservices staff in 
dying profession 
Stress career-




3.06 Need to justify keeping 
more expensive staff 
when the objective was 
to cut costs 
Stress better service 
to customers and 
better equipment 




3.07 Need to ensure skills 
transfer from departing 








Table 5.3 cont./ 
 
3.08 Need to maintain 
motivation of optronics 
staff being made 
redundant 
Show that there may 
be jobs elsewhere in 
the organization for 
some. 
Justification More 







contractor rather than 
in-house department. 
Do moves as quickly 
as possible, but at 






3.10 Remove risk of payment 
disputes between 




External agency Less 















Some adjustments to the definitions and dimensions of the six tactic categories 
presented at the end of Chapter 4 were necessary to give a complete account of 
the Case 3 data. The revised definitions and dimensions, and a summary of 
their application on the photoservices-optronics merger are given below. 
 
1 EXTERNAL AGENTS  
 
Definition:  The use of change consultants, project contractors and other 
‘experts’ from outside the organization. 
Dimensions: More...Less 
 
Because of the specialist nature of the equipment, building and moving works 
were let to a contractor with expertise in photographic equipment. To minimize 
the threat of contractual disputes the contractor’s sub-contractors were paid 





Definition:  The formal documentation and communication of project 
requirements definitions, cost-benefit analyses of the project, 
quality assurance measures and other project plans and controls. 
 
Dimensions: More... Compromised... Less 
 
The project was small, swift and geographically self-contained. An informal, 
face-to-face approach to planning was adopted, based on discussion and 
agreement of details as different issues arose. Work measurement was used to 




Definition:  The pace of an aspect of the project at a particular time. (Relative 
to other aspects or to the same aspect at other times, rather than 
absolute). 
Dimensions: Faster... Compromised... Slower 
 
The physical aspects of the project were handled as quickly as possible, with 
night working, to minimize risk of disruption. There was some staggering of 
moves of duplicated equipment to avoid unavailability of a particular machine 
type at any time. The staff aspects were handled slowly and carefully with a 




Definition:  The involvement of staff other than change drivers in scope 
decisions. 
Dimensions: More... Less 
  Bold... Cautious 
 
An autocratic approach to the change was taken by the IS director. There was a 






Definition: Justifying the content and process of the change both to the 
change drivers themselves and to others. Includes educating and 
promoting to staff the idea that the change was inevitable and 
desirable, that its organizational and individual benefits 
outweighed its organizational and individual costs. 
Dimensions: More... Less 
 
The inevitability of the change was stressed from the outset, and the IS director 
took trouble to mitigate its negative aspects (job losses and evidence of decline) 
by stressing benefits to staff. The photoservices staff would be learning new 
skills. The optronics staff would possibly have opportunities to move to other 
parts of the company. The need to continue to work during the disruption of the 
building works was rewarded with a bonus. 
 
6 ROLE DEFINITION 
 
Definition: The clarity of definition of the respective project management 
roles and responsibilities of the change drivers. 
Dimensions: Clearer... Less clear 
 
Apart from the IS director, who remained close to the details throughout, at 
least four individuals were credited with overlapping project management 
responsibilities. This aspect will be discussed further after the next case. 
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5.3 Case 4: Transfer of the NEAT project 
 
This second case study from Associated Newspapers Ltd. involves another project 
of internal restructuring which the IS director undertook during 1994. The short 
case is set out in three sections. In Section 5.3.1 the case narrative is presented in 
the format: change context, change content, change management process. In 
section 5.3.2 the management processes are summarized in tabular form. In 
section 5.3.3 the six process categories, their definitions and dimensions are again 
defined. 
 
The project with which this case is concerned is the transfer of responsibility for a 
software development project from one part of the organization to another. In that 
sense the subject is a project within a project. In the course of the analysis it 
became clear that much of the data relating to the software project itself could 
provide a great deal of insight into the factors which were influencing the change 
management processes within the company as a whole. For that reason some of 
the issues relating to problems on the software development project are included 
in the case narrative. The implications of this issue are considered in the final part 
of Chapter 5, which brings together the conclusions from all four cases studied so 
far. 
 




In addition to the photoservices and optronics department, the subject of the 
previous case, the IS director was responsible for several other departments, 
including Group Computer Services (GCS) and Group Software Services 
(GSS). The traditional division of responsibilities between these two was that 
GCS supported the company’s hardware needs while GSS dealt with software. 
 
Because of the central importance to ANL of maximizing competitive 
advantage from technological change the IS director employed two 
‘futurologists’, who happened to be located in the GCS department. Their job 
was to monitor developments and trends in information and communications 
technologies, to assess their strategic implications and to predict possible future 
technological directions for ANL. Some of their ideas became speculative 
hardware or software development projects which might, at some future time, 
result in the organization acquiring the knowledge to meet the challenges of 
technological change faster than the competition. 
  
At any given time the GCS (hardware) and GSS (software) departments had 
several such projects at various stages of advancement. Although many ideas 
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never got beyond their preliminary, investigative stages one earlier 
technological prediction by the futurologists had proved correct. They had 
forecast the demise of proprietary terminals connected to character-based 
mainframe computer systems, such as ANL’s editorial system, and their 
replacement by networked personal computers (PC)s. A software development 
project had been initiated some years previously within GCS to deal with this 
coming change. The project was code named NEAT (Next Editorial and 
Advertising Terminal). The network applications manager described the origins of 
NEAT: 
 
 ‘NEAT was produced because we’ve got seven or eight hundred 
users using these proprietary Coyote terminals. These terminals cost 
about seven or eight thousand pounds a time and they do nothing 
except act as a terminal on the editorial mainframe, so if you could 
get a PC to do the same job you could spend fifteen hundred pounds 
and it’ll not only do the job, it would allow you to run Windows, 
Word, Excel, e-mail round the company. It would open up the whole 
wide technical world to anyone who currently uses a Coyote, so 
there were huge advantages but no one world wide has found a way 
of accessing this system from a PC and we’ve got a couple of 
boffins, one in particular who knew how to do it.’ (NAM) 
 
NEAT had started its life as a hardware-related issue in the GCS department. 
However, as it progressed through its stages of development NEAT had become a 
software product. It was about to be formally released to groups of users in 




At the time of the study four dedicated staff were employed on the NEAT project. 
One of these had been responsible for the product’s development from the outset 
and was nominally the project leader, reporting to the manager of GCS. The 
project had been allowed to develop in an informal, unstructured way, and the 
software was undocumented. Its release to users had begun and was already 
showing signs of being badly out of control. When the manager of GCS left the 
company in October 1994 and was replaced by a new man, the IS director took 
the opportunity to make a change. 
 
The scope of the change was simply to move NEAT and its team of four, 
organizationally and physically, out of GCS into GSS. There NEAT would 
become the responsibility of the manager of GSS. She was seen by the IS director 
as possessing the management skills necessary to bring the project under control 
and release NEAT to users in a well-managed fashion. 
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Change management process 
 
The management process for the transfer of NEAT from GCS to GSS was 
straightforward. Few people were involved and there was no cost. The IS director 
simply persuaded the GSS manager that the time was right to move NEAT into 
her department, and she accepted, without realizing what a poor state the project 
was in. 
 
For the IS director the change was a natural progression of a software 
development project from one department to another as it moved through its life 
cycle. 
 
 ‘... this was a project that started, correctly, in a technological area, 
but when the project got through to fruition it was a piece of 
software, and software we deal with in another department, software 
support, as distinct from Group Computer Services.’ (ISD) 
 
In this case there was another impetus for change. NEAT had been championed 
from its inception by the former manager of GCS, who had recently left the 
company. The IS director was taking advantage of this opportunity to impose his 
own will. 
 
 ‘The proposed changes were in part also dictated by the fact that a 
senior manager, my most senior manager, was leaving at the end of 
October, and it gave me an opportunity to move one or two things 
that he held close to his chest into areas where I thought they were 
more appropriate. So it was a second impetus for change in the 
circumstances.’ (ISD) 
 
He felt that, although the project management of NEAT under the departing GCS 
manager had not been bad, its objectives had been allowed to drift. 
  
 ‘The project management wasn’t too bad but the objectives of the 
projects were not involving the customers as much as they needed 
to, and in software services we’re very used to involving the 
customers at all stages in the project.’ (ISD) 
 
The manager of GSS was inheriting the four dedicated NEAT staff. She was also 
effectively inheriting direct responsibility for managing NEAT from that point. 
When asked who was now the project manager for NEAT, she expressed her 
concern at having to take responsibility for a project which, in terms of integration 
and leadership, was worse than she thought. 
 
 ‘Me now, by default... that wasn’t what I... I thought I was taking on 
a project team, and there simply isn’t a project team, in fact there are 
three people... and they don’t even speak to each other until I get 
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them into a room to discuss it, so there is no project management... 
and even worse than that, I knew that there was no project 
management, but there is no project leadership.’ (GSSM) 
 
For the GSS manager, poor project management and poor co-ordination in the 
past had led to the project being out of control. The software product had already 
been released to users in an uncontrolled fashion. This was beginning to cause 
problems. 
 
 ‘I’m really struggling. What I... for instance, it’s actually live, in 
some areas, and it’s hard to catch up with who they’ve delivered it 
to this week. There’s no concept of version control. So there are 
those sorts of things to deal with, and the users are unaware of what 
they should expect or what they’re getting.’ (GSSM) 
 
Another problem was providing support for the new users, including training and 
operating manuals. 
 
 ‘There is no documentation to speak of, so I’ve now got a tech 
writer who is trying to catch up on documentation. There is no 
concept of training... not even a half-day, not even an hour of... you 
know, you’ve now got it installed on your PC and you can use it, 
and let me just run through the... nothing. So I’m trying to put all 
that around it.’ (GSSM) 
 
A further problem she inherited was that the product was being released before it 
had been properly tested. 
 
 ‘... what happens is, you get this deputation, three senior managers 
from the Evening Standard coming and saying NEAT doesn’t work, 
and I’m saying I wasn’t aware that you had it, last time I spoke to 
the developer we hadn’t tested it yet. I don’t need that.’ (GSSM) 
 
A trend in national newspapers is the opening of regional editorial offices, which 
can add value for a newspaper’s customers by providing a local flavour. The 
Daily Mail had recently opened such an office in Glasgow. When the Daily Mail 
was planning its Glasgow office the paper’s chief rival, The Express, was known 
at the time to be considering a Glasgow office. To beat the competition The Daily 
Mail rushed the Glasgow project through in six weeks from conception to 
implementation, with no expense spared. The combination of the Glasgow 
project’s speed and secrecy enabled The Daily Mail to succeed in stealing a 
competitive march on The Express. Unfortunately for the GSS manager, who was 
not in on the secret, she was unaware of the schedule. What she thought was a test 
environment for NEAT turned out to be a live environment, adding to the 
department’s mounting problems with the software. 
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 ‘... up there in Glasgow thinking we were working on a test 
environment. We made a bit of a blunder but shouldn’t have 
mattered too much because it was a test environment. It caused an 
absolute disaster and we discovered that it had gone live that day but 
nobody had told us, it was supposed to be a secret - so secret they 
hadn’t told the people who were supposed to be supporting it.’ 
(GSSM) 
 
Another looming problem which would need to be addressed in the near future 
was that of 24-hour user support for NEAT. GSS staff worked normal nine-to-five 
office hours, and yet editorial copy takers were starting to use NEAT to receive 
copy from around the world, throughout the day and night. This failure to 
anticipate and take steps to resolve inter-divisional issues was seen as typical in 
the organization. The network applications manager foresaw a serious situation. 
 
 ‘... in a month’s time you find the whole thing goes down. It’s 
midnight and various articles don’t get into the paper. I cannot 
imagine who’s head is going to roll over this or where the fingers 
are going to be pointed. And that that’s I would say is a typical 
communication, co-ordination problem. No one is finishing off the 
job.’ (NAM) 
 
Problems were made worse by constant pressure from customers for quick 
solutions to problems. This pressure was felt by the GSS manager to be a 
characteristic of the newspaper industry, with its short-term time horizon. 
 
 ‘... in the newspaper industry, because everything is only a day long, 
the users are more willing to sacrifice that concept of quality to 
expedience, and that’s something I’ve never found in any other 
industry I’ve worked in.’ (GSSM) 
 
She was aware of the need to resist compromising the quality of NEAT by giving 
in to users’ pressures. 
 
 ‘... the one thing that can’t be compromised is quality. No one 
remembers that this piece of crap came in cheap and early, two 
years later, when you’re still having to deal with the problems.’ 
(GSSM) 
 
A general lack of understanding of project management was perceived by the 
GSS manager to be a big problem in the company. 
 
 ‘We generally have I would say a big problem here in terms of 
project management and various people’s understanding of who is 




The problem manifested itself to the GSS manager in the form of lack of co-
ordination between different parts of projects. 
 
 ‘... he manages the project as he sees it but actually that’s just his 
part of the project with which he’s particularly concerned so there’s 
a lot of areas that get no co-ordination at all and that applies to 
NEAT and it applies to Glasgow and it applies to a lot of other 
things.’ (GSSM) 
 
The IS director and the GSS manager had agreed that the NEAT project leader 
had no leadership inclinations. Nevertheless he had been allowed nominally to 
fulfill the role on the basis of his highly regarded technical ability. The lack of 
suitable candidates for the NEAT project manager role had meant that, 
reluctantly, the GSS manager had to take over the role ‘by default’. The IS 
director was suggesting to the beleaguered GSS manager that she could be 
assisted by a junior member of the team as project leader. 
 
 ‘We’ve got a project leader, and this is one of these difficult ones 
that occurs, it’s an issue that we still have though, that was a 
question that the head of Group Software Services and I were 
debating just two weeks ago. We have a star in the team, a 
technological star, absolutely brilliant, highest paid, best rewarded, 
and he aint no project leader. And we’re just debating that we might 
take one of the most junior of the team and make him the project 
leader.’ (ISD) 
 
The obvious solution to the GSS manager, that of bringing in an experienced 
project manager to manage NEAT at such a critical time, was compromised by 
cost pressures. The IS director chose to save on project manager staff costs by 
giving the problems to the GSS manager in this way. The compromise was 
justified by the IS director’s wish not to add unnecessary bureaucracy or more 
time to the project schedule. 
 
 ‘... she’s the one who’s taken it over, and she’s been faced with 
taking a project which has already started and trying to get it into a 
clear and concise methodology, which is the sort of thing she’s more 
used to, but without just adding time to it, without adding 
bureaucracy to it, to any degree greater than we need. There has to 
be some bureaucracy, otherwise you get anarchy, but it’s just a 
question of how little can you have.’ (ISD) 
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5.3.2 Further analysis of management process 
 
The considerations and the resulting processes employed by the IS director are 
listed in Table 5.4: 
 
Table 5.4: Case 4 Considerations, processes, process categories and 
process dimensions 
 
Ref. Consideration Process Category Dimension 
4.01 GCS manager left 
company, creating an 
opportunity for change 
Move NEAT before it got 





4.02 Need to explain why 
NEAT had not been 
moved earlier 
Project management of 
NEAT ‘not bad’ in GCS, 
its former rightful home 
Justification More 
4.03 Need to justify move to 
GSS and get GSS 
manager to accept it 
Logical time to move it - a 
software product with a 
need for more user 
involvement. 
Justification More 
4.04 GSS manager realizing 
that the project is out of 
control and will want an 
expensive project 
manager 
Attribute problems to 
‘boffin’ who had managed 
the project. Deny 
appointment of project 
manager on the grounds of 
avoiding bureaucracy. 
Nominate a junior member 











The management processes adopted by the IS director were simple, and this is 
reflected in the short length of the case study. He simply used his authority to 
impose the structural change on the NEAT team and to reason with the GSS 
manager that the time had come for her to take the project into her department. 
By the time she discovered that NEAT was badly out of control the project 
was already part of her department, and she had no choice but to take direct 
project management responsibility herself, since the IS director would not 
provide any more resources. 
 




1 EXTERNAL AGENTS  
 
Definition:  The use of change consultants, project contractors and other 
‘experts’ from outside the organization. 
Dimensions: More...Less 
 
No external agents were used. A short-term project manager could have been 
brought in to resolve NEAT’s problems but, to minimize costs and 




Definition:  The formal documentation and communication of project 
requirements definitions, cost-benefit analyses of the project, 
quality assurance measures and other project plans and controls. 
Dimensions: More... Compromised... Less 
 
Other than some revised organizational responsibility charts produced by the 
head of personnel there was no formal documentation of the change. The lack 
of project management formality on NEAT itself had led to the project being 





Definition:  The pace of an aspect of the project at a particular time. (Relative 
to other aspects or to the same aspect at other times, rather than 
absolute). 
Dimensions: Faster... Compromised... Slower 
 
As soon as the old GCS manager left the company the IS director, who was just 





Definition:  The involvement of staff other than change drivers in scope 
decisions. 
Dimensions: More... Less 
  Bold... Cautious 
 
There was no participation in the change, other than the process of the GSS 





Definition: Justifying the content and process of the change both to the 
change drivers themselves and to others. Includes educating and 
promoting to staff the idea that the change was inevitable and 
desirable, that its organizational and individual benefits 
outweighed its organizational and individual costs. 
Dimensions: More... Less 
 
The change was justified on the grounds that the rightful home of software 
products was GSS. Its prolonged stay in GCS prior to the change was justified 
by the observation that it wasn’t project management that was the problem, but 
that more account needed to be taken of user requirements. Refusal to appoint a 
dedicated project manager for NEAT was justified on the grounds of cost, time 
and avoiding bureaucracy. 
 
6 ROLE DEFINITION 
 
Definition: The clarity of definition of the respective project management 
roles and responsibilities of the change drivers and their 
delegates. 
Dimensions: Clearer... Less clear 
 
Although the IS director named himself ‘sponsor’ of the restructuring and the 
GSS manager ‘project manager’, the latter had almost no role in the change. 






Two months after the time of the interviews the GSS manager resigned. Shortly 
after that the new managing director of ANL decided that there was too much 
duplication of IT expertise in the group. He created a single department under the 
Evening Standard’s then head of IT. The IS director and almost all his 110 staff 
were fired. Despite having been paid off sufficiently that he would ‘never need to 




5.4 Learning and implications for next stage 
 
Before moving on to the next stage of the study this conclusion to Chapters 4 
and 5 reflects on the course of the research so far. Section 5.4.1 draws together 
the major points of learning and the interim conclusions from the first four case 
studies. The common features of the considerations which give rise to the 
management processes are discussed in Section 5.4.2, with the view that the 
processes may be considered a reflection of the change drivers’ possession of 
or desire for control. Two relevant perspectives of managerial control are 
reviewed and related to the study: project control and personal control. In 
Section 5.4.3 implications for the next stage of the fieldwork are identified. 
 
5.4.1 Learning and interim conclusions 
 
Considerations and management processes 
 
The case studies presented in Chapter 4 (Ealing Hospital NHS Trust) and 
Chapter 5 (Associated Newspapers Ltd.) are the result of an open-ended, 
iterative analytical process which was developed and refined over the course of 
the studies. The process, described in Chapter 3, has in each case enabled 
elements of the external and internal context of change, the project content and 
the management process to be identified, coded, dimensioned, and defined. 
Diagrammatic mapping of the data aided the analytical process and the writing 
of the case narratives. Each element of management process was attributed to a 
‘consideration’, attended to by one or more change drivers. 
 
Case study formats 
 
A broadly similar format for the narratives of the four case studies was found to 
be appropriate, with the context of the project described first, followed by a 
summary of its declared purpose and scope (content), leading to the instances 
of employed management process. Two of the case presentations deviated 
slightly from this format. In Case 2 (Updating of Hospital Information 
Systems) a clearer presentation of the case could be made by describing the 
content before the context. A more detailed examination of part of the project 
which had failed provided a deeper understanding of the overall management 
processes in context. In Case 4 (Transfer of the NEAT Project) some of the 
aspects of the management process of the NEAT project itself (as opposed to 
its transfer) gave valuable insights into project management process issues in 
the company. However, the small size of the ANL projects was found to place 
significant limitations on the range and depth of analysis possible. 
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Range of informants 
 
One of the aims of the research is to bring together a fuller range of 
interpretations of management processes by internal change drivers, including 
the project manager(s) and the project sponsor(s). In Cases 1 and 2, where each 
project had a clearly identified single sponsor and single manager the value of 
including in the analysis the interpretations of both informants was confirmed. 
In Cases 3 and 4 a wider range of informants was interviewed. Because of the 
fragmented and loose definition of management responsibilities in Case 3 
(Amalgamation of Photoservices and Optronics) the desirability was again 
verified of including all individuals who were identified as drivers of part or all 
of the change. The interpretations of individuals other than change drivers were 
helpful in providing background data and confirming factual information. 
However, they added no new management process data. This applied both to 
subjects of the change (the photoservices supervisors) and to those involved 
peripherally (the IT Facilitator, the Network Applications Manager and the 
Head of Personnel). Perhaps this lack of additional insight into management 
processes is not surprising, given that the standpoint of the study is the 
perspective of the change drivers. 
 
Interpretations of projects and project management 
 
The subject of the study is the management of projects of change. Although 
neither the trust’s chief executive nor ANL’s IS director had any hesitation in 
identifying their own projects it was clear that their management styles, 
including their understanding and application of project management 
principles, were markedly different. There was some evidence that this 
difference existed in the organizations as a whole as well as in the individual 
change drivers’ approaches. By providing a wider spread of project contexts 
the use of paired cases in the two organizations helped to highlight the 
importance of context, including project orientation, to the determination of 
management process. The data show that the extent and nature of project 
management culture in each organization had clear implications for the 
management processes of the projects of change. 
 
Specifically, the NHS was accustomed to managing internal change initiatives 
as projects, in a formal sense, with project steering committees and 
‘methodologies’. NHS publications make explicit recommendations concerning 
projects and project management. For example, in their guide to NHS Trusts 
the NHSME advocate that when hospitals apply for trust status, ‘... the task is 
best undertaken by a project team with a designated project manager able to 
give proper leadership to the development of the proposals’ (NHSME, 1990). 
The informants’ familiarity with the basic concepts of project management and 
with its methodologies illustrated their presence in NHS culture. 
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In ANL the situation was markedly different. Whether through innocence or 
intent some of the most basic tenets of project management were at times 
absent, even on projects with a high technical content. The need to stay focused 
on objectives, and the concept of a project manager as the point of integrative 
responsibility, were both given scant regard. There was evidence in the data 
that this attitude was of central relevance to the process of change in ANL, not 
just within the IS director’s domain but throughout the company. 
 
Common management process elements 
 
The characteristics of the four projects of change were significantly different, 
both within and between organizations. All four were classed as ‘projects of 
internal change’, yet in terms of context, purpose, size, duration, urgency, 
uncertainty, definition, and technological content the projects were in many 
ways dissimilar. In addition to differences in management process arising from 
the projects themselves and from their organizational settings, the change 
drivers were clearly aware that the management processes were, at least in part, 
attributable to their own individual experiences and personal preferences. In all 
four cases, however, each instance of management process in the data could be 
placed into one of six categories, which together defined the boundaries of a 
limited repertoire of processes. The dimensions and definitions of the six 
categories were progressively refined to include all the management process 
data. 
 
5.4.2 Managerial control 
 
Having, at this intermediate stage in the study, tentatively settled upon these six 
categories of management process, the question arises: what common features 
are shared by the ‘considerations’ which give rise to the management process 
responses? How might they be classified, and what theories exist which can 
help explain them? The case studies tend to confirm March and Shapira’s 
(1988) assertions that managers believe they can reduce risks by using their 
skills to control dangers, and further that their actions may be better understood 
in terms of attention paid to selected issues rather than notions of decision 
making on the basis of complete information. The data show that, having 
decided to implement a project of change, the managers’ subsequent actions 
may be considered as attempts to reduce their risk of blame for failure and 
enhance their prospects of achieving or being associated with success by 
exercising control over certain selected aspects of the change. 
 
Two different perspectives of managerial control are relevant to studies of 
management processes in projects of organizational change. First, there is the 
idea of control mechanisms which are applied by managers. All institutions, by 
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their very nature, control human conduct (Berger and Luckman, 1966). The 
very existence of an institution implies and embodies a primary level of social 
control of its individual members by the institution’s culture, and ‘additional 
control mechanisms are required only in so far as the processes of 
institutionalization are less than completely successful’ (Berger and Luckman, 
1966: 73). Modernist perspectives of control in the field of organization theory, 
including the standardization of behaviour through bureaucracies, are described 
by Hatch (1997). She identifies that perspective of control which is related to 
ideas of bureaucracy as the cybernetic5 model of performance evaluation and 
feedback. At the project level this theory constitutes one of the core themes of 
project management. As such it is of central relevance to this study. 
 
The second perspective of control which would appear to be important relates 
to individual managers’ perceptions of their own ability to exercise control 
over their environment. This is the psychological construct known as ‘personal 
control’ (Greenberger and Strasser, 1986). In the present study a certain 
perceived level of personal control over their environment is implicit in change 
drivers’ initial declared intentions to implement planned change. Expressions 
of personal control beliefs are further embodied in the change drivers’ 
subsequent actions which make up the totality of the management process of 
the change. 
 
These two meanings of control, project control and personal control, are 
explored in the following sections. It is argued first that the presence or absence 
of project control is a key aspect of change project management, and second 
that the personal control perspective has the potential to provide fresh insight 
into attempts to understand how management processes in projects of 
organizational change may be studied as responses to managers’ interpretations 




This study’s concern with project management processes draws attention to 
theories of project control, since in project management literature control is 
central to the project manager’s role. The sense of the concept of control in the 
context of project management is performance evaluation and feedback, using 
a mechanical analogy. In a typical treatment Spinner (1992) defines project 
control as: 
 
 ... taking the necessary action on those items shown [by the 
performance monitoring process] to be drifting. (Spinner, 1992: 
51) 
                                                          
5 Cybernetics is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as ‘the science of systems of control and 
communications in animals and machines.’ 
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This emphasis on action, as opposed to simple monitoring, is made by others, 
including Andersen, Grude and Haug (1995: 151). They pursue the notion that 
control is often mistakenly identified by project participants with reporting 
bureaucracy, and assert that ‘control is management, not paperwork.’ 
 
The aim of managers who seek to control projects in this way is the setting and 
achievement of objective measures of project performance, often expressed as 
cost, schedule and quality goals. For many writers on project management, 
these three sets of goals are self-evidently in conflict, representing the 
‘impossible triangle’ for the project manager, who must juggle their priorities 
according to the demands of the particular project (see for example Turner, 
1993a; Lock, 1996). According to Clark and Lorenzoni (1978) the three 
corners of the triangle have ‘equal priority’ for the project manager. For others 
priorities are pre-set. For example, the central importance of cost control, 
especially in the context of projects with high capital expenditure, is 
emphasized by King (1968, cited in Kharbanda et. al. 1980: xvii) who asserts 
that ‘cost control is project management’. 
 
The importance of project control to managers of projects of organizational 
change is less well-established or understood, especially when control of 
project costs is of significantly less interest to project managers than the 
reaction of organizational members to the change and the performance of the 
organization after the change. In Section 2.2 evidence was examined that 
rational notions of project control have been over-emphasized, both in theory 
and in practice, at the expense of other less formalized processes. It was 
concluded that, although this may once have been the case, the inadequacy of 
purely mechanistic models of project management is now widely accepted. In 
Section 2.3 Buchanan and Boddy’s (1992) conception of control was 
mentioned as being but one of three project management ‘agendas’. Control 
expertise is identified by those authors as an essential component of the 
managerial repertoire of the change agent, along with technical competence 
(the ‘content agenda’) and political and communications skills (the ‘process 
agenda’). The ‘control agenda’ is discussed as follows: 
 
 Conventional project management texts and training courses 
concentrate on project control methodologies, such as critical path 
analysis and budgeting techniques. The project manager is thus 
expected to be familiar and competent with a range of planning, 
scheduling, budgeting, resourcing and monitoring techniques, 
with setting and meeting deadlines and targets. Problems with 
project monitoring and control are typically blamed in cases of 
delay or overspend. Project management training courses 
conventionally dwell on these issues to the exclusion of the other 
two agendas... (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992: 70) 
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Section 2.3 described how the research of these writers shows how the relative 
priorities for the change agent of the three agendas is dependent on the context 
of change (Buchanan, 1991; Buchanan and Boddy, 1992). They find that, while 
control is not the top priority of the three agendas in any of the contexts 
studied, it is of significant importance in all of them.  
 
Cases 3 and 4, in Associated Newspapers, show that conventional project 
control was conspicuous by its absence, both in the two projects which 
constitute the primary focus of the case studies and in the NEAT and Glasgow 
projects, which are incidental. The low priority given to formal control appears, 
at least in part, to stem from lack of project control expertise, as well as from 
the projects’ size (small, short duration) and from the culture of the company as 
a whole (based on short time horizons and an attitude of ‘beat the competition 
at all costs’). 
 
The hospital case studies throw further light on the application of project 
control. In Case 1 (Clinical Directorates) there was some attempt to adhere to 
rudimentary project management ideas, including defining change drivers’ 
roles and planning the stages of the structural change in outline form. However, 
the goals of the project were more concerned with the performance of the trust 
as a whole, and less with the (minimal) cost of making the change, so the 
application of project control was of marginal relevance. 
 
Case 2 (Hospital Information Systems), on the other hand, was concerned with 
tangible computer systems, budgets and externally-imposed controls. The 
concept of control, in a project management sense, was central to the case. 
Interestingly, however, the project manager was not concerned with applying 
project control in order to set and achieve project objectives so much as with 
avoiding project control in order to obscure their non-setting or non-
achievement. 
 
In all four cases the importance of project control to the study was reflected in 
the emergence and development of Formality as one of the six process 
categories. 
 
Personal control  
 
The second view of control which would seem to be relevant to interpretations 
of the initiation and implementation of organizational change is change drivers’ 
beliefs about the extent to which they have control over their environment. This 




 the individual’s beliefs, at a given point in time, in his or her 
ability to effect a change, in a desired direction, on the 
environment. (Greenberger and Strasser, 1986:165) 
 
Parkes (1989) identifies three distinct facets of personal control in the work 
environment. For the researcher, each of these facets implies a different 
ontological and epistemological position. Personal control may be thought of as 
a subjective construction of reality, as an objective characteristic of reality or as 
a stable personality variable. These three facets are described below, with 
examples of their application. 
 
1 Control is a subjective construct ‘which reflects the situational 
characteristics as appraised or evaluated in the light of the beliefs, 
attitudes and expectations of the individuals concerned’ (Parkes 1989: 
22). This subjective view of personal control has been applied at the 
level of strategic management by Dutton and Jackson (1987), who build 
a conceptual model relating organizational action to the labelling by 
managers of strategic issues as threats or opportunities. The model 
adopts an interpretive view of organizational decision making, in which 
certain issues penetrate top management’s ‘strategic filter’. Those issues 
which are categorized as threats are likely to be attributed certain 
negative qualities including lower personal control. Opportunities, on 
the other hand, will be associated with higher control. 
 
2 Control is an intrinsic, objective characteristic of the situation. This 
realist position is adopted by Milburn, Schuler and Watman (1983a; 
1983b), who develop a typology of eight kinds of organizational crisis 
based on three dimensions: organizational control over the environment, 
opportunity-threat and susceptibility. Using examples of both preventive 
and reactive strategies, a prescriptive model of individual and 
organizational response to crisis is developed which includes, for 
example, decentralization in times of ‘uncontrolled’ crisis (i.e. 
undesirable environmental issues over which managerial opportunities 
for control are absent). 
 
3 Control is a dimension of individual difference. The individual 
difference variable known as locus of control derives from the work of 
Rotter (1966). According to this view individuals who tend to attribute 
control over events to their own actions are said to have an internal 
locus of control, while those who attribute control to outside forces are 
said to have an external locus of control. Many studies of personal 
control which take this position have been conducted by organizational 
and occupational psychologists concerned with measuring the impact of 
work conditions on employee well-being and satisfaction. Spector 
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(1986) reports a meta-analysis of studies concerned with job design and 
employee participation. He finds that high levels of personal control are 
commonly associated with high levels of job satisfaction, commitment, 
involvement, performance and motivation, and with low levels of 
physical symptoms, emotional distress, role stress, absenteeism and 
turnover. The importance of this view of personal control and its 
implications for job design are clear. 
 
The three examples given above affirm Parkes’ (1989) assertion that the 
interpretation of the control construct in any particular study depends on the 
conceptual and methodological focus of the study. This research is based on 
managers’ perceptions of their reality, which implies adoption of the subjective 
view of personal control in addition to the objective. Apart from this 
methodological consideration there is support in the literature that individuals’ 
subjective perceptions of the extent of their control over the environment play a 
more important role in determining their responses to situations than the 
objective reality of the situation (Parkes 1989). The aptness of the subjectively 
interpreted view of the environment in this context is further supported by 
Greenberger and Strasser’s (1986) observation that: 
 
 Individuals are exposed to a great deal of information, but the 
adjustments they make to their control perceptions are based only 
on those particular events to which they attend. (Greenberger and 
Strasser, 1986:169, emphasis in original) 
 
The concept of control as a generalized belief (an individual’s locus of control) 
clearly has some relevance to this study, in which the main source of data is 
interviews with individuals. The attention by change drivers to particular issues 
and the nature of their response to those issues will be determined by their 
individual knowledge, skills and attitudes, as well as by personality factors, 
including, to the extent that it has explanatory value, their locus of control. 
Differences in locus of control between individuals have, however, been found 
to account for little explained variance between ‘work-related outcomes’ 
(Parkes, 1989:39). Further, Greenberger and Strasser (1986) argue that personal 
control ‘is not a stable and enduring personality attribute’. It is a cognitive 
construct, based on perception, and can change over time. To that extent 
psychometric measures of locus of control are less relevant to this study than 
the subjective, interpreted perspectives of individual managers. 
 
Returning to the case studies, each consideration/management process pairing 
could be described and explained by the following general proposition: 
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Each consideration represents an interpretation of an issue over which the 
change driver feels a degree of personal control, ranging from no control 
to a lot of control. The management process response to the issue is an 
expression of that personal control.  
 
Taking an example from Case 1 (Clinical Directorates), one of the 
considerations was the potential of the clinicians to reject change in general, 
and the new structure in particular. Some of the aspects of the chief executive’s 
response to this threat expressed low perceived control. He adopted a cautious, 
incremental approach to reform, postponing the implementation of ‘TQM’ until 
the clinical directorates and their performance monitoring systems were in 
place. He was careful to involve the clinicians in the details of the decision 
process, and took trouble to stress both the external threats which made the 
change necessary and the internal benefits which would ensue, both for the 
organization and its employees. Other aspects of the management process 
showed how, once he had committed himself to the change the chief 
executive’s feeling of control over the situation in general enabled him to place 
limits on the extent to which he was prepared to defer to the clinicians’ 
disruptive potential. The opportunity for change had been enhanced by the 
recent operational problems, by the chief executive’s newness to the trust and 
by the driving force of the annual business planning cycle. 
 
The multi-dimensional nature of personal control implied in the above example 
has been acknowledged by Jackson and Dutton (1988), who mention 
autonomy, resources and competence as three distinct generalized aspects of 
perception of control in the context of threat and opportunity. It is not clear, 
however, that the various dimensions of personal control in the example are 
satisfied by these three. They do not, for example, allow the explicit cover of 
the dimensions of opportunity and lack of resistance by those subjects of 
change with the power to block the change. Both of these are, arguably, aspects 
of personal control which are not satisfactorily included in notions of 
autonomy, resources or competence. In this study there is an opportunity to 
clarify the categories and dimensions of personal control and their relationship 
with management process, by way of the same analytical process as that which 
was used to unearth the management process categories and dimensions. 
 
To summarize this review of managerial control it is argued that: 
 
1 Both project control and personal control are important concepts for 
understanding change management processes. The presence or absence 
of project control is a component of management process, and all 
aspects of management process are expressions of personal control. 
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2 The subjective view of personal control has methodological ‘fit’ with 
this study, in which managers respond to their selective perceptions of 
external reality. The quantifiable locus of control view of the individual 
is a less appropriate way of building understanding of change 
management processes. 
 
3 Existing categorizations of subjective personal control may be 
inadequate in describing the case study examples. An opportunity exists 
to explore and categorize the construct, using a constant comparative 
approach, and thus to examine from a new perspective how management 
process is affected by context. 
 
5.4.3 Implications for next stage 
 
Following the theoretical sampling approach, the lessons and conclusions from 
Cases 1 to 4 and from the review of project control and personal control point 
towards the next part of the study having certain ideal features: 
 
1 The organizational setting for the project(s) of change should have a 
culture of project management which is both strong (in contrast with the 
newspaper group) and core to the business (in contrast with the 
hospital). 
 
2 To enable a rich, multi-faceted study to be made the project(s) should be 
large and important to the organization (unlike the newspaper group 
projects). This would appear to be more important than the need for 
paired projects. The organization itself should not be so large as to 
render infeasible the achievement of depth. 
 
3 The policy of identifying and interviewing all principal change drivers 
should be pursued. 
 
4 The same analytical process should be followed, with an additional 
focus on personal control as a central feature of internal context. 
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6 RESULTS FROM BECHTEL 
 
At the end of Chapter 5 it was argued that a suitable subject for the next case 
study would be a major project of change in a project oriented company. 
Informal enquiries among colleagues associated with major project industries 
led to the identification of engineering contractor Bechtel as a potentially 
appropriate setting. The organization’s London office was known to be in the 
middle of a radical two-year project of organizational change. While the 
initiative had implications for the whole multi-national Bechtel group it was 
being spearheaded and driven from the London-based division of the company, 
Bechtel Ltd. A formal written approach was made to the senior management of 
Bechtel’s London office, setting out the research aims and access requirements. 
Despite warnings from construction industry observers that the company was 
notoriously unapproachable by researchers, the research topic and approach 
were apparently deemed sufficiently interesting and non-controversial for 
access to be granted. 
 
In Section 6.1 the background of the Bechtel group is outlined, and details of 
access and informants briefly described. Relevant details of the process of data 
collection and analysis are presented. 
 
The case study (Case 5) is presented in Section 6.2. First the case narrative is 
presented in the context-content-management process format. The concept of 
personal control is then developed, defined and related to management process. 
The case is then presented in tabular form and the six process elements 
discussed in relation to personal control. 
 
In Section 6.3 learning from the case is summarized and the implications of the 





Bechtel is a US-based multinational engineering, procurement and construction 
(EPC) contractor. With offices in more than thirty countries the company’s 
worldwide interests are, for the EPC sector, unusually diverse, both 
geographically and in the type of projects undertaken. Bechtel has a history of 
achievement around the world on major projects in petrochemicals, power, 
mining, and civil engineering. The company’s employees are said to take pride 
in the association of the Bechtel name with a great many prominent projects, 
from the carving of Mount Rushmore to the reinstatement of the Kuwaiti oil 
fields after the invasion by Iraq. Bechtel was founded in 1898 as a ‘two mule 
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grading team’1. As an indication of its size in 1995 the company recorded 
$12.5 billion worth of new orders in that year. Uniquely among its competitors 
Bechtel remains a privately-owned American ‘family’ firm with a traditional, 
conservative self-image. 
 
Until just before the time of the data collection, in the first half of 1996, the 
Bechtel corporation had been centrally controlled by an ‘executive committee’ 
consisting of owner and CEO Riley Bechtel and a few close associates, based 
in the corporation’s San Francisco head office. At the end of 1995, in response 
to commercial pressures and following the appointment of a former head of the 
McKinsey consulting outfit as group vice-president, executive management 
was restructured from a central executive committee into local operating 
committees. Profit responsibility for the company’s worldwide operations was 
devolved to four regional execution units: North America, 
Europe/Africa/Middle East/Southwest Asia (EAMS), Asia Pacific, and Latin 
America. The head office of EAMS was Bechtel Ltd., in Hammersmith, west 
London. Its project of internal reorganization is the subject of this study. 
 
Following an informal discussion with a Bechtel employee and a subsequent 
formal, written approach to the company’s senior management a preliminary 
interview was set up between the researcher and the company’s operations 
manager. The latter had had considerable involvement in the reorganization from 
the outset, initially as project sponsor and later as head of one of the departments 
which was to be the main recipient of the impact of the changes. He described the 
reorganization as two projects, separate but related, each with a designated project 
manager. He identified five key change drivers in all. These were himself, the two 
project managers, the manager of engineering and the regional office manager 
(the top manager in EAMS). In addition two of the company’s operational project 
managers, who were not associated with the change management process, were 
identified who could give a potentially broader perspective of the change, from 
the operational level. 
 
The characteristics of the two projects are summarized in Table 6.1. 
 
                                                          
1 Source: Bechtel 1996 Global Report 
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Table 6.1: Comparison of the two Bechtel Ltd. project characteristics 
 
 Project 1 (Case 5a) Project 2 (Case 5b) 
Title Project optimization Technical resources 
Origin Commercial pressure to 
reduce Total Installed Cost 
(TIC) by 30%. (TIC is the 
cost of a project to 
Bechtel’s client.) 
Need to centralize the 




Nature of scope Complete operational 
reorganization, to be 
applied on all future 
business projects. 
Structural reorganization. 
Drivers identified Regional office manager 
and operations manager 




Regional office manager 
and operations manager 




Main driver Project manager Project manager 
Status Mid-way through a two-











emerging. Expected to be 
handed over by project 
manager mid 1997. 
Resources Several million dollars-worth of overhead manhours 
were formally allocated to the combined reorganization. 
 
The titles and roles of the five change drivers and the two additional project 
managers are listed in Table 6.2: 
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Table 6.2: Bechtel Ltd. interviewees 
 
Title Ref. Role on Project 1 Role on Project 2 
Regional office 
manager (EAMS) 
ROM Initiator, co-sponsor Initiator, co-sponsor 
Operations 
manager 
OM Co-sponsor Co-sponsor 
Project manager 1 PM1 Project manager Interested party 
Project manager 2 PM2 Interested party Project manager 
Engineering 
manager 






for technical staffing 
Operational project 
manager 1 
OPM1 None, but would in 
future need to operate in 




OPM2 None, but would in 
future need to operate in 
the new structure 
none 
 
Interviews were conducted between January 1996 and June 1996. Each lasted 
between one and two hours. All interviews except that with operational project 
manager 2 were tape recorded and fully transcribed. (The interview with 
operational project manager 2 was an unscheduled opportunity. Detailed notes 
were taken.) Project manager 1 and the operations manager were interviewed 
twice over the period. The interviews were loosely structured around the 
informant’s background, the company’s worldwide competitive position and 
the reasons for the changes, their role on the project(s) and the roles of others. 
A one-hour formal presentation on the changes by project manager 1 was also 
witnessed and recorded. Archival data included presentation slides, company 
reports, an internal document detailing the projects’ objectives and scope, and 
an organizational chart showing the new reporting structure.  
 
The two projects were closely related and interdependent. For the purposes of 
presentation and analysis it was found appropriate to combine the two as a single 
case study, here labelled Case 5. The data were analyzed in the same way as 
Cases 1 to 4, starting with the outline framework of inner and outer context, 
content and management process and categorizing data from scratch. In 
addition to analyzing instances of management process and the specific 
considerations which gave rise to those processes, categories and dimensions of 
personal control were identified and coded. 
 
There was some overlap between informants’ accounts, particularly with regard 
to the details of the context and content of the changes. However, in addition 
each of the five main change drivers contributed much unique data from their 
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individual perspectives, from which a detailed picture of the combined 
management process of this complex project emerged. The two operational 
project managers had not been involved in devising the shape of the changes, 
nor in implementing them. Their contributions were limited to factual 
confirmation. Four of the change drivers clearly enjoyed a great deal of mutual 
respect and co-operation, and between these four there were no significant 
disagreements over who had done what and why. There was evidence that the 
fifth, the engineering manager, was not truly a member of the ‘inner circle’ of 
top management. Some of his perceptions, which were not shared by the 
others, reflected both this exclusion and the fact that his involvement was 
limited to implementing the details of part of the change. 
 
A detailed draft report of the analysis was sent to all five change drivers 
inviting their comments, corrections and suggestions for improvement. The 
operations manager telephoned his approval. Project manager 2 returned his 
copy with some minor factual embellishments (and some grammatical 
polishing of his own quotes). Project manager 1 wrote enthusiastically about 
the informative nature of the analysis. The regional office manager and the 
engineering manager did not respond. 
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6.2 Case 5: Project optimization and Technical resources 
 
This section presents the combined case study for the two linked projects of 
internal change in Bechtel Ltd., London, which were in progress in the first half of 
1996. The two projects were, first, the establishment of a new, horizontally-
integrated ‘project optimization centre’, and second, the creation of a central 
‘technical resources management’ group. 
 
The case is presented in three sections, following a format similar to that of cases 
1 to 4. Section 6.2.1 contains the case narrative, structured around the context, 
content and process of the change. Section 6.2.2 begins by introducing and 
defining the personal control construct on five dimensions which have been 
distilled from the data using the same iterative coding technique which was used 
to develop the management process dimensions. The case is then summarized in 
tabular form, showing instances of management process and the considerations 
which gave rise to them. The table also shows related feelings of personal control 
which are supported by the data. Section 6.2.3 contains a brief discussion of the 
six elements of management process in relation to the five elements of personal 
control. 
 




Increasingly since the mid-1980s a powerful combination of changes in the 
commercial environment of global EPC contractors had brought a new set of 
challenges which, for all but the most specialized firms in the sector, demanded 
an unprecedented strategic response. The changes presented a growing threat to 
the continuing prosperity and ultimate survival of Bechtel and its many 
competitors. The changing demands on Bechtel’s operations which had been 
exposed in the years leading up to this study reflected the wide-ranging 
complexity and commercial turbulence of the sector in general. 
 
The business was now characterized by extreme competitiveness. As the 
competition reached out into all geographical areas and into all segments of the 
EPC market there was becoming less to distinguish the major players. There 
was increasing pressure on contractors to offer their clients better value for 
money and shorter project schedules. A relative market collapse in Europe and 
a boom in the Far East had been accompanied by intense competition at the 
lower end of the market as more companies around the world developed the 
capability to provide detailed engineering design. In response to this trend, 
cost-saving initiatives which nibbled at the margins of operational efficiency 
would no longer be enough. Bechtel’s operations in the USA and Europe were 
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suffering under the high cost of western labour. The company was, on many 
projects, simply no longer in a position to compete, particularly on the 
relatively mundane ‘production’ work of detailed engineering design. With 
advanced telecommunications technology this could be done on modern CAD 
facilities by low-cost workers in countries such as India for a quarter of the 
cost. 
 
Bechtel’s managers saw a need to respond in several ways to this growing 
threat. They would turn their attention to the high knowledge, high value-added 
end of the business, in particular the front-end conceptual engineering phase of 
projects. They would form alliances with suppliers, clients and other 
contractors, and would seek new ways of cutting out the project delays and 
rework which resulted from the traditional compartmentalization of 
engineering, procurement and construction operations. They would create a 
self-regenerating ‘learning organization’, able to pool its global knowledge and 
hence maintain a position of pre-eminence in EPC practice. 
 
Effective action was made difficult by a number of additional complications. 
Clients’ decision authority for capital expenditure was being increasingly 
delegated to their local operations management, which tended to increase the 
diversity of business approaches needed. The swing away from cost-
reimbursable work towards fixed price lump sum contracts exposed 
competitive weaknesses, particularly in EAMS where there was no buffer of 
low-risk US government work. The demand for highest net present value 
facilities which could be achieved through lower-cost standardized plants or 
more efficient process technologies brought the need for specialization and for 
alliance with particular process owners. Clients were placing heavy 
requirements on contractors by demanding their own way in deciding how 
things were done, even on lump sum contracts where the contractor bore much 
of the financial risk. 
 
In response to this complex set of forces, Bechtel’s London-based operation, 
which had over 1000 staff based in its Hammersmith office, had committed to a 
radical change initiative with two closely-related themes, each designated as an 
internal project. 
 
1 Project optimization. Radical restructuring of the engineering, 
procurement and construction business processes, as part of the 
objective of reducing the total installed cost of facilities (i.e. the cost to 
clients). 
 
2 Technical resources. Removing staffing responsibilities from technical 





The reorganization was the London office contribution to Bechtel’s global EPC 
Process Innovation (EPCPI) initiative. The initiative was part of Bechtel’s 
ongoing strategic response to changes in its commercial environment, and had 
the stated aim of increasing value to the customer by 30%. Overall 
responsibility for delivering the changes in London was divided between two 
managers. One was establishing a new, horizontally integrated ‘project 
optimization centre’. The other was setting up a ‘technical resources 
management’ group. This section briefly outlines the purpose and scope of 
their tasks. 
 
Project optimization. The ultimate aims of the project optimization project 
were to increase value to clients and shorten project schedules, to change the 
focus of the operation to suit fixed price lump sum work, and to create a 
‘learning organization’ and multi-discipline centre of technical excellence. 
 
The scope of the change was to restructure the organization both physically and 
administratively from the traditional EPC functional/project matrix 
configuration with vertically distinct divisions and multiple interfaces to a 
horizontally integrated organization. In the new set-up multi-functional asset 
management teams would have responsibility for an entire work package, from 
initial conception and design, through to final handover to the client. 
 
The design of the new organization included a plant optimization centre for 
front end engineering with three major groupings: 
  
1 Engineering and design optimization (the rump of the old engineering 
organization split horizontally into three groupings: conceptual 
engineering, project definition, and specialist engineering.) 
 
2 Supply strategy (to optimize the supply chain). 
 
3 Execution optimization (to optimize the execution process, including 
construction activities). 
 
The key to the success of the new approach was that the optimization centre 
would produce studies and designs as a packaged product which included 
process and utility flow diagrams, piping and instrumentation diagrams, 
material take-offs, requisitions for long lead items, execution plans and cost 
control estimates. The whole optimized package with its core team could then 
be turned over to the next stage of the project for detail engineering and 
execution, either in London or elsewhere, including low cost execution centres 
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in the Far East, with a higher degree of pre-definition, and hence minimal 
rework. 
 
Multi-Project Acquisition Groups (MPAGs) consisting of engineers, buyers 
and vendors would be set up. Working as integrated teams, these would 
eliminate the traditional bureaucratic communication interfaces between these 
parties and dramatically reduce the bid-evaluate-commit cycle time. The 
MPAGs would create multi-project agreements with key suppliers, with pre-
defined terms and conditions, including pricing and technical specifications. 
Immediate on-line access to vendor data would be available. 
 
In addition to the restructuring, the changes involved rationalization and 
simplification of systems and procedures to suit the new streamlined 
organization, and development of the electronic knowledge bank for the whole 
Bechtel organization. 
 
Technical resources. The purpose of the second aspect of the changes was to 
create a more mobile and more versatile workforce, which had a broader scale 
of involvement in projects, and which was able to fill positions in the new 
project optimization centre and in project execution. Opportunities for staff 
development would be improved by centralizing the project staffing function, 
removing the traditional departmental barriers to moving people freely around 
the organization. A further benefit would be the release of engineering talent by 
allowing engineering managers complete dedication to technical tasks rather 
than expecting them to perform staffing duties as well. 
 
The scope of this change was simply to take responsibility for staff allocation 
away from technical departments and place all job opportunities in a central 
location from which the workforce could be assigned by a dedicated, 
committed team of human resource specialists. 
 
Change management process 
 
In the years leading up to the projects described above Bechtel Ltd. in London 
had been through a succession of corporate-wide change initiatives driven from 
its USA headquarters, including ‘waste elimination’ and customer-focused 
quality drives. The company’s owner and CEO, who had recently taken over 
the reins of the family business from his father, was perceived by some 
informants as being particularly prone to management ‘fads’. Previous schemes 
had been seen to fail through staff’s ability to pay lip service, pledging their 
commitment to the latest corporate initiative while failing to take any real 
action. Senior managers in London, who were often concerned with more 
immediate problems, had experienced a lack of control over the 
implementation of ‘cultural’ change. This contributed to the decision to appoint 
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an outside consultant for the EPCPI initiative, Coopers and Lybrand, to work 
with Bechtel in London and come up with a set of recommendations for radical 
change. 
 
 ‘[the regional office manager] took that up, with the intention 
of formally making something happen rather than just paying 
lip service to it, and he set up the Coopers team.’ (OM) 
 
Bechtel staff were assigned to work with Coopers and Lybrand, but Bechtel 
involvement in the study was hampered by attention to other issues. Without 
the consultant’s detached dedication to the study, it might have lost its impetus. 
  
 ‘Coopers came in, and we put several people with them, but 
over the... I think they were here six months, over the period 
they were here, that Bechtel involvement with it was a bit hit 
and miss, and it was really because Coopers were being paid 
to do that study with us that they forced the study to 
completion.’ (OM) 
 
The consultants were able to complete the study within six months. Its output 
consisted of a set of detailed recommendations of how Bechtel should ‘re-
engineer’ its London operation. Although many of the recommendations were 
aimed at correcting organizational problems which were already known to 
exist, the report was generally well received by the regional office manager. 
However, because the findings of the Coopers and Lybrand study were 
expected to be used in the USA as well as in London there was some hesitance 
on the part of the regional office manager to rush into implementing them 
without agreement and guidance from Houston and San Francisco. 
 
Internally the report was distributed to department heads and some preliminary 
discussions were held. The regional office manager found that the department 
heads were intent on resisting the changes by casting doubt on their wisdom 
and by compromising their aims. As a result of this resistance no concrete 
action on the Coopers and Lybrand report was taken for a further six months. 
The regional office manager decided to acknowledge the problem and take his 
time. 
 
 ‘... you can’t just go do something like that overnight. The culture 
in a company like Bechtel is very strong and people have learned 
over the years how just to... I don’t know, sort of round shoulder 
things. They can just shrug something off, they can sort of give it 
lip service, and modify it in a way that you don’t really get 
anything changed. And we distributed the report, and tried to have 
some discussions with our existing departments, and what we 
found they did was just turned around and remade the whole thing 
back into the way it was. And really... it’s a genius that we all 
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have, and it just occurred to me that it wasn’t going to work that 
way, and then, as I started looking at it I had this whole series of 
people coming in saying, you know, shit, are you sure this is 
going to work. So one night I just sort of decided that I was just 
going to take my time.’ (ROM) 
 
He saw the need to take time to get a core team of senior staff to understand 
and accept the reasons for the changes, and to support him. The consultants 
were used to help the education process among senior managers. At this time 
the regional office manager sought and gained the support of his deputy, the 
operations manager. The two of them held an ‘away-day’ with the department 
heads, at which they looked for further support. Also present were two Bechtel 
managers who were outsiders to the London set-up and who were to become 
the project managers of the two change projects. The technical resources 
project manager (project manager 2) described the meeting. 
 
 ‘... he called us off site to Taplow, and explained to us that we 
were about to undergo a significant change in the organization... 
what he was looking for there was buy-in, that the management 
team would support it.’ (PM2) 
 
The regional office manager and the operations manager had already 
concluded that many of the existing departmental managers were incapable of 
driving the changes. 
 
 ‘Asking the existing people to reorganize themselves didn’t really 
work. I don’t think anybody was refusing to do it, but they were 
almost incapable of doing it... No matter how hard they tried, and 
how long they took, just... just locked.’ (OM) 
 
Their solution to this difficulty was to enlist the services of the two experienced 
senior project managers from elsewhere in the Bechtel organization and ask 
them to drive the two aspects of the change as if they were like any other 
Bechtel project. Both men had corporate-wide reputations as effective project 
managers. Each had a track record of success. Both expressed the belief that the 
key to their success in managing the changes in London lay in their ‘outsider’ 
status and their lack of ‘baggage’. The process optimization project manager 
(project manager 1) described the need for detached project management. 
 
 ‘[the engineering manager’s] background was not suited for 
implementing such a scheme, you have to have a project manager 
to do it, and we’ve appointed two project managers, myself for 
that, and the other project manager for the technical resources 
management function... you have to have somebody without any 
baggage, so basically you had two ex-project managers that have 
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changed the entire organization. And if we had used existing 
people it just would not have happened.’ (PM1) 
 
The team of change drivers now consisted of the regional office manager, the 
operations manager and the two project managers. This was the turning point. 
These London managers saw that they were ahead of their USA counterparts. 
The regional office manager and the operations manager had developed the 
confidence not to wait for direction from the USA, but to seize the initiative, 
to drive change like a project. To borrow their much-used phrase they decided 
simply to ‘do it’. 
 
 ‘In the end we decided we weren’t going to wait for the States. 
We were ahead of them so we felt strong enough to be able to go 
ahead and just do it. [project manager 1] became available, 
[project manager 2] became available, and those two were 
appointed in their new positions, with a remit to ‘just do it’.’ 
(OM) 
 
For the regional office manager this marked the end of the process of general 
staff participation in the changes. 
 
 ‘And then we just put an organization to it one day, we said we 
weren’t going to have any more forums or any more discussions, 
we were just going to do it.’ (ROM) 
 
He described how project manager 1 was selected for his unstoppable drive, 
which he saw as a characteristic of his industry. 
 
 ‘... he’s just unstoppable... you know he’ll just go on a straight 
line, right up the beach... people in this industry are also... are 
always sort of time driven... we’re project driven... you get on a 
schedule... if they know they’re only going to do something for a 
year they just try to compress the hell out of it.’ (ROM) 
 
The two project managers were given full delegated responsibility to 
implement the consultants’ recommendations by establishing and heading up 
the two new organizational entities. Project manager 1 summed up his position 
at the time. 
 
 ‘I came in, I had no baggage, I don’t have any friends as such, and 
they said do it.’ (PM1) 
 
The appointment of the two project managers enabled the rest of the new 
management structure to fall into place. The operations manager expressed 




 ‘We then had another series of all day sessions with the other 
managers in the office, but with [the two project managers] in 
position saying OK, well I’m this guy, and I’m that guy, now, 
how are the rest of you going to work around that. There was a lot 
more structure to it, but with six or eight people around saying 
well who wants to be what... I don’t know of we’d have ever got 
there like that.’ (OM) 
 
This consolidation of the change management team marked the end of political 
compromise of the changes. The regional office manager was able to adopt a 
single minded approach and stick to the undiluted spirit of the consultants’ 
recommendations. The participative approach to refining the change 
philosophy was abandoned. 
 
 ‘...there was that tendency to kind of jimmy it around to 
keep everybody happy. We’ve abandoned that.’ (ROM) 
 
Apart from the appointment of the two project managers another enabling or 
justifying factor in the change process came from drawing comparisons with 
the USA. There was a perception that the London operation had a culture of 
change and was more agile than Bechtel’s USA offices. Project manager 2 
described a preference for planning change in the ‘ponderous’ USA as an 
excuse for avoiding action, and an inability to ‘get past the existing 
management’. The operations manager described how London’s action-
oriented risk-taking ‘seat of the pants’ approach contrasted with the 
bureaucratic change processes which were traditional in Houston and reflected 
the change drivers’ independence. 
 
 ‘Houston has lots of documents... they have a schedule, they have 
a flow-chart, they have all kinds of written status... We’ve had 
none of that. It was defined but loosely structured. And the idea of 
that I think was that we had a lot of independence... it was design 
as you go.’ (OM) 
 
The importance of a flexible approach was underlined by project manager 2, 
who saw the pitfalls of detailed planning in the face of uncertainty. 
 
 ‘... when you’re going into an organizational change like this you 
need to think through very thoroughly what you’re about to 
embark on, you need to set out your guidelines, you need to 
understand where you want to go. But above all you need to be 
flexible. One of the risks of developing a plan and a structure, a 
theoretical plan and a structure, in too great a detail is you tend to 




Whether the change would achieve its aims would be difficult to judge. There 
was a general feeling amongst all the change drivers that, although the new 
organization might not prove to be perfect the old one was definitely wrong, 
and that this was a good enough reason to go ahead. The operations manager 
stressed the existence of external factors that could ‘knock it off course’. 
Project manager 1 expressed his determination that his project would not fail 
for internal reasons. The regional office manager foresaw the need to change 
course if necessary, but to ‘get it rolling’. 
 
The change drivers stressed that they had put a lot of effort into selling the 
need for change to staff, and into making sure that staff understood how the 
new organization would function, and how it would affect their jobs. The team 
saw their role as overcoming resistance to the changes through a tireless, 
ongoing programme of presentations, forums and discussions. One of the 
justifying themes for the process optimization project was the protection of 
jobs and the inevitability of the company’s demise if change failed to happen. 
 
 ‘... you need to do what is right for the business, ultimately you 
protect their jobs. If we don’t do it they will be unemployed.’ 
(PM1) 
 
Project manager 2 saw that one of his tasks was to break the concept of core 
technical departments. His aim was to convince technical staff that their future 
lay in focusing on projects rather than on their technical functions. 
 
 ‘... what we want people to see is that there is value in working on 
projects, that working on projects is the place to be. That’s where 
recognition comes, that’s where our challenges come, that’s 
where we make our money. They have a certain core skill base, 
but that isn’t the only thing they can do. Being assigned to a 
project is actually desirable, as opposed to being assigned to one 
of the core departmental organizations. So we want people to be 
excited about working on projects by focusing on the project, and 
breaking down this identity with departments and identity with 
disciplines within engineering. You can be an engineer in Bechtel 
with a civil background... and that’s all you need. You don’t need 
to say I work for the civil department and I report to a civil chief. 
We’re trying to break the concept.’ (PM2) 
 
He felt that achievement of the dissociation of individuals’ organizational 
identities with departments would depend on their acceptance that times had 
changed. Traditional paternalistic notions of staff career development had been 
displaced by a focus on the ‘real work’ of projects. 
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 ‘... what we’re telling people now is that... the way we’re bringing 
about this change is first of all, as an individual you have to 
accept responsibility for your career, because nobody’s going to 
do it for you. If you’re depending on somebody else to do it 
you’re probably terribly mistaken because in the business world 
today nobody has the benefit of enough time to stop and think 
about other people’s careers. Everybody is working hard on the 
real work which is executing projects.’ (PM2) 
 
He felt that younger people would be able to adapt more quickly than the ‘older 
guys’. He welcomed this and expressed a desire to stimulate the younger 
employees, who would be carrying the organization forward into the new era. 
 
As well as selling the changes to staff there was a perceived need to sell them 
to clients, since they too would need to adapt and accept the new way of 
working. In addition, project manager 1 had been putting some effort into 
explaining the changes to visiting Bechtel senior managers from the USA. 
Without educating them their commitment and support could not be taken for 
granted. 
 
 ‘Our two senior vice presidents were here on Tuesday, and I made 
a two hour presentation to them also, so I now have to bring those 
people on because they’re still in the old EPC silos. They know 
something has changed, but they don’t know what has changed. 
[They provide] general vocal support also, that’s important, at 
meetings, you know, presentations that I make, the general 
manager comes in and simply supports what we are doing, and 
expresses his total commitment to it.’ (PM1) 
 
Around the time of the start of the change implementation the office had won a 
major project to design and build a petroleum refinery in India. The design 
stage of the project, referred to as ‘the Reliance project’ was mobilizing at the 
time of the interviews. The project was huge, even by Bechtel’s standards, and 
would eventually lead to the employment of more than 1000 people in 
Hammersmith. Bechtel’s success in beating their closest competitor after a long 
battle to win the job had ended a famine of work in the office. The regional 
office manager described how winning Reliance had diverted staff’s attention 
from the changes, making the change drivers’ job easier. 
 
 ‘... people in this industry [are] depressed when there’s no work 
and when there’s work they’re all happy, and so everybody was 
all focused on... gee, we’ve got a lot of work in house. Now had 
we been completely devoid of work I think we would have had a 
lot of people wondering what was going on, but I think we 
escaped a little bit.’ (ROM) 
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Reliance had a further important effect on the projects of change. It provided 
the regional office manager with the opportunity to remove at a single stroke 
all of the chief engineers2 who had proved to be the strongest source of 
resistance and were acknowledged as having the ‘most to lose’ by the changes. 
Reliance was so large and so important that he was able simply to assign all the 
chief engineers to the project as lead engineers for their respective disciplines, 
at the same time relieving them of their departmental responsibilities. 
Significantly, the chief engineers’ deputies were moved up to head the 
departments. Unlike the departing chiefs the deputies were not seen as being 
senior enough to interfere in the change drivers’ efforts. 
 
 ‘... [the deputies] weren’t in control of the organization, they 
weren’t defensive to the point where, this is my organization, I 
have built it over the years and I’m going to defend it. So they 
were more open minded and willing to take on the change.’ 
(PM2) 
 
This sweeping staff change was also seen to ease the task of project manager 2. 
Engineers’ familiar departmental heads were suddenly no longer there, 
reinforcing the idea that staff would have to get used to change, and to being on 
their own as far as their career was concerned. 
 
 ‘It just swept through so quickly people don’t even think about it: 
whoa, the person who knew me is no longer there, I have to start 
over again.’ (PM2) 
 
In some ways, then, Reliance was an enabling opportunity for change. In 
another way, however, it illustrated two problems in implementing the new 
project optimization structure which had yet to be overcome. First the company 
had to have projects of a suitable size to fit the new organizational structure. 
Reliance was too large. 
 
 ‘The physical size of projects means that we couldn’t physically 
locate a Reliance into the optimization group...’ (OM) 
 
Second, it needed clients’ complicity. Reliance’s clients insisted on the old, 
familiar way. 
 
 ‘They weren’t interested in it. They wanted a very traditional kind 
of project.’ (ROM) 
 
                                                          
2  Bechtel had a dozen or so engineering specialist groups under the control of the engineering 
manager. These included mechanical, control systems, piping, electrical, vessels, telecoms, 
environmental, geotechnology, and pipelines. Each engineering discipline had a “chief”. Under the old 
structure each chief was responsible for allocating specialist staff to projects, as well as for their 
technical performance. 
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Moving part-completed projects into the optimization centre was not thought to 
be a good idea, so the work of the new set-up was limited initially to studies 
and proposals. Having established the basis of the new structure the regional 
office manager’s concern was ‘trying to get a job to actually go through this 
process.’ 
 
It was generally accepted that the two change project managers would have 
limited tenure in their new positions. From the perspectives of the regional 
office manager and the operations manager the company had two of its best 
and most senior project managers tied up on managing internal change rather 
than making money on projects. 
 
 ‘Whilst we want him to do this, we also want him to run projects. 
We make money on projects. This company’s always been project 
focused. Whilst in theory it might be right to spend more attention 
on this stuff, the reality is that if some big project comes up that 
demands [project manager 1] then that’ll be it.’ (OM) 
 
 ‘... he’s also one of our best project managers, and so it is possible 
that... a job comes in or something we’ll have to replace him.’ 
(ROM) 
 
The two project managers were themselves keen not to remain in their change 
management functions longer than necessary. Encouraged by the regional 
office manager they had both been lining up successors. 
 
Although people of their seniority and project management experience had 
been needed to start the changes, it was generally felt that, provided the 
possibility of a ‘rearguard action’ had been removed, others of a lesser calibre 
could see the changes through to completion. 
 
 ‘You just have to shut everything down, and we’ve done that, we 
sort of gutted engineering, and took people and tried to spread 
them around, and do other things with them so that we wouldn’t 
have kind of a... I don’t know what you’d call it... a rearguard 
action.’ (ROM) 
 
Project manager 1 had pursued this ideal with radical, symbolic physical 
changes. 
 
 ‘If it is not radical the tendency will always be to go back to the 
way we used to do it, so I’ve physically moved everybody, 
physically demolished their offices, physically gave them new 
titles, physically rearranged the entire floors, so people know that 
things have changed, and they can’t go back to the way they used 
to do things. I took all of the secretaries away.’ (PM1) 
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Project manager 2 was especially keen to return to the familiar world of defined 
accomplishment offered by construction projects. He expressed discomfort at 
the lack of objective ways of measuring his achievement in his role as technical 
resources manager. He saw that others might be reluctant to take on the role, 
and stressed that it was good experience. 
 
 ‘I think that no other position in the company will help a manager 
to learn how to manage a workforce better than this role, but... 
people, technical people especially will think that’s hard, and they 
don’t want to do it.’ (PM2) 
 
In an attempt to introduce objectivity to the role he was using data from the 
annual corporate staff questionnaire survey to monitor employee satisfaction 
and understanding of the changes. He considered that this data offered insights 
into the true feelings of staff. 
 
 ‘We need to know what the perceptions of the employees are. It’s 
very likely that, when I’m making a presentation and having a 
discussion with them in a group, that I’m not going to hear their 
true feelings.’ (PM2) 
 
He acknowledged the limits of his own understanding of the way the company 
worked and explained how this reinforced the need to delegate detail. 
 
 ‘I want to leave that to the team... I recognize that I had to be very 
careful not stipulating how people were going to work, because I 
didn’t understand the work processes any more.’ (PM2) 
 
From the engineering manager’s point of view the technically complex nature 
of the company’s business meant that great care had to taken in translating the 
spirit of the changes into its detailed systems and procedures. Nevertheless 
project manager 1 explained that the approaching deadline for the company to 
satisfy Lloyds in the renewal of its ISO quality standard accreditation was 
speeding up this formality. He described how, in the style of an engineering 
project, he had broken the task down into a number of ‘work improvement 
programmes’, each to be delegated and delivered as a separate package: 
 
 ‘...with a sponsor, hours, value and job number, and a brief 
description, the objective, justification, deliverables, the people 
involved and when we’re going to do it. And then we’re going to 
be scheduling it, over this year, how we’re going to implement it, 
over what time period, and that’s basically the budget for this 
year... they will be monitored and tracked, it’s basically an 
overhead expense, and you know we don’t have unlimited 
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resources and funds available, so I have an administrator that will 
actually track and report progress against it.’ (PM1) 
 
This formality, although very much in evidence at the level below the change 
drivers, was not present among the change drivers themselves. Project manager 
2 described how the team operated on the basis of trust. 
 
 ‘[the process] was very unstructured, in fact it... once [the 
regional office manager] sent us out for the task, he didn’t even 
follow up. He has never, in the whole time we have done this, he 
has never called me up and said can you come and give me an 
update on where you are. I volunteered a couple of times, and I 
have sent him some information, but other than that it’s like it’s 
total trust.’ (PM2) 
 
With one exception the change drivers were all doubtful that the effects of the 
changes would be clearly demonstrable. They felt that to attempt to isolate the 
effects from those of other influences would be futile. They expressed the view 
that the changes were necessary and that was that. The survival of the company 
would be sufficient proof that they were effective. The engineering manager 
alone expressed a different view. He wished develop a mechanism whereby he 
would be able to be able to demonstrate to ‘skeptics’ that the new way was 
achieving its aims. 
 
 ‘We deliberately kept very careful metrics here, about the savings, 
and so far the figure here is in excess of 60 million, as an 
example, reported savings, just with this new approach here... so 
that’s the type of thing that’s being captured so that when the 
skeptics come along, here’s the case studies, this is what’s been 
happening, what’s your problem.’ (EM) 
 
6.2.2 Further analysis of management process 
 
The principal features of the management processes employed on the two 
combined projects are summarized in Table 6.3 below. The format of the table 
is the same as that at the end of Cases 1 to 4, except that an additional column 
has been added: Control cat. This column contains the categorization of 
personal control expressed by the change driver(s) in their adoption of the 
chosen management processes in response to the listed consideration. 
 






The individual and collective beliefs of the change drivers which give rise to 
greater or lesser feelings of being able to implement the scope of the desired 
changes. 
 
AUTONOMY. The extent of perceived autonomy about how to respond. Have 
I got the control and the freedom to act or am I constrained by rules or 
directives? 
 
RESOURCES. The extent of perceived availability of resources or means for 
responding. Have I got access to the resources that I need? 
 
COMPETENCE. The extent of perceived personal competence to act. Am I 
competent, and am I perceived by others as being competent? 
 
OPPORTUNITY. The extent of perceived availability of workload which 
presents an opportunity to effect the change. Is the opportunity there at the 
moment? 
 
CO-OPERATION. The perceived extent to which the change will be welcomed 
and supported by those change subjects with the potential ability to disrupt or 
block it. 
 
Each instance of personal control shown in Table 6.3 is followed by (-) or (+). 
 
(-) indicates negative feelings of personal control on one or more dimensions 
and that the management process response is an expression of that perceived 
lack of control. It may also express an attempt to increase control. 
 
(+) indicates positive feelings of personal control on one or more dimensions 
which are exploited, with that exploitation being expressed in the management 
process response. 
 
Taking the first row of the table as an example, the consideration is the 
regional office manager’s knowledge that technical managers have in the past 
got away with paying lip-service to corporate change programmes. This 
represents a feeling of lack of control over those with the ability to resist the 
changes (negative co-operation). The expression of this desire for control is 
reflected in the process response: exploiting the corporate desire for change by 
spending corporate resources to employ a consultant to produce a study which 
is explicit enough to provide a detailed plan of action and overcome the 
inertia. At the same time the action expresses control by exploiting autonomy 
from the USA by becoming the global leaders in implementing EPCPI. In 
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summary, the act of employing the consultants in this instance expresses the 
possession of Resources (+), Autonomy (+) and the lack of, and desire to 
increase Co-operation (-). 
 
Table 6.3: Case 5 Considerations, processes, process categories and 
process dimensions 
 
Ref. Considerations Control cat. Process Process cat. Dim’n 
5.01 Desire to formally 
make something 
happen rather than to 
continue to allow 
managers to pay lip 








and Lybrand, to 












5.02 (1) Evidence of ability 
to ‘round-shoulder’ 
change led to lack of 
confidence in ability 
to implement change. 
(2) Uncertainty over 
whether to take the 
lead on 
implementation of 










Lybrand study for 
six months.  
Pace slower 
5.03 (1) Unable to do it 
alone. 
(2)Need to build the 
support of a core team 
of senior managers 
who understand the 
need for change and 






Use Coopers and 




Invite top selected 
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5.04 (1) Realization that 
existing managers are 
unwilling or incapable 
of reorganizing.  




available to come in 
and drive it like a 
project. 
(3) ‘Felt strong 
enough’ to implement 
change without the 

















London to come in 
and ‘just do it’. 
 














5.05 Democratic approach 
with six or eight 
people wouldn’t 
work. 
Autonomy (+) Delegate complete 
responsibility to 






5.06 Learned to resist the 
tendency to 
compromise the ideal 




Be single minded 
about sticking to the 
recommendations. 
Participation less 
5.07 (1) No need to take 
the lead from the 
USA. 















unpredictable. Need to 
have a go and tweak it 
if necessary. 
Autonomy (+) Don’t be over-
concerned with 
failure itself, (but be 
able to tell if the 
causes of failure are 
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5.09 (1) Staff need to 
understand why the 
changes are being 
made and how they 
will work. 
(2) Clients must see 
that the changes are 
good or they will 
reject the new 
approach. 
(3) Visiting senior 
managers from the US 
can help promote the 
change if they are 













staff, visiting US 
top brass and 
clients. 
Justification more 
5.10 When there is a lot of 
work people don’t 










5.11 (1) Chief engineers 
will resist change. 
(2) Deputy chiefs not 
in control and not 
senior enough to 
interfere. 









Destabilize the old 
guard by putting 
chief engineers on 
Reliance project. 
Do not invite 
deputy chiefs to 










5.12 Implementation of 
change depends on the 
complicity of clients 
and on the availability 
of the right kinds of 
project. 




Table 6.3 cont./ 
 
5.13 (1) Two senior project 
managers are tied up 
on this rather than 




(2) Starting the 
change was the 
difficult part. As long 
as you’ve burned the 
boats others will be 
able to finish it. 

















line up successors. 
Remove the 







5.15 Recognize own 
limitations.  
Competence (-) Leave it to the team. Participation more 
5.16 Technically complex 
work requires care in 
procedural change. 






5.17 ISO certificate 




Get new systems 






5.18 Large but finite 
resources allocated for 
change. 
Resources (-) Detailed planning 
and control applied. 
Formality more 
5.19 The team has total 
trust. 





5.20 Need to be able to 
justify change to 
skeptics. 






The conclusions of the Bechtel study are presented below in the form of a 
brief discussion of each of the six management process elements and their 
apparent relationships with personal control. 
 
1 EXTERNAL AGENTS  
 
External agents (Coopers and Lybrand) were used to increase control in two 
ways. First, to help overcome the effects of doubts and resistance on the part of 
the department heads and to exploit the corporate desire for change by 
producing a formal, detailed list of recommendations for action. Second, to 
provide vocal support to the regional office manager at the time in the early 





At the top level the absence of formality reflected the team’s mutual self 
assurance and their growing self-belief in the preparedness for change in 
London by comparison with the USA. Below the level of the change drivers 
formality was used extensively to increase control. Examples of this included 
the formal detail of the Coopers and Lybrand report, the decision to use a 
formal project management approach to its implementation and the 
appointment of detached, experienced project managers, and the desire by the 
two project managers and the engineering manager to control their own futures 




The pace of change was slowed initially by the regional office manager’s 
uncertainty over his ability to overcome resistance without the support of a 
strong team, and over the extent of his autonomy over the USA. After the 
project optimization structure had been introduced there was a lack of suitable 
work to put through it, which slowed the full extent of its implementation. 
There was some evidence of a slow, cautious approach to changing systems 
and procedures in the face of external quality constraints, although this 
restriction on pace was somewhat relieved by the impending Lloyds visit. The 
availability of resources for external consultants helped overcome the initial 
resistance, and the pace increased dramatically with the coincident arrival of 
the two project managers and the Reliance project. These events enabled the 
change drivers to give unhampered structure to their team and helped provide 




The regional office manager’s early tendency to involve the department heads 
in designing the changes and, later, in implementing the consultants’ 
recommendations reflected his need for their co-operation and his desire to 
‘keep everyone happy’. This participation, however, only resulted in 
compromise and resistance. As he learned to resist this compromise the 
participative approach to the introduction of project optimization was 
abandoned. Control was asserted when the project managers took charge and 
was consolidated when the chief engineers were moved out of the way, with 
their deputies being insufficiently senior to trouble the change drivers. The 
concern of the technical resources project manager, on the other hand, was to 
maintain a participative approach, partly because he wanted to ensure a feeling 
of ‘ownership’ of the new staffing process on the part of those who would run 
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Before the appointment of the project managers and the removal of the chief 
engineers the regional office manager and the operations manager, with the 
help of the consultants, spent a lot of effort justifying to senior staff the need 
for the changes, in order to establish support and develop understanding of the 
new way. After that point there was a shift in the staff communication process. 
There was no longer a need to sell the changes to senior managers, and the 
whole team of change drivers was able to spend their efforts communicating at 
the lower levels of the organizational hierarchy. The process of gaining control 
over the change by justifying the new way to clients and visiting managers 
from the USA continued. 
 
6 ROLE DEFINITION 
 
There was a lack of clarity of management roles and responsibilities in the new 
organization in its early stages, both at the top level in relation to the USA and 
at the local senior management level. The political compromise reflected the 
lack of control felt by the regional office manager and the operations manager 
over the departmental heads and over the USA. As control was assumed roles 
at the level of project manager and below were clarified, although a certain 
flexibility was maintained between the change drivers themselves. Defined 
responsibilities were delegated. The more passive roles of the new 
departmental heads were reinforced as the physical changes were imposed and 
the possibility of ‘rearguard action’ removed. 
 
 185
6.3 Learning and implications for next stage 
 
This section draws together the major points of learning from the Bechtel study, 
Case 5. The implications of the findings of the case for the next, final stage of 
the study are discussed. A justification is made for the selection of the fourth 
organizational setting. 
  




No refinements to the six categories of management process, their definitions or 
their dimensions were found necessary. The range of reported conduct of change 




The Bechtel case provided an empirical example of how the subjective possession 
by change drivers of control over change relates to the management processes 
they employ. In Section 6.2.3 five dimensions of the personal control construct 
were clarified and defined. This builds on a previous reference by Dutton and 
Jackson (1987) to the multi-dimensional nature of the construct in the context of 
response to strategic threat and opportunity. 
 
The case thus confirmed and clarified one of the interim conclusions from Cases 1 
to 4: change driver’s feelings of personal control over the implementation of a 
change project may be described as a combination of their perception of 
autonomy, resources, competence, opportunity and co-operation. The data 
indicated that the change drivers’ adopted management processes represent 
expressions of that combination. It was argued that processes associated with high 
personal control are expressions of the possession and exertion of that control. 
Processes associated with low personal control are expressions of lack of control 
and of the desire either to increase control or to justify the position that increasing 
control is not possible. 
 
Range of informants 
 
The case confirmed that a more complete picture of the management process 
perceived by the change drivers could be obtained by interviewing all change 
drivers, including the project manager. Further, the case confirmed that the 
accounts of organizational members peripheral to the driving of the 
implementation process add little new information. 
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Size of project 
 
One of the conclusions from Cases 1 to 4 was that projects which are larger and 
more significant to the organization have the potential to provide the setting for a 
richer, more valuable study of management processes than smaller, less significant 
projects. Case 5 was therefore selected for its size and significance. The 
importance of project size was confirmed by the range of data and the resulting 




In Cases 1 to 4 it was found that the exercise of formal project plans and controls 
was an important aspect of management process, and that managers tended to 
avoid control in certain circumstances. One of the reasons for selecting Bechtel as 
the setting for Case 5 was the company’s strong project orientation in contrast 
with Ealing Hospital NHS Trust and Associated Newspapers. This characteristic 
of the organization proved to have important consequences for the change 
management process and was able further to clarify the role of traditional notions 
of project control in internal change. Although formality at the level of the change 
driver team was minimal, even in such a strongly project-oriented company, 
project manager 1 was keen to exercise strong formal project control downwards 
over his project. 
 
There appeared to be two reasons for this. First, he was appointed for his project 
management expertise. He saw the formal approach to internal change projects as 
being no more than an extension to his normal way of working. The process 
optimization initiative was a large, expensive project in its own right. An 
appropriate degree of control would ensure the adherence to costs and schedules 
by the subordinates to whom he had delegated packages of detailed work, and a 
high degree of definition would stop them from remoulding the scope to suit their 
own interests. The second reason for the employment of a high degree of project 
control was to ensure that, should the project fail to deliver its intended benefits it 
would demonstrably not be due to the project manager’s failure to deliver the 
agreed scope, but would be due to forces beyond his control, such as the 
withdrawal of human resources or funding, or unanticipated changes in the 
company’s commercial conditions. 
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6.3.2 Implications for next stage 
 
Each of the first three organizational settings confirmed the importance of an 
appreciation of context in studying not only the content of change, but also the 
management process, the central theme of this study. Cases 1 to 5 have shown that 
context has implications for analysis at every level, including the sector, the 
organization, the project, and, individually and collectively the team of change 
drivers. 
 
From the time the research design was first outlined it was intended that the fourth 
setting should be a manufacturing organization. Applying this original intention, 
and continuing the policy of theoretical sampling, the domestic appliance 
manufacturing operation of the Electrolux corporation based in Luton, England 
was chosen over several other possibilities for the final stage of the study. This 
choice was guided by the lessons of the first three organizations. The Luton 
operation of Electrolux was of a similar size to the other three organizational 
localities and fulfilled the manufacturing criterion. It was mid-way through a 
major programme of internal restructuring and agreed to co-operate in the 
research. Like Bechtel its head office was overseas. In contrast with the major, 
heavy industry project nature of Bechtel, however, Electrolux’s operation was 
light and low-technology, and in a strongly unionized setting. 
 
The differential characteristics of the four organizations may be summarized as 
follows (Table 6.4): 
 
Table 6.4: Differential characteristics of the four organizations 
 





Sector (1) public private private private 
Sector (2) service service service manufacturing 
Ownership (1) public shareholding private shareholding 


















7 RESULTS FROM ELECTROLUX 
 
The subject of this final results chapter is a major project of internal change at 
Electrolux’s vacuum cleaner manufacturing facility in Luton, England. At the 
end of Chapter 6 the reasons for the choice of this research site were outlined, 
with its characteristics compared with those of the first three sites. 
 
In Section 7.1 background details of the Electrolux group and the Luton 
operation are provided. The principal characteristics of the change project are 
listed. The process of gaining access to the organization and identifying the 
interviewees is described. Relevant details of the data collection and analysis 
processes are outlined. 
 
Section 7.2 contains the case study, presented in the established form of 
narrative, tabular summary and descriptive summary of the six management 
process elements and their links to personal control. 
 
Section 7.3 summarizes the learning from Case 6, the Electrolux study. The 




In 1996, the time of the study, Electrolux was a major multinational 
corporation. With around 600 companies in more than 40 countries the 
Electrolux group of companies employed over 150,000 people. It was the 
largest manufacturer of electrical appliances in the world. Its size was not 
always appreciated by outsiders because, unlike its major competitors (for 
example Philips and Panasonic), Electrolux traded under a variety of different 
brand names in different countries. This diversity of identity was a legacy of 
Electrolux’s policy of growth through acquisition of companies and their 
brands, which was exercised with particular vigour in the 1980s. In 1996 
Electrolux brands included Frigidaire, Flymo, Husqvarna, Tricity-Bendix, 
AEG, Parkinson Cowan and Zanussi. The companies were all wholly-owned 
subsidiaries of Electrolux, a Swedish corporation with its head office in 
Stockholm. 
 
Until the early 1990s Electrolux was organized on a national basis. Each local 
Electrolux company with a manufacturing or sales organization served the 
needs of its country and was administered by a national organization. In 1993 
the group was restructured. National barriers were removed and Electrolux was 
organized on a product line basis. Each product line was administered by a 
product line management team in Stockholm. 
 
 189
There were five product lines, dubbed internally Cold, Hot, Garden, Wet and 
Dirty. The chief executives of the five product line groups were part of 
Electrolux’s top management structure, which also included corporate quality 
and ‘pure’ research and development. The Dirty division, known as D-division, 
had its own chief executive in Stockholm responsible for manufacturing, sales 
and marketing of ‘floor care products’ - principally vacuum cleaners. 
 
The Luton operation started in the 1920s as a manufacturing site for Electrolux 
vacuum cleaners. Over the years, under the old nationally-based organization 
structure, Luton’s manufacturing activities expanded to include refrigerators, 
freezers, oil-filled radiators and microwave ovens. By 1996, under the product-
line organizational structure, all products except vacuum cleaners had 
disappeared from the Luton operation, and were made elsewhere. In 1988 the 
Luton business employed 3,000 people. As a result of the group restructuring, 
including the resiting of refrigerator manufacturing, there were, in mid-1996, 
750 employees remaining on the Luton site, 600 of whom were hourly-paid 
production workers. 
 
Access to Electrolux was first arranged in August 1995 through a former 
business student at the University of Luton, where the researcher was an 
external examiner. The original purpose of access had been to write a teaching 
case study on the organization’s new product development project management 
methodology. While data for the teaching case was being collected it emerged 
that the organization was in the midst of a major project of change which may 
have proved suitable as a research setting. The opportunity to study the project 
was pursued in May 1996. At an initial interview with the factory’s divisional 
director and chief executive the project was outlined and its suitability for study 
confirmed. The divisional director described how there had initially been six 
people at the site, including a designated project manager, plus himself, 
involved in defining and implementing the project. He explained, however, that 
the team had contained only four individuals, including himself, who had been 
the effective change drivers. This view was also largely expressed by the other 
three. The divisional director agreed to allow the interviews with the change 
drivers to take place. 
 
The main characteristics of the project are summarized in Table 7.1: 
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Table 7.1: Electrolux project characteristics 
 
 Case 6 
Title The step change project 
Origin Desire to become a world class manufacturer of 
vacuum cleaners 
Nature of scope A sequenced effort to exploit potential for 
improvement in all areas of the business, including 
design, materials management and manufacturing.  
Drivers 
identified 
Divisional director (sponsor), project manager, 
materials manager, design and development manager. 
Main driver Project manager 
Status Three years into a programme initially envisaged as 
five years in total. The outstanding tasks were known 
but not formally scheduled. 
Resources Consultants fees unknown, estimated at several 
hundred thousand pounds. Internal resources not 
budgeted. 
 
The titles and roles of the four nominated change drivers are listed in Table 7.2: 
 
Table 7.2: Electrolux interviewees 
 
Title Ref. Role on Project 
Divisional director DD Initiator, 
champion 
Step change project 
manager 
PM Project manager 
Design and development 
manager 
DDM Step change 
driver 
Materials manager MM Step change 
driver 
 
The four were interviewed in May 1996. The divisional director and the design 
and development manager were interviewed again in June 1996, with a list of 
follow-up questions which arose during the process of transcribing the earlier 
interviews. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. Additional data 
included corporate reports, organizational charts showing reporting 
responsibilities before and after the changes, and a conference paper written by 
the project manager. The starting point for the process of coding and analysis 
was the same preliminary conceptual framework as the other cases. The data 
provided many further instances in established personal control and 




In terms of overlap of perceptions, and of agreement and disagreement, the four 
change drivers were effectively two pairs. The divisional director and the 
design and development manager were older, more senior managers who had 
been with the company for the majority of their careers. The project manager 
and the materials manager were younger people who had each been with the 
company for about eight years. They had been plucked from relatively junior 
positions and given major responsibility on the basis of their potential ability to 
conceive, communicate and drive change. The members of the younger pair 
apparently agreed with one another on every major issue, and were prepared to 
talk more openly about where the company’s problems lay. The older pair, 
whose accounts also tended to agree, expressed more caution about what had 
been achieved and also seemed more reluctant to confront the problems which 
were holding back the success of the project. There was a certain amount of 
disagreement between all four over the chronology of events, which perhaps 
reflected the company’s tendency not to schedule the project but to allow it to 
unfold in an unplanned fashion. 
 
A detailed account of the analysis was sent to the divisional director for his 
verification and approval, and for distribution, under his control, to the others. 
He wrote back, stating that he found the analysis ‘very interesting and thought 
provoking’. He offered no suggestions for changes. 
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7.2 Case 6: The step change project 
 
This section contains the case study of the project of internal change undertaken 
by Electrolux Luton between 1993 and mid-1996, the time of the data collection 
for the study. The aim of the internally named step change project was to 
transform the Luton operation from its perceived status as a traditional, 
hierarchically-organized manufacturing operation to a world class business with 
all day-to-day decisions taken by ‘empowered’ teams of employees. 
 
The case is presented in three sections. Section 7.2.1 contains the case narrative, 
structured around the context, content and process of the change, as described by 
the four change drivers. The commercial forces for change on Electrolux Luton 
in the 1990s are outlined, and the change is set into context by a discussion of 
three important features of the company’s recent history. The change content is 
then outlined, in the form of lists of tasks already completed and those 
outstanding at the time of the data collection. The final part of the case 
narrative describes the features of the management process reported by the 
change drivers, divided into three chronological phases. 
 
In Section 7.2.2 the case is summarized in tabular form. Lastly, Section 7.2.3 
contains a descriptive summary of each of the six elements of management 
process as expressions of personal control. 
 




Until the mid-1980s Electrolux’s Luton operation enjoyed relative freedom 
from competitive pressure. The business served a mainly domestic market, 
which to a large extent it shared with a single major competitor (Hoover). 
There was little need for aggressive marketing. In that climate it was by the 
standards of today, according to the design and development manager, possible 
to operate inefficiently, producing expensive products to low quality standards, 
and still make money. 
 
By the early 1990s several commercial forces had combined to signal the 
coming end of this demand-driven twilight of comfort. Globalization of the 
household appliance market meant that, increasingly, Luton found themselves 
competing against a range of cheap, high quality products, in both their 
domestic and foreign markets. Over-supply in the market led to downward 




A further irritant to Luton was that a significant share of their potential market 
had been won by an audacious new entrant. In a market where, according to the 
divisional director, 80% of vacuum cleaners sold at a price of less than £100, 
UK-based Dyson Appliances Ltd. were able to sell theirs for £200. The Dyson 
product boasted a strongly differentiated appearance and some innovative 
features, but cost little or no more to manufacture than conventional designs. 
 
Accompanying this increased external competition was the restructuring of the 
acquisitive Electrolux group from a country-based structure to an international 
product-line operation. This placed Luton in a position of actual or potential 
competition with other Electrolux products and acquired brands made in other 
operations in the group’s floor care division in other countries, including Italy, 
Germany, Sweden and the USA. 
 
To understand the effect of these forces on the Luton business, and to better 
appreciate the context of the company’s management response, the situation 
should be considered in the light of three significant features of the company’s 
recent history and future direction, discussed in turn. 
 
A traditional past. First, in easier times Luton had developed a tolerance of 
internal difficulties and outdated traditions, many of which were not shared by 
newer Electrolux business units around the world. Some of the more obvious 
consequences of this legacy were openly undesirable and could therefore be 
dealt with relatively easily. For example in 1993 the factory was making up to 
6000 ‘incompletes’ a month1, and had a reputation among its suppliers for 
repeated disruptive changes in delivery priorities. Few would argue that such 
inefficiencies should be tolerated. 
 
Other characteristics were not so simple to eliminate, being entrenched customs 
and practices of a unionized work force. The general perception among change 
drivers was that procrastination had in the past often proved to be more 
attractive than action. Two of the more serious issues were the existence of a 
‘LIFO’ redundancy policy (Last In First Out) and a remuneration system for 
hourly paid workers based on individual piece work. The factory had an untidy, 
dirty, old-fashioned image. It was dubbed the ‘Siberia of Electrolux’ elsewhere 
in the group. Visitors were known to make jokes based on the notion of a dirty 
factory making vacuum cleaners (‘Don’t they work then?’). There were no 
lockers or canteen areas for employees. Smoking and eating on the shop floor 
were allowed. 
 
Despite these features (or perhaps partly because of them) the factory was far 
from being considered a bad place to work. The company treated its shop floor 
                                                          
1 Typically unfinished products awaiting parts delivery. 
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employees well. It was ‘family oriented’, with many employees having 
relatives working there. The LIFO system had enabled the emergence over the 
years of a ‘25 Year Club’ for more than 100 long-serving employees. Recently, 
resentment among newer members over their relative lack of tenure led to the 
disbanding of that elitist group. 
 
A stable present. The second significant feature was that the step change 
project was initiated in 1993 in circumstances perceived by many to be 
unfavourable for change. The company had just come through a major 
economic recession with no job losses; it was UK market leader in some areas; 
it was an award-winning exporter of 50% of its production; it was bringing out 
new models; production had surged to 7000 units per day and was projected to 
grow; the workforce was expanding. Further, the company was achieving its 
profit targets on a £65m annual turnover, a performance record which could not 
be claimed by some other Electrolux companies at the time. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, when told about the Luton divisional director’s plan to make 
far-reaching changes the reaction of many employees was, ‘Why us? Why 
now?’ 
 
A global future. The third circumstance which should be taken into account 
was that the Electrolux group as a whole were taking steps to pursue their own 
corporate vision. In a bold attempt to bring together all their diverse operations 
around the world Electrolux were striving to achieve common standards and 
administrative frameworks which could help to optimize the use of their vast 
resources and thus to create more value for their customers. Luton were 
expected to play their part in these corporate change initiatives which were, to a 
great extent, running on a parallel course with Luton’s own internal efforts. 
 
It was under these conditions that the divisional director decided in October 
1993 to go ahead with an internal project introducing some far-reaching 
changes to his organization, which he had been considering for two years. The 
project was not crisis-driven, nor was it Stockholm-driven. It was a local 
initiative which would integrate many important individual manufacturing 
principles such as inventory reduction and efficiency improvement. The 
divisional director had been encouraged by the management best seller The 
Machine That Changed The World (Womack et al, 1990), a study of the shift 
from mass production to ‘lean production’ in the automobile industry. He had 
formed a vision of manufacturing excellence, and had become a devotee of the 
practice of ‘benchmarking’2. He had toured the USA and Europe visiting a 
diverse set of Electrolux and non-Electrolux companies, some of which were 
Japanese ‘transplants’. He had seen how ambitious targets could be met and 
                                                          
2 Making quantified observations of perceived good practice in other organizations. 
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continuously improved upon by an empowered work force operating in clean, 
tidy conditions in a flexible team-based structure with the right reward systems. 
The target he set for himself and his employees was to become a world class3 




The benchmarking visits by the divisional director had highlighted the 
possibility of considerable improvement in all key areas of the Luton operation, 
including new product design, materials management and manufacturing. 
Management consultants Andersen Consulting were brought in to conduct an 
audit of the operation, and their report confirmed the potential. With 
Stockholm’s approval Andersen were then engaged to help plan a restructuring 
initiative, titled the step change project, and to assist in the early stages of its 
implementation. 
 
The aim of the project was stated by the divisional director as simply ‘to 
become the first world class manufacturer of vacuum cleaners’. In order to 
begin to operationalize this goal and to make visible the extent of its 
achievement five ‘core competencies’ of the business were established which 
could be the object of specific improvement targets. The five core 
competencies were listed as: 
 
1 New product design and development 
2 Materials management 
3 Electric motor development and manufacturing 
4 Injection moulding 
5 Production assembly 
 
The way to world class status was to be through team working, constant 
challenging of the status quo, benchmarking and the progressive elimination of 
non-value adding activities. Teams would be formed of committed, 
autonomous, integrated sets of employees, empowered, rewarded and 
supported by a delayered management structure. All tactical decisions, whether 
they concerned personnel, materials, engineering, production or quality, would 
be taken by the teams. Ultimately each team would be responsible for a 
business unit and would have its own budget.  
 
The main elements of the achieved scope of the step change project at mid-
1996 may be described as a series of managerial actions. Six Luton employees 
below top management level led by an appointed ‘step change project 
                                                          
3 The meaning of “world class” was defined by the divisional director as : “giving shareholder value, 
contributing to the group’s profits, but also giving customer satisfaction and employee satisfaction.” 
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manager’ were selected and seconded as far as possible from their normal 
duties to work full time with the consultants. Over a six month period this ‘core 
team’ examined best practice elsewhere and set about planning how the Luton 
operation could achieve a state of perpetual self-regenerating improvement in 
the key areas identified. 
 
After this initial planning stage the team was expanded and formed into three 
special ‘work streams’ in new product introduction, materials management and 
manufacturing. Their task was to establish specific, measurable targets in the 
three areas, and then to set about achieving them. 
 




Aggressive benchmarked targets for improvement set in all core areas. 
Employee suggestion and reward scheme streamlined and improved. 
Staff departments downsized. 
Increased use of training, workshops and general employee communication. 
 
In new product introduction: 
 
New product lead time reduced by 60%. 
Department restructured around project teams rather than functions. 
Electrolux group formal project management process introduced. 
Design support team moved to main factory. 
Accelerated tool testing, using CAD data to machine test parts from solid. 
Product testing function relocated in the design department. 
 
In materials management: 
 
Supplier and materials functions merged. 
Production control responsibility devolved to business unit teams. 
Buyers’ office moved into factory. 
Significantly reduced supplier base. 
Moved towards supplier development using higher calibre buyers. 
Material shortages virtually eliminated. 
‘Frozen period’ introduced in order book. 




Business unit teams established in all production and stores areas. 
Press work outsourced. 
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Schedule adherence improved. 
Many improvements from site consolidation, including a less fragmented 
layout and a substantial reduction in floor area. 
 
At mid-1996 the following achievements were still to be made: 
 
Removal of LIFO policy. 
Rationalization of payment system, including finding an acceptable alternative 
to piece work. 
Improvement of take-up of the employee suggestion scheme. 
Simplification of the production lines. 
Improvements to housekeeping. 
Improvements to worker mobility and flexibility within manufacturing 
sections. 
Removal of distinctions between direct (production) and indirect (materials) 
workers. 
Improvement of communication of company challenges and objectives. 
 
Change management process 
 
For purposes of analyzing the step change project management process the case 
may be divided into three phases: 
 
Phase 1: from October 1993 to March 1994. Immediately following the 
restructuring of Electrolux’s UK operations Luton’s divisional director seized 
the opportunity to pursue the world class vision that he had been harbouring for 
two years. Because there was no crisis for change the divisional director was 
careful to engage an independent consultant to confirm his expectations about 
the company’s potential. This they did, and the divisional director gained 
Sweden’s approval to further employ the consultant to help initiate the change. 
With Andersen’s help a team of change ‘champions’4 was established. They 
benchmarked several organizations and set ambitious targets for change. The 
team had some early successes and became enthusiastic to pursue the project. 
 
Phase 2: from March 1994 to May 1995. Encouraged by their recent 
experiences with benchmarking and a growing belief in their ability and need 
to carry forward the process alone, the change drivers agreed to bring an early 
end to their association with Andersen. In the year following Andersen’s 
departure the company embarked on an unplanned sequence of changes, with 
the change drivers turning their attention to wherever they felt was right. They 
adopted an ‘easiest first’ approach, starting with the non-unionized 
                                                          
4 An Andersen term. 
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departments. Further successes were acclaimed, particularly in improving 
relations with suppliers and in virtually eliminating ‘incompletes’. 
 
Phase 3: from May 1995 to mid-1996 (the time of the interviews). Problems 
started to appear when the change team turned their attention to some of the 
more intractable aspects of the operation. There was a growing realization that 
abandoning the organizational hierarchy was more difficult than they had 
imagined. Management admitted their inability to give up control, and saw that 
the work force did not necessarily want to take responsibility for business 
decisions. At the end of the period disillusionment was setting in as the change 
drivers realized that some things were less easy to change than others. 
Enthusiasm for change was starting to wane, with the team members spending 
more of their time on routine duties. 
 
Details of the three phases are presented below. 
 
Phase 1: The divisional director ‘first got excited’ about the step change 
project idea in 1991. For two years he became increasingly convinced of the 
potential for improvement, but took no action. Then, in October 1993, the 
Electrolux global reorganization provided the necessary trigger. 
 
 ‘ [with] the change in the management structure in the UK, I felt 
for the first time that we could really take some risks.’ (DD) 
 
At that time the operation was profitable, which brought into question the 
wisdom of introducing radical change. The materials manager summed up the 
situation. 
 
 ‘There was no burning platform... The focus and the commitment 
wasn’t there. It was seen as... it’s not broken, what are you trying 
to fix, we’re making money, the orders are here, we’re bringing 
people in, we’re recruiting people, where’s the problem, why do 
you need to make these changes?’ (MM) 
 
To confirm the divisional director’s expectations, to help convince the 
doubters, and to help convince the division’s product line manager in 
Stockholm, Andersen Consulting were brought in to do a feasibility study to 
establish Luton’s potential. The exercise was used to gain approval from 
Stockholm to further employ the consultants, who were seen as ‘good but not 
cheap’. Their role was to ‘kick start’ and accelerate the change process and, at 
Stockholm’s insistence, to help Luton set quantified targets for improvement. 
 
 ‘We had to show [the head office product line manager] what we 
wanted to do, and set ourselves some targets which we said we 
would meet... we selected our core competencies and then we set 
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for each of those core competencies Key Performance Indicators, 
which we said we would improve by certain elements, in certain 
periods of time. So it was a... head on the block, really.’ (DDM) 
 
The consultants taught the change drivers to aim for fast change, thus fulfilling 
their role of accelerating the process in its early stages. 
 
 ‘They were essential to get us to question not just what we did, 
but the speed with which we did it, because every time you came 
up with a time scale they’d throw it in the bin and said you could 
do it in half the time.’ (PM) 
 
Stockholm played their part in keeping up the pace by monitoring Luton’s 
progress. 
 
 ‘They were very visible and very challenging in coming over 
probably every two or three months, and saying, OK show me 
what you’ve done, you know, where are we now, where are the 
time scales.’ (MM) 
 
When the change drivers were being selected the divisional director and his 
long-serving and trusted design and development manager shared some doubts 
that the latter was the right man to lead a key area of change. The divisional 
director used a recruitment consultant to increase confidence that the design 
and development manager was the best person for the job. 
 
 ‘So although it was an internal appointment we looked at him 
against external candidates. And so he should feel very confident 
that we’ve actually got the best guy.’ (DD) 
 
There was no self-selection of team leaders. They were picked by the divisional 
director and interviewed by Andersen to confirm their suitability. Their roles as 
change agents were clearly established and their targets for improvement 
allocated. To underline the unusual importance of the step change project they 
were as far as possible relieved of all responsibilities to their previous line 
managers. 
 
 ‘We got all our duties taken off us, because normally these 
projects are, you know, bustingly important and they’re so 
important you can do all your other work as well, whereas this 
was the first time that we were actually taken off the thing that we 
were previously doing.’ (PM) 
 
Part of the role of Andersen in this stage of the project was introducing the 
change drivers to the practice of benchmarking. The consultants used their 
contacts in other firms, and arranged visits to show not only that large 
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improvements were possible, but also to reassure the change drivers and the 
departmental managers that other firms too had problems which they had 
overcome. 
 
 ‘Andersen’s would support us in saying it’s achievable, you know 
we stand by the plan, and anybody who thinks it can’t be done 
we’ll show you someone who’s done it, so it was almost a fait 
accompli for many of the senior managers who were a little 
nervous at first at the scale of some of the changes.’ (PM) 
 
Phase 2: After the Andersen team had been working full time with the change 
drivers for six months the combined team had already made some notable 
achievements, particularly in materials management, and had virtually 
eliminated ‘incompletes’. The project manager felt that he and the rest of the 
team had learned quickly from the consultants about the benchmarking process. 
They had also learned the importance of taking a lot of trouble to justify to 
employees why change was necessary, but not necessarily coming up with a 
complete plan before starting action. With the confidence that came from this 
learning Andersen’s perceived usefulness was rapidly declining. 
 
 ‘We were learning less and less and doing more ourselves.’ (PM) 
 
Despite the successes there was concern that other employees were merely 
paying lip service to the changes, and that once the consultants had gone would 
revert to previous practice. 
 
 ‘I think we had a lot of lip service being paid to people being 
committed to it, and that they were just sitting back and waiting 
for the consultants to go, so that they could go back to the way it 
was.’ (MM) 
 
The team had always been keen to demonstrate that the changes were not being 
driven by the consultants. For this reason the team had been careful to ensure 
that they, not Andersen personnel, led meetings and presentations to 
employees. The team’s new-found confidence in their ability to go it alone, 
combined with the increasingly urgent need to show employees that the 
empowerment process was driven from within, led to the decision to part 
company early with Andersen. Six months after the start of the step change 
project, three months earlier than planned, the change team decided to stand on 
their own feet. 
 
 ‘... it was very important that we said good-bye to them at that 
time. Because if we’d gone on much longer I don’t think anyone 
would have come along with us.’ (MM) 
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The project manager increased his efforts to improve communication about the 
project to the company’s managers. He found, however, that he could not 
assume that other managers would disseminate any further the information he 
provided. The company had an entrenched ‘need to know’ information policy 
which had to be overcome. 
 
 ‘We realized no one was telling [the supervisors] anything, so 
they rightly were getting the hump... in the end I started sort of 
sticking them on the notice boards and handing them out to 
people, whatever... we have been untouched for a number of 
years, and people were on this sort of need to know basis.’ (PM) 
 
In the early stages the divisional director and his team were spending a lot of 
time selling the new ideas to shop stewards. He realized early on that he would 
also need the co-operation of full-time union officials, who also became 
recipients of day to day change information. 
 
Despite efforts to communicate the aims of the project and to schedule short 
term actions there was no long term plan. The aim of the step change project 
had always been measurable improvement. For this reason the importance of 
setting targets and monitoring achievements against performance metrics was 
central to the process. Formal scheduling and control of the project’s scope 
were, however, not seen to be important. Indeed the divisional director felt that 
scheduling the complete scope of the project was undesirable for two reasons. 
First he felt that formalizing the timing of future actions would be setting 
himself and the team up for demonstrable failure to move quickly enough. 
Second he thought that such formality would be daunting, in that people would 
be overwhelmed by what was still to be done. He used a domestic metaphor to 
make the point. 
 
 ‘I think that’s a bit daunting to do that. I mean maybe we should 
do it, and I think perhaps I should do it. [But if] my wife starts to 
write down a list of things I should do, and there’s plumbing, 
perhaps the radiator’s leaking... and in the end, the list becomes 
so long I get so daunted by it that I almost lose heart. I feel that 
she’s adding things on the end of the list faster than I’m knocking 
things off the beginning of the list. I think that if we start to say to 
people that these are all the things that we’re going to do, people 
will say it’s... oh, forget it, you know.’ (DD) 
 
The change drivers’ scheduling policy had, from the outset, been to attack the 
easiest problems first, and to turn their attention to wherever they felt change 
was immediately achievable. Since Andersen’s fee was a proportion of 
achieved performance the consultants had done nothing to discourage this 
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process. In the words of the design and development manager a consequence of 
this tendency to take the easy way, regrettable in hindsight, was that: 
 
 ‘We started our team working structure from the top down.’ (DDM) 
 
The top-down, easiest-first policy was later widely seen as the wrong approach. 
Nevertheless it was followed and the early changes were mainly attempted in 
the non-unionized departments such as design and development, and 
procurement, where redundancies and changes to working practices could be 
imposed with comparative ease. Changes in practice on the shop floor were 
cautious and experimental. 
 
 ‘We’ve sort of accelerated this change in this area [design and 
development]. We have changed dramatically in my view the 
areas which we are not constrained too much by, in other words 
all the staff areas have changed dramatically.’ (DDM) 
 
The project manager explained how the early redundancy of a non-co-operator 
in the purchasing department helped reinforce the seriousness of the change 
team’s efforts, if only at the management level. 
 
 ‘You cannot afford to leave people in the organization who are a 
walking example of non-change... the option to just tread water 
isn’t there, and you either have to be enthusiastically being seen 
to be in the boat and rowing, not splashing your hand in and out 
of the water and pretending you’re swimming. And the first guy 
who left on the basis of not paddling, I think had a profound 
effect on everyone else.’ (PM) 
 
After several months of tackling problems in non-unionized areas and setting 
up tentative pilot schemes in the factory, it became apparent that the company’s 
most serious obstacles to being world class happened also to be its most 
intractable and deep-rooted problems. Two significant barriers to change in the 
factory were the LIFO redundancy policy and the piece work payment system. 
The company’s management had long known that these traditional practices 
were holding back change and encouraging a preponderance of long-serving 
employees who favoured the stability of the old way. 
 
The divisional director expressed his awareness of these issues but justified his 
hesitance in dealing with piece work on rational grounds. 
 
 ‘I’m anxious not to throw out the baby with the bath water. Most 
people have taken piece work out, and they did it a few years ago, 
I think we’re one of the remaining surviving companies that still 
have got piece work. But those who took piece work out generally 
saw a 20% to 30% productivity drop.’ (DD) 
 203
 
The design and development manager’s view was that the ‘easiest first’ policy 
had been wrong. The company should have tackled unionized resistance first. 
 
 ‘We have changed what we could, and now we’re starting to 
change what we can’t (laughs). What we have to do now is attack 
that area. That’s holding us back now. We haven’t attacked the 
difficult area first. And my view is that if I knew then what I 
knew now, and I’d have been party to it, I would have insisted on 
doing the hard thing first.’ (DDM) 
 
The project manager and the materials manager supported this view. 
 
 ‘Everyone knows it’s wrong, and it’s an area that with every 
redundancy when we throw good people out, we know we should 
do something, and we subsequently haven’t.’ (PM) 
 
 ‘One of the things that was said when the step change project 
started was that there should be no sacred cows, and unfortunately 
we still have far too many of them. I think LIFO, I think, the piece 
work system, I think they’re tough to tackle and so we don’t do 
it.’ (MM) 
 
One notorious attempt to introduce change on the shop floor had been a failure. 
In a tentative, experimental scheme a traditional production assembly line had 
been ‘empowered’ but its workers had quickly become disenchanted with the 
new way. After an unhappy period, when output was clearly diminished, the 
line returned to its former practice. The divisional director and the design and 
development manager gave two independent reasons for this failure, both 
avoidable in hindsight. First they picked an assembly line which did not lend 
itself to integration and team working.  
 
 ‘We picked the wrong line... it was structured... these things come 
down to detail in the end, the way the product was made, the way 
it was engineered, the way the line was engineered didn’t 
encourage people working in that way. Because, what you had 
was a group of people at the front doing... all doing one job, the 
same job, then a group of people in the middle were doing another 
job the same, and a group of people at the end doing another job 
the same, so the people at this end of the line had no conception 
of what the people at the other end of the line was doing. What 
you really needed was three sets of people all doing the same job, 
making the product, you know, and we have actually... the irony 
is we had that in other areas.’ (DDM) 
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Second, problems of working together in the new way were blamed on 
inadequate training. 
 
 ‘We didn’t do the training and that’s what happens to most 
people, they’re so anxious to get a result they don’t put the 
training in first. We would have gone faster if we’d done that.’ 
(DD) 
 
The failure was a set-back to the step change project because it reinforced the 
message on the shop floor that the old way was better. 
 
 ‘We lost output, and we reverted, and I think that set us back 
quite a bit. Because the message goes out that this is actually the 
best way to do it. The old way is the best way. The single most 
difficult thing about change is the view that the old way is the 
best way.’ (DDM) 
 
All four change drivers liked to encouraged the idea that becoming associated 
with the change project offered development opportunities for the individual.  
 
 ‘What I would say to them is... purely on a personal level, look at 
what it may do for you, you know, if you get on the train 
enthusiastically and show what you can do, you know, you may 
arrive somewhere else.’ (PM) 
 
All four described how they were attempting to rid the company of a deep-
seated ‘blame culture’. In many cases this simply meant tolerance of passive 
roles. In other cases employees who had shown themselves to be successful in 
the new way of working were given opportunities and promotions. With almost 
biblical relish the project manager described the case of one storeman who had 
embraced benchmarking and the world class goal and had quickly risen to the 
level of business unit manager. 
 
 ‘Let them go and make some mistakes. And by the same token let 
them be washed in the glory stick. They certainly didn’t think he 
was a business unit manager, and it’s interesting now that he’s, 
you know, he’s just on a longer and longer leash in terms of what 
he’s allowed to go and do.’ (PM) 
 
Phase 3: In the last year of the project , leading up to the time of the interviews 
it became increasingly apparent to the change drivers that certain 
characteristics of the operation were making the achievement of world class 
status more difficult to achieve than the early successes had indicated. Apart 
from LIFO and the piece work policy, which they had not begun to tackle, 
inherent constraints were becoming more obvious. 
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Two acknowledged problems were, first, achieving a culture of cross-
functional integration in an entrenched departmental hierarchy, and second, 
recruiting people of a sufficiently high calibre into the materials department. 
The change drivers saw that effective team workers were hard to find in the job 
market. 
 
 ‘... we’ve found that it’s been impossible to find the right type of 
person to do the job we wanted, and we came to the conclusion 
that they’re not out there for you to go and find. We’re going to 
have to create them ourselves, so we’re trying to pick the best 
and develop them in the role... I’ve found it quite alarming what 
we’ve been through.’ (MM) 
 
In one attempt to overcome these problems the design and development 
manager and the materials manager had taken the unprecedented step of 
making a material co-ordinator the leader of a new product development 
project, a task that had always been done by a designer. In the words of the 
materials manager this was intended to ‘try and force this thing with cross-
functional working’, at the same time raising the status of the materials 
department. 
 
Another problem was interference from Stockholm. Luton had always been 
expected to play their part in a series of global change initiatives with 
acronyms such as JIT-90 (Just In Time), TQM (Total Quality Management) 
and PLUS (an initiative to improve payment terms).  
 
 ‘Often in the past major projects have come wafting in from 
Stockholm as being the flavour of the month or whatever, and it’s 
sort of Moses carries that tablet down the hill and gives you it...’ 
(PM) 
 
From the start the change drivers felt the need to stress to employees that step 
change was a locally inspired effort. 
 
 ‘There had been numerous previous programmes taking place, 
and a lot of people initially thought the step change programme 
was another one of those, but... [the divisional director] tried to 
communicate the message that this one’s different because it’s 
local, it’s not... you know it’s not come from Sweden, we’re 
doing this to ourselves.’ (MM) 
 
The divisional director described how directives from Stockholm had in the 
past caused problems which had become confused with the effects of the step 
change project, to its detriment. 
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 ‘We were being pushed by the group to reduce our lead times, and 
as we reduced the lead times so the shortages got worse and 
worse, and things were going wrong here, and people were 
muddying that up with the step change. The shop stewards were 
saying, these teams don’t work, we want to get back to the days of 
the foremen and the charge hands.’ (DD) 
 
The design and development manager claimed that corporate priorities clashed 
with Luton’s efforts and diluted Luton’s change resources. He gave the 
example that union problems were, to Luton, far more urgent than the need for 
adherence with the global quality drive. 
 
There was a growing realization that some employees would never embrace 
change. For the project manager they had been over-tolerant in some areas, 
including non-unionized departments. 
 
 ‘We really flogged along in purchasing for much longer than I 
would have liked seeing, with people who either couldn’t or 
wouldn’t do it.’ (PM) 
 
Much of the tolerance of ‘traditional people’ came from the divisional director, 
himself a survivor of the old days. He described the need for a balanced mix of 
‘the two types of people’: traditional and change-oriented types. Traditionals 
were useful in planning roles, to keep people’s ‘feet on the ground’. 
 
All four change drivers made repeated references to the extreme difficulty of 
changing from a command-based hierarchy to an empowered organization. 
Many managers found it hard to give up their power and many employees at 
lower levels simply did not want to have the responsibility for seeking 
improvement and making decisions. 
 
The following quotes give an insight into the difficulties experienced by the 
divisional director and the design and development manager, the self-confessed 
‘traditional’ half of the change driving team. 
 
 ‘One of the difficulties that some of the management team 
suffered from. They thought that, you know, if you have teams 
then you’ve got to leave them on their own, but... you know, you 
really can’t afford to do that.’ (DD) 
 
 ‘We keep some control on that, because it is important... to do the 
calculations in a consistent way, so that’s the only piece of 
bureaucracy that I’ve left in the structures.’ (DD) 
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 ‘We started to have some real industrial relations problems, the 
teams didn’t know how to handle those, and so they’d refer to 
their manager and their manager would take the decisions.’ (DD) 
 
 ‘They kind of put us back in the position of making the decisions, 
as well as some people felt uncomfortable letting go of the 
authority levels, so they weren’t very confident, they wondered 
what they would do if all the teams took all the decisions.’ (DD) 
 
A convenient device for the design and development manager was to classify 
his own domain of decision making as ‘strategic’, with decisions delegated 
below that level. Any decision he took was classed as strategic, although he 
admitted that he and the divisional director sometimes reverted to hierarchical 
type and took decisions that were less than strategic. 
 
 ‘Occasionally we both slip up, like he occasionally reverts back 
to... go away and do this, and I occasionally revert to - he’s told 
me to do it so I must drop everything and do it, and that’s... 
having worked together for so long, it’s very easy to do: I’m the 
boss. And you know, that happens still.’ (DDM) 
 
The project manager observed that employees who didn’t want change tended 
to be older, although this was by no means an ‘absolute rule’. Some older 
people were found to accept change and some younger workers resisted it. 
 
The factory’s employee suggestion scheme provided generous individual staff 
bonuses calculated from the potential financial benefits of their suggestions, 
and continuous efforts were being made to make the scheme more 
straightforward and appealing. At the time of the interviews the divisional 
director expressed his continuing disappointment at the take-up of the scheme. 
The materials manager gave her view of the situation. 
 
 ‘They don’t contribute... there’s obviously a core there that don’t. 
For so many years we’ve asked them to switch their brain off as 
they’ve come in the door, now all of a sudden we’re asking them 
to switch it back on. That’s not going to happen over night. And 
so far it hasn’t happened in a couple of years. And it’s difficult to 
accept that some people just want to come in, earn their pay and 
go home.’ (MM) 
 
Having seen at first hand many shining examples of world class manufacturing 
companies the project manager held the view that changing an existing set-up 
was far more difficult than establishing a world class operation from scratch. 
He attributed part of the ongoing problems in Luton to the company’s history 




 ‘It is a factory, therefore by definition it should be a toilet as well. 
If you’re not wandering round head to foot in shite, you know, 
you haven’t done a day’s work, basically.’ (PM) 
 
He felt that threat of closure was a powerful incentive to change, and hinted at 
the relative futility of his own ceaseless efforts to persuade and cajole Luton’s 
employees. He had seen factories in other countries manufacturing messier 
products in relatively pristine conditions. He cited the example of Electrolux’s 
Mexico factory. 
 
 ‘Our motor shop in Mexico, you know it was an absolute shithole, 
to put it crudely, and he said, we gave them a year and said you 
either clean it up or we close it down, and it... crisis driven 
projects are much easier for people to get their heads round, than 
walk out of that presentation and think, ‘what did he mean by that 
then?’ But it looked like a doctor’s operating theatre when I 
walked round it.’ (PM) 
 
The divisional director summed up the rather difficult position facing his team 
after three years of step change. 
 
 ‘We’re going through a sort of valley of despair... it dips below 
the line, then somebody says you must be doing something 
wrong, you know, you’ve got it wrong, you’ve... go back to this 
old method, whatever it was, and so, most people abandon the 
programmes at that point, and go back to this, instead of which 
I’m insisting that we go through this valley of despair.’ (DD) 
 
7.2.2 Further analysis of management process 
 
The case is summarized in Table 7.3, divided into the three phases. 
 
Table 7.3: Case 6 Considerations, processes, process categories and 
process dimensions 
 
Ref. Considerations Control cat. Process Process cat. Dim’n 
Phase 1 




to take risks 
Autonomy (+) Put change on 
agenda after a 
two-year delay 
Pace faster 
6.02 Difficulty of 
initiating change in 
time of no crisis, 




Get Andersen to 
confirm potential. 
Sell it to 










about wisdom. Sweden. 
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6.03 (1) Consultant 
needed to kick-start 
radical change 
 
(2) Approval from 









targets to justify 
















6.04 Doubts that 
existing 
development 
manager is right 
team member. 
Need to convince 
oneself and other 
team members that 
he is right. 
Competence (-) Engage 
recruitment 
consultant to 
confirm that he is 









6.05 Managers are able 
to discover team 
leaders 









6.06 Managers should 
set team 
performance targets 
Competence (+) Performance 















expected to give 








6.08 Need for 
reassurance that 
other firms have 
problems too 
Competence (-) Observe negative 
qualities as well 




6.09 (1)Experience of 




(2) Need to show 
that change is not 
consultant-driven. 







6.10 (1) Have learned 
the consultants’ 
tricks. 
(2) Need to show as 
early as possible 
that management 
are standing on 





Get rid of 
consultant early, 









6.11 Need to get support 
of shop stewards 
Co-operation (-) Sell benefits to 
them. 
Justification more 
6.12 Need to overcome 
‘need to know’ 
culture. 
Co-operation (-) Increase efforts at 
communication. 
Justification more 
6.13 (1) Planning sets 
you up for failure. 
(2) Some parts will 





Stop justifying it 
and just do it. 
Start with the 
easier parts and 







6.14 We rushed into it 
without sufficient 
thought and 





Slow down. Pace slower 
6.15 Need to encourage 
employees’ 
willingness to be 
associated with 
change. 
Co-operation (-) Promotion within 
new structure for 








6.16 Need to stress 
benefits to 
individuals’ careers 
















6.18 Realization that 
some people will 
never buy in to the 
change. 
Co-operation (-) Stress that you 







6.19 Realization that 
people used to a 
command and 
control style will 
find it hard to 












6.20 Realization that it is 
clearly easier to 







all UK factories 
are like that. 
Justification more 
6.21 Realization that 
many have rejected 
the change, and that 
the company is in a 















Instances of the six management process elements in the Electrolux study, and 
their links with personal control, are summarized below. 
 
1 EXTERNAL AGENTS  
 
Three aspects of the divisional director’s personal control were relevant to the 
first stage of his appointment of Andersen Consulting, to confirm the potential 
for change. First there was a need to justify the desirability of change in that 
crisis-free time to overcome the potential lack of co-operation. Second, the 
divisional director wanted support and confirmation that his own feelings were 
right, a doubt which was also expressed in the decision to appoint the 
recruitment consultant. Third, he lacked autonomy from Sweden, who would 
have to approve the project. The extension of Andersen’s appointment to the 
first six months of the project reflected the Luton managers’ lack of experience 
of benchmarking and radical change, with the Swedish input at this stage 
further underlining their lack of autonomy and resources. The early decision to 
terminate involvement with Andersen arose when the change drivers’ own 
growing confidence combined with their increasing perception that the more 
the consultants’ presence was prolonged the less credibility the project would 





Formality was initially imposed by Sweden and passed on to the change teams 
by Luton management in the form of targets, both for improvement in 
performance and for the time scales of change. As the project progressed and 
specific project funding was no longer visible nor needed, the application of 
project scheduling and cost control was abandoned. The change drivers saw no 
benefit in setting daunting schedules which might demotivate employees and 
expose their own inability to plan the unknown future and achieve project tasks 




When the Electrolux group product line organization was introduced in 1993 
the divisional director felt free enough to initiate the process of action, and the 
step change project got under way after a two year build-up. The pace was 
briefly slowed by the need to quantify benefits in order to get funding for the 
consultants. Once the consultants were appointed they were able to accelerate 
change, forcing the pace particularly in non-unionized areas and encouraging 
the change drivers to take swift action. Two features of the project led to a 
slowing of the pace after the first year. First the failed attempt to introduce 
team-based working on the assembly line increased the feeling that it would 
thereafter be more difficult to convince employees that the new way was better. 
Second, there was a realization that the more intractable aspects of the project 




The lack of participation reflected in the ‘top down’ approach was a result of 
managers’ underlying belief that teams could not really be expected to lead the 
changes, and of their own familiarity with the command and control culture. 
They were encouraged by the realization that many employees did not want to 
accept responsibility for decisions, and that self-motivated staff able to work 
effectively in cross-functional teams were hard to find. Managers selected team 
members, defined their roles, set their targets for them, and continued to 
impose their decisions on staff, even though they sometimes acknowledged that 




The high incidence of management processes intended to justify both the 
changes themselves as well as the approach to change reflect the change 
drivers’ general perception that selling and communicating were essential if 
they were to gain any control over the change process. There was a continuous 
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process of justification to Stockholm and to the Luton work force and the 
unions. As the project went on the justifications turned towards the change 
drivers themselves, with an increasing incidence of rationalization of failure 
and acknowledgment of difficult times ahead. 
 
6 ROLE DEFINITION 
 
The change drivers’ roles were clear initially, as the project got off to an 
enthusiastic and successful start. The divisional director made sure that 
everyone understood the roles of the change teams and stressed the importance 
of the step change project by removing the change leaders from their normal 
duties. As the project took effect the change drivers became more used to 
finding their own roles, which were made less clear by their declining 
dedication to managing the changes less as a project and more as the everyday 





This final section summarizes the main points of learning from the Electrolux case 
and indicates how the findings of the study as a whole will be explored in the final 




Case 6 confirms that the six categories of management process identified and 
refined over the course of the study offer a comprehensive way of describing the 
actions and intentions of drivers of projects of organizational change. Some of the 
six, in particular participation and formality, have a significant presence in 
organizational literature. In Chapter 8 the findings of the six cases which make up 




One of the reasons for selecting Electrolux as the setting for the final study was its 
status as a manufacturing company, in contrast with the other three service 
organizations. The importance of researchers’ attention to context in the field of 
strategic management was established in Chapter 2. However, the focus of the 
strategic literature is the link, in context, between change content and 
organizational performance. In Chapter 2 it was argued that the extent to which 
context, at both industry and organizational levels, is a determinant of project 
management process is an under-studied phenomenon. Its importance has been a 
strong feature of the emerging conclusions uncovered by the theory-building 
analytical process in all six cases. The feelings of personal control which are 
reflected in those management processes are clearly strongly influenced by 
context, as well as by the individual characteristics of change drivers. 
 
The studies confirm March’s (1996) observation that managers attend selectively 
to certain key issues. In each case there is a unique, core set of a few central issues 
which both enable and limit action in this way. In the Electrolux case, for 
example, managers’ actions are shaped by such context issues as the persistent 
effects of tradition and the desire for conformity with manufacturing industry 
norms and expectations, including but not limited to Electrolux’s group 
aspirations. In Bechtel the influence of project orientation was one of the central 
characteristics. 
 
In Chapter 8 the central context issues in each of the cases are explored, and in 
Chapter 9 the implications of this study for management practice are discussed. It 
is argued that it is difficult and yet important for managers to understand how the 






Case 6 also confirms the conclusion, summarized in Section 6.3, that management 
processes in projects of organizational change may be considered as expressions 
of personal control. In addition to the development and definition of the six 
management process categories their link, via personal control, to context is the 
central contribution of this study. The research has resulted in a new perspective 
on the project management process which suggests many further questions and 
opens possibilities and opportunities for further work in this area. These are 
discussed in Chapter 9. 
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8 CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
 
The first and second stages of analysis of the six cases were set out in Chapters 
4 to 7. Each case was presented first in the form of a narrative description and 
second as a summary tabulation and discussion of each of the six management 
process elements. The purpose of this chapter is to take the analysis to a third 
stage of data reduction. The aim is to express the findings of the study in the 
form of an emerging theory which is generalizable to all six cases. 
 
Two aspects of the study are addressed. First, data and analysis from the cases 
are brought together and the case findings summarized in the form of a series 
of theoretical propositions linking the five categories of personal control with 
the six categories of management process. 
 
Second, the concept of personal control as an intermediary between context and 
management process provides an opportunity to examine how context affects 
management process. It is argued that positive and negative feelings of 
personal control are a link between key characteristics of the organization and 
the change drivers’ actions. For each of the six cases the central issues, to 
which the change drivers directed their attention, are identified. These central 
issues are aggregated to form a set of seven key organizational characteristics 
which existed to a greater or lesser extent in each organization. 
 
The overall theory arising from this study is expressed diagrammatically in the 
form of a summary model. The essence of the model is that attention to key 
organizational characteristics gives rise to positive and negative feelings of 
control which are expressed as management processes. 
 
The chapter concludes with a summary of the learning process which took 
place throughout the case studies. 
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In this section each of the six management process categories is presented in a 
separate sub-section which starts with a cross-case tabulation showing, for each 
instance of the category, the following information: 
 
1 The reference number of the instance from the secondary analysis table 
in the case. For example, 1.05 refers to the fifth row in the summary 
tabulation for Case 1. 
2 The personal control elements which accompanied the instance. 
3 The relevant dimension of the management process under consideration. 
4 A summary description of the process, using fragments of quotes 
appearing in the case narrative. 
 
After each tabulation there is a discussion of generalized processes . The 
purpose of the discussion is not only to establish cross-case generalizations but 
also to allow this final stage of analysis to take account of exceptions to those 
generalizations, and to integrate the latter into the analysis. Glaser and Strauss 
stress that unless exceptions are fully dealt with in this way analysis is 
incomplete. 
 
 Sometimes such incomplete analysis can be spotted easily 
because [the analyst] uses a phrase such as ‘in general’ to qualify 
his [sic] main analysis; for instance, he may assert that ‘in general 
such and such is true’, but readily admit there are exceptions - he 
may even briefly explain why there are exceptions - but he does 
not really offer a full analysis of the conditions causing 
exceptions, let alone integrate it with his main analysis. (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1971: 7) 
 
Conjectured generalizations, which take account of exceptions, are then 
summarized in the form of propositions relating the management process 
element to the personal control dimensions. 
 
In relation to the first four of the six elements, propositions concerning their 
negative aspects (for example restriction of use, reduction of use, or non-use of 
external agents) are not simply the converse of the positive (increased use). In 
order to achieve generalizability and to satisfy exceptions across all cases it 




8.1.2 External agents 
 
Table 8.1: Cross-case tabulation of processes of engagement, deployment 




External agents Process 
1.05 Autonomy (+) 
Competence (-) 
Co-operation (-) 
more Engaged the ‘support of the regional change 
management team.’ 
1.09 Autonomy (+) 
Competence (-) 
Co-operation (-) 
more Brought in temporary specialists with a ‘track 
record’ who could ‘speak with authority’ to 
clinicians. 
2.02 Autonomy (+) 
Competence (-) 
more Used AT&T, since hospitals ‘are not in the 
business of developing computer systems.’ 
2.12 Autonomy (-) more Tolerated AT&T’s insistence on quality 
bureaucracy. 




less Use internal team who are ‘sensitive in their 
dealings with people’s feelings and 
expectations’ to install systems rather than 
insensitive outsiders. 




more Bring in specialist trainers who understand 
‘professional sensitivities’. 
3.09 Autonomy (+) 
Resources (-) 
more Use a specialist contractor rather than the 
company’s in-house building services 
department. 
3.10 Autonomy (+) less Take responsibility away from contractor for 
payment of sub-contractors. 
5.01 Autonomy (+) 
Co-operation (-) 
more Employ consultants to formalize action rather 
than allow ‘lip service’ to continue. 
5.03 Autonomy (+) 
Resources (-) 
more Extend consultants’ remit to ‘help educate’ 
staff. 
6.02 Autonomy (+) 
Competence (-) 
Co-operation (-) 
more Doubts about the wisdom and possibility of 
initiating change, particularly in times of no 
crisis. 
6.03 Autonomy (+) 
Competence (-) 
Co-operation (-) 
more Outside help needed to ‘kick start’ radical 
change. 
6.04 Autonomy (+) 
Competence (-) 
more Needed recruitment consultant to convince 
that internal appointment was ‘the best guy’. 
6.10 Autonomy (+) 
Competence (+) 
Co-operation (-) 
less Having learned the consultants’ approach, 
show that internal change drivers are able to 





External agents were used in all cases except Case 4. Each instance of the use 
of external agents in Cases 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 represented a unique expression of 
the change drivers’ personal control. Each instance of the employment or 
termination of outside consultants and other experts reflected a complex 
balance of the dynamic and competing components of personal control at a 
particular point in the project. Despite this complexity, however, it is possible 
to draw some general conclusions. 
 
Autonomy. Almost every instance of the engagement, use and disengagement 
of external agents was a positive expression of the change drivers’ autonomy to 
act, within certain budgetary constraints, in a manner of their choosing. Even in 
Cases 5 and 6, where the relatively high cost of employing the consultants was 
such that head office funding approval had to be obtained, the change drivers 
initiated the process of engagement of consultants, directed their use and 
decided when to terminate them. The one exception to perceived autonomy 
over the use of external agents was Case 2, where the project manager was 
forced by externally imposed rules to accept AT&T’s insistence on applying 
bureaucratic quality standards. 
 
Resources. Naturally, the engagement of external agents indicated the 
possession of the necessary financial resources. In cases 2, 3, 5 and 6, these 
were part of externally-approved budgets; in Case 1 the various outside experts 
were either free or cost so little as not to need outside approval. Apart from 
financial resources and the contributions of the change drivers themselves (see 
Competence below), in Cases 2, 3 and 5 external agents were brought in to 
address a perceived lack of available internal expertise on which the change 
drivers could draw. In Case 2 some of AT&T’s responsibilities were withdrawn 
when the project manager saw that members of his own internal team were 
better placed to deal with issues which demanded political and professional 
sensitivity. 
 
Opportunity. Cases 1, 2 and 3 were concerned with the introduction of changes 
to ongoing day-to-day operations. In these cases the change drivers expressed 
no doubt that the opportunity for change - in the sense of there being in 
progress at the time an operation to which the change could be applied - was 
present. In Case 5 there was a declared underlying assumption, in which 
Coopers and Lybrand played no part, that the right kind of projects, where the 
change could be applied, would come sooner or later. In Case 6 Andersen were 
instrumental in establishing that the opportunity existed to apply benchmarked 
changes to each of the five core competency areas. Once the opportunity was 
confirmed the consultant helped the change drivers decide which areas of the 
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factory presented the best immediate opportunities for change, encouraging and 
setting the ‘easiest first’ pattern. 
 
Competence. In several instances the change drivers engaged external agents 
when they doubted or wished to supplement their own ability to see through the 
change unaided. Cases 1 and 2 contain examples of this, where outsiders with 
special competencies were brought in temporarily for specific tasks. The Case 
2 project manager’s desire personally to involve himself more with user 
acceptance, and to use AT&T less in this role, shows a heightening of his 
perception of his own relative competence at overcoming resistance. The use of 
Coopers and Lybrand in Case 5 was more a result of the need for time-
consuming attention to detail and legitimation of the change initiative than lack 
of self-confidence in the ability of the change drivers to do the job themselves. 
In Case 6 both Andersen and the recruitment consultants were used to back up 
the divisional director’s uncertain hunches, with Andersen being dismissed 
ahead of time when the change team’s perceived competence had grown. 
 
Co-operation. Most instances of the employment of external agents through 
lack of perceived self-competence were accompanied by an expectation of lack 
of control through non-co-operation. Exceptions to this took two forms. First, 
in Cases 2 and 3 external agents were employed purely for their specialist 
technical skills. Second, where technical specialism was not an issue and where 
little resistance to change was foreseen the issue of self-competence was of 
little concern and the perceived need to use experts was of relatively small 
importance. In Case 2 the restriction on AT&T’s involvement was a result of 
their stirring up a hornets’ nest of non-co-operation. In Case 6 the early 
termination of Andersen was the result of the tipping of a fine balance between 
the growing confidence of the change drivers as they learned the consultants’ 
methods, and the prospect of increased resistance the longer they stayed. 
 
Propositions 1(a) to 1(e) 
 
The engagement of, and delegation of responsibilities to external agents is an 
expression of change drivers’ perceptions of the balance of (a) their 
autonomy; (b) their possession of financial resources combined with lack of 
possession of competent internal resources; (c) their uncertainty over the 
extent of opportunity to pursue the change; (d) uncertainty over their own 
competence either to plan or to implement specific aspects of the change; (e) 
potential lack of co-operation. 
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Proposition 2(a) to 2(e) 
 
The willful disengagement of, and denial of responsibilities from, external 
agents is an expression of change drivers’ perceptions of the balance of (a) 
their autonomy; (b) their possession of internal resources to continue the 
change; (c) removal of doubts over the opportunity for change; (d) their own 
competence to continue to drive the change; (e) the existence of areas of low 
resistance to change or the threat of increased resistance due to the presence 









1.01 Autonomy (-) 
Opportunity (+) 
Co-operation (-) 
more Use ‘vital and fundamental’ business plan to spell 
out externally imposed requirements. 
1.08 Opportunity (+) 
Competence (-) 
Co-operation (-) 
more Request preparation for workshop. 
1.12 Co-operation (-) more Use 7-S framework to demonstrate 
professionalism and commitment to planning. 
1.20 Autonomy (-) 
Co-operation (-) 
more Use legitimating power of executive board. 












less Avoid ‘time wasting’ and pointless formal 
planning and monitoring processes. 






less ‘No time’ for formal planning. Reliance on verbal 
communication between change drivers and 
contractor. 
3.12 Autonomy (+) more Use work measurement to show need for more 
staff cuts. 
4.04 Autonomy (+) 
Co-operation (+) 
less No project manager appointed on the grounds of 
avoiding bureaucracy. 
5.01 Co-operation (-) more Employ consultant to objectivize and itemize 
project scope. 
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Table 8.2 cont./ 
 
5.04 Competence (+) 
Co-operation (-) 
more Reify the change as a ‘project’. 
5.07 Autonomy (+) less Non-bureaucratic (seat of the pants’ approach 
compared with USA. 
5.16 Autonomy (-) more Need for attention to technical detail. 
5.17 Autonomy (-) more Revise procedures for ISO certificate. 
5.18 Resources (-) more Finite resources for change. 
5.20 Co-operation (-) more Careful records to measure ‘before and after’ 
effects of change. 
6.03 Autonomy (-) more Quantify targets to get funding approval. 
6.06 Competence (+) more Performance targets set by managers. 




In each of the six cases there were instances of the adoption, use, avoidance or 
abandonment by change drivers of formally communicated plans and controls. 
Each instance of adoption or use was an expression either of the possession of 
personal control combined with a desire to exercise that control or an 
expression of the lack of possession of personal control combined with a desire 
to increase that control. Each instance of avoidance or abandonment was an 
expression of the lack of possession of personal control and of a desire not to 
worsen or expose that lack. 
 
Autonomy. In Case 1 the change drivers’ lack of autonomy in the face of 
externally-imposed regulations is expressed in their attempts to increase their 
control by using those regulations to justify and legitimate change. In Case 2 
the purposeful emphasis on compliance with legal requirements for approval of 
capital expenditure diverted attention from the project manager’s desire to 
avoid formality in respect of relatively uncontrollable but nevertheless 
significant internal costs. The grudging acceptance of AT&T’s quality 
procedures was an example of lack of autonomy overcoming the desire to 
minimize bureaucratic exposure of problems. In Cases 3 and 5 the lack of 
formalization of the tasks of the change drivers themselves reflects a 
combination of their unrestricted freedom and their shared, understood goals. 
An exception to this is Case 3, where the IS director used work measurement to 
objectify his decision to further cut staff. The deliberate lack of formal project 
management in Case 4 showed the IS director’s unrestricted power to over-ride 
his staff, who were denied the desired formality to demonstrate and help 
overcome their own lack of control. In Case 5 the imposition of formal plans 
and controls lower down the organization was partly a result of the need to 
comply with legal requirements. At the beginning of Case 6 formal goals were 
imposed and closely monitored by Sweden. As this external pressure sharply 
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declined after the termination of the consultants so did the perceived need for 
adherence to schedules. 
 
Resources. The relationship between financial resources and formality was the 
same in all cases. Where there was an externally-imposed need for the approval 
and control of limited budgets the minimum necessary formality was applied. 
Where there was no imposed requirement, or when the change drivers learned 
that such control could be circumvented, formality was as far as possible 
avoided. In Case 5 scheduling and control of the tasks of a known internal 
work force whose time was allocated for that purpose, and who were 
accustomed to such control, was highly formalized. Where it was felt that there 
was an uncontrollable or unpredictable availability of internal resources to 
bring about the change, as in Cases 1, 2 and 6, formal control was absent. In 
Case 2 the desire not to waste resources was used as justification for the 
perfunctory, minimal adherence to requirements for formal processes. 
 
Opportunity. The opportunity for change in Case 1 was bounded by the 
financial year. The sense of urgency which could be generated by this deadline 
was maximized by the issuing of formal schedules linking the restructuring 
activities to the business planning cycle. The lack of such limitations in Cases 
2, 3, 4 and 6 was accompanied by unhurried, open-ended schedules. In Case 5 
the opportunity to impose the full extent of the reorganization was restricted by 
the lack of an appropriate portfolio of projects on which to apply the changes. 
However, this meant that the preparatory work which made up the bulk of the 
project could proceed with its schedule unhampered by the complications of an 
overload of work. 
 
Competence. The tightly-scheduled formal introduction of the new structures 
in Cases 1 and 5 expressed the change drivers’ belief in their competence to 
bring about the changes to the design of the organizations, at least on paper. In 
Case 3 and 4 this formality was lacking. Despite the IS director’s own 
perceived self-competence, no-one was monitoring the specific achievement of 
the project tasks. In Case 2 detailed planning and scheduling by AT&T of 
programming work on each individual module reflected the change drivers’ 
self-assurance in their ability to deliver the technical content of the upgraded 
software modules in accordance with the schedules which were part of the 
formal requirement for capital expenditure approval. In contrast, the vagueness 
or lack of detail of the implementation plans showed their lack of self-
assurance at being able to introduce the new modules. In Case 6 the change 
drivers’ early confidence in the superior ability of managerial over operational 
staff led them to set formal targets for the ‘empowered’ workforce. Scheduling 
activity declined as the perception grew that ‘planning sets you up for failure’. 
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Co-operation. Formal plans and controls were issued by change drivers as a 
way of confronting potential lack of co-operation by reifying the project. This 
was seen in Cases 1 and 5, and in the early stages of Cases 2 and 6. However, 
when the change drivers were confronted by actual resistance to change in the 
latter two cases, the attempted use of formality quickly declined as its 
meaninglessness only served to reinforce the perception that change was 
resistible. In Cases 3 and 4 the informal approach reflected the IS director’s 
perception of his absolute ability to talk his way out of any possible resistance. 
This perception was reinforced by unfolding events. 
 
Propositions 3(a) to 3(e) 
 
The use or acceptance of formal plans and controls is an expression of 
change drivers’ perceptions of the balance of (a) their lack of autonomy or 
their desire to objectify the project’s undesirable consequences; (b) their 
awareness of externally-imposed budgetary limitations and deadlines and the 
existence of a known, dedicated work force who would understand and 
respond to formal control; (c) a limited ‘window’ of opportunity for change; 
(d) their competence in delivering those aspects of the project detailed in the 
plans and monitored by others; (e) potential but unrealized non-co-operation. 
 
Proposition 4(a) to 4(e) 
 
The non-use or willful avoidance or abandonment of formal plans and 
controls is an expression of change drivers’ perceptions of the balance of (a) 
their autonomy; (b) the lack of external imposition and scrutiny of financial 
expenditure and deadlines, and the existence of a known, dedicated work-
force who would respond to formal control; (c) unrestricted opportunity to 
attempt the implementation of change; (d) their lack of competence in 
delivering those aspects of the project not detailed in the plans; (e) lack of 
















faster Build on dissatisfaction with status quo. 




Co-operation (-) slower Phased approach to change. 






slower Experience of non-acceptance of systems led to 
more cautious approach. 
3.07 Co-operation (-) slower Double-manning during skills transfer. 
4.01 Opportunity (+) faster Resignation of GSS manager provided 
opportunity. 
5.01 Resources (+) faster Use consultant to produce objective study. 
5.02 Competence (-) 
Co-operation (-) 
slower Evidence of staff’s ability to ‘round shoulder’ 
change. 
5.03 Autonomy (-) slower Uncertain whether to take the lead from the USA. 





faster Felt strong enough to implement change without 
the blessing of the less change-oriented USA. 
5.08 Autonomy (+) faster Acceptance that possible failure is inevitable, will 
not be viewed negatively, and is reversible.. 
5.11 Opportunity (+) 
Co-operation (+) 
faster Replace chief engineers with less potentially 
disruptive seconds-in-command. 
5.12 Opportunity (-) slower Non-compliant clients and the wrong kinds of 
project. 
5.16 Autonomy (-) slower Need for attention to detail in standards and 
procedures. 
5.17 Autonomy (-) 
Opportunity (+) 
faster ISO certificate revalidation due. 
6.01 Autonomy (+) faster Change in UK management structure empowers 
divisional director to take risks. 
6.02 Competence (-) 
Co-operation (-) 
slower Doubts about wisdom and possibility of change 
in time of no crisis. 
6.03 Resources (+) faster Funding approval enables Andersen to ‘kick-
start’ project. 
6.13 Competence (-) 
Co-operation (-) 
faster Acceptance that some parts will be easier than 
others. 
6.14 Competence (-) 
Opportunity (-) 
Co-operation (-) 






Each row in Table 8.3 represents an instance of the change drivers’ perception 
of the relative pace of the project. Most instances of faster pace are expressions 
of positive personal control and most instances of slower pace express a lack or 
reduction of personal control. There are exceptions to this, which are built into 
the propositions. 
 
Autonomy. Case 5 illustrates the effects both of perceived lack of autonomy 
and of realization that autonomy was, after all, possessed. The change drivers 
started slowly and hesitantly, expressing their uncertainty and reluctance to 
take the lead for change ahead of the USA. The realization that they were 
unconstrained by head office combined with their feelings of a superior track 
record of change to enable the pace to be accelerated. The positive effects of 
perceived autonomy on faster pace, and vice-versa, were also present in Cases 
4 and 6. The exceptions to these generalizations were that in Cases 1 and 5 the 
restrictions to autonomy caused by the imposition of external directives were 
turned to the change drivers’ advantage and used to force the pace. In Case 1 
the externally-imposed business plan deadline, and in Case 5 the deadline for 
ISO re-certification, were employed in this way. 
 
Resources. In Case 2 the lack of internal staff resources and the tight 
limitations on financial resources were cited as constraints on pace. The 
availability of money for consultants in Cases 5 and 6, and the availability of 
high-calibre project managers in Case 5, were seen to have a strongly positive 
effect on the early start and acceleration of the projects. 
 
Opportunity. Cases 1, 4 and 5 contained examples of the opportunistic 
exploitation of a temporary relaxation in potential non-co-operation, to 
accelerate the pace. In Case 1 this opportunity took the form of general 
dissatisfaction with the status quo; in Case 4 the resignation of the long-
standing GSS manager enabled the change to be accelerated; in Case 5 the pace 
was enhanced by the chance to remove the potentially-disruptive chief 
engineers and replace them with their more compliant deputies. Cases 5 and 6 
both showed the slowing effect of the non-existence of the right kinds of 
operation on which to impose the planned change. 
 
Competence. The effects on project pace of the change drivers’ perception of 
their own competence to bring about the intended changes were made apparent 
in three different ways. First, if their competence was in doubt but untested 
they proceeded with initial caution (Case 6). Second, if early confidence in 
their own abilities was later shown by events to be misplaced, they slowed the 
pace (Cases 2 and 6). Third, if an early lack of confidence was bolstered by 
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success or by the realization that barriers to success were not necessarily all-
embracing, they speeded up the pace (Cases 5 and 6). 
 
Co-operation. Table 8.3 shows that in every instance except one perceptions of 
pace are positively related to the expectation of co-operation and negatively 
related to the expectation of resistance. The exception is Case 6, where the 
‘easiest first’ approach resulted in an initial euphoria of pursuit of achievement 
which was later replaced by a feeling that, by leaving the more intractable areas 
until last they had effectively damaged their chances of ever completing the 
changes. 
 
Propositions 5(a) to 5(e) 
 
The relative speeding up of a project’s pace is an expression of change 
drivers’ perception of the balance of (a) their autonomy or their ability to 
take advantage of constraints to their autonomy in the form of externally 
imposed schedule directives; (b) the availability of financial and internal staff 
resources; (c) the existence of opportunities to take advantage of a potential 
relaxation of potential non-co-operation, and of a suitable work-load on 
which to impose the change; (d) their competence to proceed with selected 
parts of the project; (e) a lack of possibility of non-co-operation on those 
selected parts. 
 
Propositions 6(a) to 6(e) 
 
The relative slowness of a project’s pace is an expressions of the change 
drivers’ perception of the balance of (a) their lack of autonomy; (b) the lack 
of availability of financial and internal staff resources; (c) the lack of a 
suitable work-load on which to impose the change; (d) their lack of 















Co-operation (-) more Away day to discuss the establishment of new 
roles. 
1.17 Competence (+) 
Co-operation (-) 
cautious Readiness to impose control if clinicians show 
signs of failing their new responsibilities. 
1.20 Autonomy (-) 
Co-operation (-) 
less Use power of executive board to overcome 
resistance. 
2.13 Competence (-) 
Co-operation (-) 
more Failure of nursing system shows more 
involvement of users needed. 
2.15 Resources (+) 
Competence (-) 
more Clinical department experts seconded to project 
team. 
2.16 Competence (+) 
Co-operation (-) 
cautious Clinical departments make false demands and 
unfulfilled promises. 
2.19 Co-operation (-) more Consultation needed with ‘real decision makers’, 
sometimes junior staff. 
3.03 Resources (+) 
Competence (-) 
Co-operation (+) 
more Involvement of staff to ensure physical 
functionality of new layout. 







less Bring in experienced project managers to ‘just do 
it’. 
5.06 Autonomy (-) 
Co-operation (-) 
less Stick to the letter of the recommendations. Avoid 
political compromise. 
5.10 Opportunity (+) 
Co-operation (+) 
less Less need for two-way communication when 
workload is high. 
5.11 Opportunity (+) 
Co-operation (+) 
less Replace chief engineers with deputies 
unaccustomed to having a say. 
5.13 Resources (+) 
Competence (+) 
Co-operation (-) 
less ‘Burn the boats’ to remove the possibility of a 
‘rearguard action’. 
5.15 Competence (-) more Project manager recognizes his own limitations 
and leaves detail to the team. 
6.05 
6.06 
Competence (+) less New roles and performance standards set by 
management. 
6.19 Resources (-) 
Competence (+) 
Co-operation (-) 






The instances of participation summarized in Table 8.4 show that the 
relationship between this aspect of management process and the five elements 
of personal control is complex. Where the objectives of the project of change 
include employee ‘empowerment’ and the creation of a bottom-up approach to 
organizational learning this would indicate the suitability of a participative 
approach to defining and executing the project. However, reluctance on the part 
of the change drivers to relinquish their perceived superiority in decision 
making tend to counteract the natural devolution of control. 
 
Autonomy. Case 4 is an example of absolute freedom to act over-riding any 
hint of democratic participation. The IS director’s decision to move NEAT 
went against the wishes of everyone involved. Cases 1 and 5 show that 
constraints on managerial action due to outside rules and directives may be 
emphasized for the purpose of limiting the possibility of a participative 
approach to change. Both cases show that project reification may be brought 
into play or held in reserve if there are signs that the choices of the empowered 
work force may conflict with the aims or wishes of the change drivers. Thus 
both the possession or lack of possession of autonomy may contribute to 
participation, depending on the balance of the other elements of personal 
control. 
 
Resources. Much participation is a result of the change drivers’ acceptance of 
the need to use the specialist know-how of the change subjects as a resource in 
the details of implementation, if not the overall policy. Cases 2, 3 and 5 
provide evidence of this. Case 5 also shows that when high powered or 
specialized internal resources are employed and brought in as fully- 
acknowledged members of the change driving team for the purpose of 
strengthening the team this results in a reduction in the possibility of 
participation immediately below the level of the change drivers. 
 
Opportunity. In Case 5 the sudden arrival of the Reliance project diverted the 
attention of staff away from the disruptive effects of the reorganization and 
allowed it to take place with less need to involve staff in discussing details. At 
the same time the opportunity to replace the chief engineers with their deputies 
effectively removed a level of management at which participation was seen to 
be necessary. In Case 6 the change drivers’ own failure to find an appropriate 
production line for implementing the new way led to them increasing their 
efforts to achieve the desired level of employee participation. 
 
Competence. On the relationship between the change drivers’ perceived 
competence in managing the change and the level of participation in the details 
of its implementation, two different sets of circumstances may be generalized. 
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First, Cases 2, 3 and 5 show that lack of technical competence is accompanied 
by a willingness to delegate decision making responsibility, at least initially. 
Second, Cases 1, 2, 5 and 6 show that, as trust in delegation is shown to be, or 
anticipated as being misplaced, a level of caution is employed as change drivers 
restrict or prepare to restrict participation. In every case the more the perceived 
competence relative to that of the change subjects the higher the level at which 
participation is restricted. 
 
Co-operation. Perhaps not surprisingly, co-operation is the element of personal 
control which appears most frequently in connection with the change drivers 
accounts of participation. The relationship between the two concepts is, 
however, difficult to pin down. In Cases 1 and 2 the involvement of clinicians 
was invited as a means of overcoming potential resistance to change. In the 
same cases the change drivers were, however, prepared to restrict opportunities 
for participation if change subjects took advantage of the approach to distort 
the aims of the change to their own ends. In Case 3 the tension between the 
potential lack of co-operation and the need for participation in technical details 
was resolve by the IS director ‘buying’ co-operation through the promise of 
jobs and bonuses. In both Cases 5 and 6 the change drivers had experienced the 
negative effects of allowing staff too much say in change policies and were 
starting to pursue alternative approaches. 
 
Propositions 7(a) to 7(e) 
 
The adoption and use of a participative approach to change is an expression 
of change drivers’ perceptions of the balance of (a) their autonomy, when 
combined with a willingness to engender a spirit of devolution of 
responsibility for decisions; (b) their willingness to use internal specialist 
technical know-how to ensure functionality; (c) their lack of opportunity to 
leave behind old practices on an old workload; (d) their lack of decision 
making competence relative to that of the change subjects; (e) their 
expectation that opportunities for participation would overcome the threat of 
a desire to resist change. 
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Propositions 8(a) to 8(e) 
 
The avoidance or abandonment of a participative approach to change is an 
expression of change drivers’ perceptions of the balance of (a) their absolute 
autonomy, or their lack of autonomy combined with an intent to exploit that 
lack of autonomy to reify the project; (b) a strengthening of the change team 
by bringing in the additional resources of new members; (c) their opportunity 
to use a changing workload to remove the need for participation; (d) their 
lack of decision making competence relative to that of the change subjects; 
(e) experience of the ineffectiveness of such an approach or its exploitation 














more Stress difficulties, intent to change and mandate. 
1.03 Opportunity (+) 
Co-operation (-) 
more Stress widespread dissatisfaction and ‘insight’. 
1.05 Resources (-) 
Co-operation (-) 





more Appeal to NHS norms of expenditure. 
1.11 Autonomy (-) 
Co-operation (-) 
more Stress that no trust, no hospital. 
1.13 Opportunity (+) 
Co-operation (-) 
more Stress low management costs and clinical 
benefits. 





more Stress incremental approach with a long way to 
go using low-calibre resources. 






Co-operation (-) more Stress desire not to waste resources on 
management control bureaucracy. 
2.20 Co-operation (-) more Stress benefits of integrated systems. 
3.02 Autonomy (-) 
Opportunity (+) 
Co-operation (-) 
more Stress inevitability of change, including 
redundancies. 
3.04 Co-operation (-) more Stress gratitude for forbearance during temporary 
disruption. 
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3.05 Co-operation (-) more Stress ‘lucky to have a job’. 
3.06 Competence (+) more Stress better service despite sub-optimal cost 
reduction. 
3.08 Co-operation (-) more Promise possibility of jobs elsewhere in the 
company. 
3.12 Co-operation (-) more Use work measurement to justify staff cuts. 
4.02 Competence (-) more Explain why NEAT had not been moved earlier. 
4.03 Opportunity (+) 
Co-operation (-) 
more Explain why NEAT needs to be moved. 
4.04 Competence (-) more Dismiss reasons for previous problems. 
5.03 Co-operation (-) more Build commitment of managers to change. 
5.04 Opportunity (+) 
Competence (+) 
less Appoint experienced managers to ‘just do it’. 
5.09 Autonomy (-) 
Co-operation (-) 
more Sell change to staff, clients, visiting top brass. 
5.10 Opportunity (+) less No need to worry about change when there’s 
plenty of work. 
6.02 Co-operation (-) more Stress potential for change. 
6.03 Autonomy (-) 
Resources (-) 
Competence (-) 
more Stress need for consultant to ‘kick start’. 
6.04 Competence (-) more Stress suitability of internal candidate. 
6.07 Co-operation (-) more Stress importance of step change. 
6.08 Competence (-) 
Co-operation (-) 





more Stress not consultant driving change. 
6.11 Co-operation (-) more Sell benefits to shop stewards. 
6.12 Co-operation (-) more Need to overcome ‘need to know’ culture. 
6.15 
6.16 
Co-operation (-) more Stress career development for supporters of 
change. 
6.17 Autonomy (-) 
Co-operation (-) 
more Differentiate local from group initiatives. 
6.18 Competence (-) more Stress need for mix of traditional and new types. 
6.19 Resources (-) 
Competence (+) 
more Rationalize need for continued hierarchy. 
6.20 Opportunity (-) more Rationalize difficulty of changing traditional UK 
factory rather than starting from scratch. 
6.21 Competence (-) 
Co-operation (-) 




Many of the instances of justification shown in Table 8.5 can be attributed to a 
desire either to overcome potential non-co-operation, or to rationalize potential 
challenges to the change drivers’ competence. 
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Autonomy. The lack of autonomy from Sweden in Case 6, and the inability of 
staff to differentiate between the ill-effects of local and group-wide change 
initiatives, meant that some effort was put into differentiating the two. It also 
led to the need to justify the changes to Sweden in order to get funding 
approval. In Cases 1, 3 and 5 the change drivers used their lack of autonomy to 
reify the project, stressing economic difficulties and the inevitability of change. 
 
Resources. The desire by the change drivers in Cases 1 and 2 to demonstrate 
their thrifty approach to management is reflected in their frequent stressing of 
low-budget, cost-minimizing, non-bureaucratic approaches. Apart from 
financial resources, in Cases 5 and 6 the low calibre of staff in the industry as a 
whole is blamed for the lack of success of some aspects of the change. 
 
Opportunity. There are instances of justification in cases 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 which 
indicate the taking of opportunities by change drivers to build on dissatisfaction 
with the status quo and the inevitability of making changes to the existing way 
of managing the workload. In Case 6 the difficulty of changing an existing 
operation rather than starting from scratch is emphasized. 
 
Competence. In Case 1 the chief executive was at pains not to make incautious 
claims of his own competence. He separated the successful achievement of the 
administrative change from the achievement of the benefits it was intended to 
bring, which would take several years to be realized. In Cases 3 and 4 the IS 
director was conscious that, by his own declared criteria, two possible charges 
of incompetence could be levelled against him. One of these he blamed on 
others; the other he gave a logical explanation for. Cases 5 and 6 contain 
examples of the change drivers prolonged exercising of their perceived superior 
decision-making ability. In Case 6 the change drivers emphasized the need to 
demonstrate to staff their own managerial competence. They described the 
consultants’ role first in building up and then ultimately threatening that 
perceived competence. 
 
Co-operation. The cases contain many examples of the use by the change 
drivers of justification processes to overcome potential or actual non-co-
operation. These include building commitment by stressing to all concerned the 
desirability, efficacy, inevitability, wisdom and economy of the change, 




Propositions 9(a) to 9(e) 
 
Justification of the change itself, of the approach to change and of the 
apparent lack of progress of the change is an expression of change drivers’ 
perceptions of the balance of (a) their lack of autonomy; (b) their lack of 
financial or internal resources; (c) the existence of opportunities to build on 
dissatisfaction and to stress the inevitability of change; (d) possible apparent 
lapses of competence on their part, or the expected length of time before the 
ultimate effects of the change would be realized, or their superior decision-
making ability; (e) potential or actual non-co-operation. 
 
8.1.7 Role definition 
 




Role def’n. Process 
1.06 Co-operation (-) unclear Second project manager from change 
management team. Sponsor retained control. 
2.03 Resources (+) 
Competence (+) 
clearer Distinct separation of roles. Established, 
technically-adept project manager had clear 
responsibility. 
3.01 Co-operation (-) unclear Project manager role shared/confused. 
4.04 Co-operation (-) unclear GSS manager nominally appointed project 
manager (against her wish and against her 
professional instincts). 
5.03 Resources (+) 
Co-operation (-) 
unclear Gradual build-up of top level supporters with 
loosely defined roles. 
5.04 Resources (+) clearer Experienced project managers appointed to 
change team. 
5.05 Competence (-) 
 
clearer Delegation of detail to technical experts at 
implementation stage. 
5.11 Opportunity (+) 
 
clearer Remove entire level of senior management. 
Delegate responsibility for detailed execution. 
5.13 Autonomy (+) clearer Project managers line up successors. 
5.19 Competence (+) less clear Total trust and agreement over policies. 
6.05 Autonomy (+) 
Competence (+) 
clearer New roles defined by management. 
6.07 Resources (+) clearer Team members give up other responsibilities. 
6.15 Autonomy (+) 
Co-operation (-) 
clearer Promotion for those who helped change succeed. 
6.21 Competence (-) 
Co-operation (-) 





In each case the extent to which the project roles and responsibilities of 
individuals were defined or left undefined by change drivers varied over 
different levels in the organization. A higher degree of definition reflected a 
higher degree of anticipated or experienced control. Anticipated control was 
strongly linked to project management expertise. Reduction of clarity of role 
definition reflected lack of control shown up by negative experiences during 
the project. 
 
Autonomy. Autonomy from outside directives to delegate clearly defined roles 
was unrestricted in all but Cases 1 and 2, where NHS guidelines signaled 
expectations of a clear sponsor/manager split. In Case 1 this split was 
technically acknowledged, even though the sponsor retained substantial control 
over the project’s details. In Cases 3, 4, 5 and 6, where there was no restriction 
on autonomy, the extent of definition was determined by other dimensions of 
control. 
 
Resources. In Cases 1, 2, 5 and 6 the identification and appointment of project 
managers by project sponsors was dependent on the availability of individuals 
who were perceived as trusted, competent and committed to the change. In 
Cases 3 and 4 the sponsor deliberately kept roles beneath his own vague. In 
Case 5 both project managers were keen to keep control over their own 
destinies by lining up a deputy who could succeed them. 
 
Opportunity. Cases 5 and 6 provided the only instances where the opportunity 
for change was made uncertain by the nature of the company’s work-load. In 
Case 5 the effect of this on clarity of project roles and responsibilities was 
difficult to establish, since it was possible for the project managers to delegate 
many detailed tasks in the form of changes to systems and procedures. In Case 
6 the lack of opportunity only became apparent after the failed attempt to 
introduce change on an assembly line. The subsequent relaxation and drift of 
clear responsibilities for change provide the only clue that clarity of definition 
of roles was negatively affected by the existence of a suitable work 
opportunity. 
 
Competence. The lack of clarity of definition of project manager and project 
sponsor roles in Cases 1, 3, 4, in the early stages of Case 5 and in the later 
stages of Case 6 reflect a balance of (i) the sponsors’ wish to retain control, 
based on his own perceived ability in each case to manage the day-to-day 
aspects of the change at that stage in the project relative to that of his project 




Co-operation. The unremitting expectation of non-co-operation in Cases 1 and 
4 led to the sponsor in each case retaining substantially undelegated control. 
The selectivity of delegation of tasks in Cases 2 and 3 reflected the perceived 
need for a participative approach. In Case 5 the controlled downward release of 
authority, particularly after the events of the Reliance project, accompanied the 
lessening threat of resistance. In contrast, in Case 6 the dissipation of initially 
clear responsibilities reflected the growing feeling of lack of control over 
remaining changes. 
 
Propositions 10(a) to 10(e) 
 
The degree of clarity of definition of downward-delegated roles and 
responsibilities, both between the change drivers and at lower levels, is an 
expression of the change drivers’ perceptions of (a) their autonomy; (b) the 
availability of committed, trusted colleagues combined with the need to 
implement the change; (c) the existence of an opportunity to implement the 
planned change; (d) their expectations of control through project 
management given the superiority of competence of the delegates in those 
aspects delegated; (e) lack of potential or actual resistance. 
 
 237
8.2 Central issues and key organizational characteristics 
 
One of the aims of this study has been to examine the effect of the context of a 
project on its management process. For this reason projects were studied in 
four different organizational settings. Along with project content and project 
management process, context has been one of the elements in the analytical 
framework. The constant comparison method led to the identification of a 
context coding group labelled key organizational characteristics, aggregated 
from the central issues to which change drivers allocated significant attention 
in each case. 
 
Section 8.2.1 takes Case 1 as an example, and explains how these case-specific 
central issues, which may be considered as the essential features of the context 
of a case, were identified. In Section 8.2.2 the central issues from all six cases 
are described. In Section 8.2.3 the central issues from the individual cases are 
aggregated to form a set of generic key organizational characteristics in the 
form of seven contextual dimensions which were represented to a greater or 
lesser extent in each case. 
 
8.2.1 Identifying central issues 
 
The ‘transcendental realist’ ontological perspective which has been adopted to 
identify possible mechanisms linking the behaviour of managers with their 
organizational environment was explained in Chapter 3. Central to the 
application of this perspective has been the role of managerial cognition as the 
intermediary between stimulus and response. To put this cognitive view into 
its wider perspective it is first explained how it differs from two other 
theoretical perspectives in organizational literature. 
 
First, in the field of organizational behaviour, cognitive orientations are 
distinguishable from behaviourist theoretical perspectives. The latter are based 
on the positivist view, which restricts the objects of scientific investigation to 
those phenomena that are directly observable. Cognitive orientations, 
including social cognition (Wyer and Srull, 1986; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978), 
expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), attribution theory (Weiner, 1985) and 
control theory (Campion and Lord, 1982), on the other hand, regard ‘the 
workings of the human mind as a legitimate object of investigation’ 
(Buchanan and Huczynski, 1991: 19).  
 
Second, in strategic management literature theories based on managerial 
cognition may be set apart from theories from the deterministic paradigm, 
discussed in Chapter 2. In this view change in an organization is seen to be 
produced by its environment. 
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The cognitive approach, which emphasizes the active role of the individual, 
underlies the ontological, epistemological and methodological orientation of 
this research. 
 
In Section 5.4 the view of managerial attention as a scarce resource was 
discussed. March and Shapira’s (1988) assertion that the actions of managers 
arise from their limited attention to selected issues has been borne out by this 
study. The allocation of managerial attention in a case may be indicated by 
aggregating the ‘considerations’ in the summary tabulation of the case into a 
small number of central issues. 
 
In Case 1, for example, the enacted management processes listed in Table 4.3 
arose from the change drivers directing their attention to just a few central 
issues. To illustrate the existence of central issues, Table 8.7 below lists the 
individual ‘considerations’ from Case 1, with their associated processes, as 
shown in Table 4.3. For each specific consideration the general central issue 
which underlies the actions or intentions of the change drivers is identified. 
 
Table 8.7: Case 1 considerations, management processes, 
and central issues 
 
Ref. Consideration Process Central issue 
1.01 1994/95 Business plan 
required to be issued 
March 1994 
Use plan to stress 
difficulties, intent to 
change and mandate 
Externally imposed rules may 
be used to overcome potential 
resistance from clinicians 
1.02 Need to maintain 
confidence of ‘awkward 
squad’ 
Caution not to turn the 
place upside down 
Potential resistance 
1.03 Trust staff dissatisfied 
with status quo 
Build on dissatisfaction 
to make and market 
change 
Organizational instability in 
recent history may be used to 
overcome potential resistance 
1.04 Staff will be asked to 
take on more 
responsibility 
Stress change for the 
better to the working 
lives of individuals 
Concern to be seen not to be 
increasing management 
bureaucracy and costs 
1.05 Regional change 
management team 
available and free 
Use them, stressing that 
they are free, despite the 
use of costly change 
consultants being the 
norm in other hospitals 
Appeal to industry norms to 
demonstrate that change being 
done on a shoe-string 
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1.06 Need to differentiate 
project sponsor and 
project manager 
Second project manager 
from change 
management team 
Response to externally-imposed 
directives and expectations 
concerning project management 
1.07 New clinical directors 
must be actively 
committed to change 
Hold away-day to get 
people excited about 
establishing new roles 
Potential resistance 
1.08 Need to secure 
commitment to change 
and purpose for away-
day 
Send out paper setting 
out agenda and 
requesting preparatory 
work 
Externally imposed rules may 
be used to overcome potential 
resistance from clinicians 
1.09 Clinicians may doubt 
that clinical directorates 
is the right solution 
Hold workshops using 
experts who can speak 
with authority 
Appeal to industry norms to 
overcome potential resistance 
1.10 Management will be 
seen to be spending 
excessive money on 
consultants 
Use paid consultants as 
sparingly as possible, 
appealing to NHS 
norms 
Appeal to industry norms to 
demonstrate that change being 
done on a shoe-string 
1.11 Merger talks 
undermining credibility 
of trust entity 
Stress that no trust, no 
hospital 
Use externally-imposed trust 
rules and instability of recent 
history to overcome potential 
resistance 
1.12 Need to compromise 
between PM’s wish for 
structured project 
planning process and 
CE’s desire to minimize 
bureaucracy 
Use simple milestone 
schedule and 7S 
framework in an 
informal way 
Conscious response to 
externally-imposed directives 
and expectations concerning 
project management 
1.13 New structure might be 




resources spread thinly 
and clinical benefits of 
new structure 
Concern to be seen not to be 
increasing management 
bureaucracy and costs 
1.14 Managers’ jobs might be 
seen by them as too big 
Stress meaningfulness Concern to be seen not to be 
increasing management 
bureaucracy and costs 
1.15 People will lose sight of 
the seriousness and 
enormity of the task 
Be cautious in claiming 
success; stress phased 
approach 
Comparison with industry 
norms to show managerial 
prudence 
1.16 Pressures for change 
will cause change 
overload 
Resist simultaneous 
introduction of quality 
initiative 
Need for caution in interpreting 
externally-imposed 
expectations for change 
1.17 Empowered clinicians 
might fail their 
responsibilities 
Be ready to step in if 
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1.18 Clinical directors must 
meet the deadlines of 
the annual planning 
cycle 
Officially introduce the 
new structure in good 
time 
Externally imposed rules may 
be used to overcome potential 
resistance from clinicians 
1.19 Externally imposed 
financial requirements 




imposed from without 
Externally imposed rules may 
be used to overcome potential 
resistance from clinicians 
1.20 Change will be resisted 
internally 
Use the legitimating 
power of the executive 
board 
Externally imposed rules may 
be used to overcome potential 
resistance from clinicians 
 
Table 8.7 shows that the specific considerations which give rise to the 
behaviour of the change drivers are centred around a few central issues. These 
are summarized in Section 8.2.2 for all six cases. At the end of Section 8.2.2 a 
series of secondary issues is identified. Whilst these were apparently not as 
important as the central issues they played a significant role in determining 
change driver behaviour. 
 
8.2.2 Central issues in the six cases 
 
In Case 1 three central issues summarize the principal considerations behind 
the management processes: 
 
1 Rule issues. The change drivers were responding to and operating in an 
environment of externally imposed rules, regulations, recommendations 
and guidelines. 
 
2 Management cost issues. The change drivers were faced with persistent 
ideological and commercial conflict. They sought to balance financial 
stringencies imposed on public hospitals with the growth in 
administrative bureaucracy which was intended to support new formal 
financial obligations and service responsibilities. 
 
3 Potential resistance issues. The change drivers were attempting to 
bring about radical changes to the roles and responsibilities of hospital 
staff, particularly senior clinicians, who were perceived to have 
ingrained ways of thinking and a lot of power to resist unwanted change. 
 
In Case 2 the central issues are similar. Because of the more tangible nature of 
the project’s scope, however, they are framed in slightly different terms. 
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1 Project management bureaucracy issues. The change drivers were 
operating in a public sector capital project management role. There 
were certain requirements to follow such projects through a 
proceduralized, formally documented and controlled process of 
initiation, implementation and close-out. 
 
2 Subjective cost/benefit issues. In addition to objective formal 
requirements for quantified cost-benefit analysis the change drivers 
were expected to deliver new computer-based information systems 
which were perceived internally as creating, subjectively, a feeling of 
positive balance of benefits over costs. 
 
3 Professional expert issues. The change drivers were attempting to 
introduce integrating systems to a differentiated set of ‘professional 
niches’. The change drivers needed to elicit and interpret the 
requirements of clinical experts, many of whom had no personal 
interest in changing from their existing disparate ways of working to a 
hospital-wide system. 
 
In Case 3 the central issues reflect the need to keep up with and exploit 
technological change in a fast-moving day-to-day environment whilst 
maintaining the integrity of the internal service role of the photoservices 
department. 
 
1 Customer benefit issues. The IT department existed to provide a 
service to its internal customers. The IS Director aimed constantly to 
capitalize on technological advance to provide a demonstrably better 
service for a demonstrably lower cost. 
 
2 Staff benefit issues. The immediate threat of digital image transmission 
had left photoservices staff in no doubt about the imminent redundancy 
of their present skills. The project provided the change drivers with an 
opportunity to prolong the jobs of some photoservices staff and to allow 
them to learn new skills for the future. 
 
3 Issues of continuity during change. The photoservices department was 
expected to provide high-quality pictures to producers of daily 
newspapers, virtually around the clock. Disruption to that service was to 
be avoided at all costs. 
 
4 Management role issues. The change drivers’ roles were ill-defined in 
a formal sense, with at least four people sharing overlapping 
responsibility for managing the project. This had implications for the 
need for effective day to day communication. 
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By comparison with the Case 3 project, the change in Case 4 was relatively 
unsuccessful. The central issues reflect unresolved compromise brought about 
by the competing aims of bringing the NEAT project under control and the IS 
director’s pursuit of cost savings. 
 
1 Management control issues. Relocating the NEAT project was 
intended to address problems of lack of management control. 
 
2 Customer pressure issues. The change was intended to enable the GIS 
Division to respond faster and more effectively to the growing pressures 
and demands from their customers. 
 
3 Structural compromise issues. The success of the change was 
compromised by personalities, internal disagreement and territorial 
disputes, and by the IS director’s desire to minimize project management 
bureaucracy for the sake of saving on full-time staff costs. 
 
In Case 5 three central issues were clear representations of Bechtel’s 
characteristics. 
 
1 Technical professional issues. Bechtel employed highly technically 
qualified professionals whose skills were integrated on large, complex 
engineering projects. The change drivers faced issues of professional 
sensitivity and engineering design integrity. 
 
2 Project reification issues. The company’s project culture had a 
significant influence on the change drivers’ approach. The formal 
definition and objectification of the change as a project, and its role as a 
temporary assignment, reflected this culture. 
 
3 Multinational subsidiary issues. Initial uncertainty over the relative 
roles of the London and USA offices was increasingly resolved as the 
change drivers focused on their sub-cultural differences. 
 
The central issues in Case 6 reflected the focal bias of the Electrolux change 
drivers. 
 
1 Traditional issues. The company had a marked legacy of entrenched 
‘traditional’ practices and values, including its unionized structure and 
paternal hierarchy. The untidy, run-down appearance of the site were 
physical manifestations of its 70-year history. 
 
 243
2 Multinational subsidiary issues. Head office in Sweden exerted control 
over the step-change project, particularly in its formative early stages. In 
addition the expectation of concurrent compliance with group initiatives 
was a pervasive issue. Luton’s status as member of a multi-national 
group of factories guided its benchmarking activities. 
 
3 Benchmarking issues. The company became a member of a community 
of organizations which sought to learn from one another’s successes and 
failures. The change drivers sought solutions to their problems and 
legitimacy for their actions through evidence from other firms. 
 
The foregoing summary of key issues reflects the three or four principal 
considerations in each case. In some cases relatively less important, but still 
significant issues also played a part in gaining the change drivers’ attention. 
These secondary issues were identified as: 
 
Ealing Hospital NHS Trust: unstable recent history; tendency to appeal to 
industry norms. 
 
Associated Newspapers: renewed, modern self-image; independence from 
other organizations; tendency to differentiate from the competition; unstable 
history. 
 
Bechtel: private ownership. 
 
Electrolux: stable history; low technology. 
 
8.2.3 Central issues summarized as key organizational 
characteristics 
 
An examination of the central issues from all six projects provides a cross-case 
comparative view of how the selective attention of change drivers is influenced 
by the characteristics of their organization and its sector. This aggregation of 
case-specific central issues resulted in the final identification of seven generic 
key organizational characteristics which acted to a greater or lesser extent in 
each case. In common with the other major categories of the final version of the 
theory, the key organizational characteristics were the result of a complex and 
lengthy process of theoretical iteration. The final labelling and definition of the 
seven aggregated key organizational characteristics is shown below. Appendix 
B contains an earlier version, which shows the characteristics’ dimensions 
before the latter were condensed into a single ‘extent’ for each characteristic.  
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Key organizational characteristics 
 
OWNERSHIP: PUBLIC/PRIVATE 
The extent to which the organization is a public or privately-owned entity 
 
SELF-IMAGE: TRADITIONAL/MODERN 
The extent to which the organization has a traditional or modern self-image 
 
GROUP MEMBERSHIP: MEMBER/INDEPENDENT 
The extent to which the organization is part of a conglomerate 
 
CONFORMITY: ISOMORPHIC/DIFFERENTIATING 
The extent to which the organization is an active member of an isomorphic sector 
 
HISTORY: STABLE/THREATENED 
The extent to which the organization has a recent history of stability 
 
ORIENTATION: PROJECT/PROCESS 
The extent to which the organization uses projects in its mainstream business 
 
TECHNICAL EXPERTISE: HIGH/LOW 
The extent to which the change subjects have ‘expert power’ derived from their technical 
expertise 
   
A diagrammatic representation of the eight key organizational characteristics, 
and a qualitative representation of their relative significance in each 
organization, as revealed by the allocation of management attention, is shown 
in Appendix C. In Section 8.3 it is shown how the presence or absence of these 




8.3 An integrated theoretical model 
 
A set of propositions linking management processes with personal control was 
derived in Section 8.1. In Section 8.2 the role of the key organizational 
characteristics as indicators of the allocation of managerial attention was 
developed. Taken together, these three concepts form the basis of the final 
stage in the theory building process - the building of an integrated theoretical 
model which summarizes this explanation of how the management processes of 
a project of change are determined by its context. 
 
To illustrate the mechanism, three sets of examples are presented. First, in 
Section 8.3.1, two examples of ‘simple trios’ are given, each being a 
combination of a single dimension of each of the three concepts. Second, in 
Section 8.3.2, two examples of ‘complex trios’ are provided, wherein multiple 
dimensions of one or more of the three concepts act together. Third, a further 
complication is introduced in Section 8.3.3, which gives examples of both 
positive and negative feelings of personal control arising from the same 
organizational characteristic. This feature of the theory has important 
consequences for its practical implications, discussed in Chapter 9. 
 
In Section 8.3.4 the three major elements of the theory which is built from this 
study are brought together. The essence of the theory is that key organizational 
characteristics (context), influence change driver behaviour (management 
process) through the intermediate cognitive link (personal control). The theory 
is presented in the form of a summary model. 
 
8.3.1 Simple trios 
 
A central theme of this thesis is that an underlying mechanism exists, whereby 
a cognitive intermediary - personal control - links key organizational 
characteristics with management processes. This mechanism may be illustrated 
with examples from the data. It is possible to represent many combinations of 
the three concepts as simple linked ‘trios’ consisting of conceptually self-
contained processes. In the following two examples attention to a single key 
organizational characteristic influences a single dimension of the change 
drivers’ feelings of personal control which is, in turn, expressed by a single 
management process. The examples are selected from the many occurrences of 
the mechanism in the summary tabulations of Section 8.1. 
 
Simple trio: example 1 
 
In Case 6 Electrolux’s recent stable history had resulted in an acknowledged 
lack of a ‘burning platform’ from which to launch change. This resulted in an 
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expected lack of co-operation, a consequence of which was a delay to the start 
of the project while an independent assessment of its wisdom was established. 
 
 













Simple trio: example 2 
 
In Case 5, the technical complexity of Bechtel’s projects meant that the 
proposed changes could not be introduced without the need for carefully 
planned changes to the company’s engineering procedures. This led to the need 
for the change drivers to rely on technical specialists whose contribution to the 
changes was directed, monitored and controlled through a highly formal, 
structured approach. 
 
Key organizational characteristic 













8.3.2 Complex trios 
 
In other instances, as shown by the summary tabulations in Section 8.1, the 
situation was more complex, with combinations of more than one dimension of 
the three central concepts acting together. Two examples of these ‘complex 
trios’ follow. 
 
Complex trio: example 1 
 
Case 6 describes how the Electrolux change drivers prematurely cut short their 
association with Andersen Consulting because the change drivers were 
concerned that resistance to change arising from the company’s stable past and 
from its long tradition of non-change would result in the factory workers 
‘reverting’, having viewed the change as yet another consultant-driven fad. 
Acknowledging the likelihood of this, the change drivers asserted that they had 
learned enough about the benchmarking process to be able to continue without 
the consultants. 
 














External agents (less) 
Justification (more) 
 
Complex trio: example 2 
 
In Case 2 the Ealing NHS Trust change drivers described how compliance with 
the full formal public sector requirements for project cost control, including 
cost-benefit analysis, was seen as a waste of time. They appealed to NHS 





















8.3.3 Positive and negative features of key characteristics 
 
The situation is further complicated by another factor. The data show not only 
that there were complex, multi-dimensional links between the three central 
concepts, but also that each characteristic had simultaneous positive and 
negative effects on personal control. For example: 
 
* Ownership (Public/Private): Bechtel’s private ownership could 
increase the autonomy of its managers and hence make the company 
more responsive to change. The characteristic could also decrease the 
autonomy of regional change drivers through demands for compliance 
with the changing whims of the owner. 
 
* Self-image (Traditional/Modern): There were many negative features 
of the traditional self-image of Electrolux. The change drivers’ 
reluctance to face up to the more intransigent aspects of the step change 
project at the outset led to further-entrenched non-co-operation. On a 
more positive note, the image enabled the change drivers to make a 
sharp distinction between the old and the new, using opportunities to 
make highly visible and symbolic promotions of supporters of the step 
change project. 
 
* Group membership (Member/Independent): Electrolux Luton’s sister 
factories provided opportunities to pursue their benchmarking aims. 
However, internal competition between Electrolux group operations 
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threatened the change drivers’ perceived ability to overcome resistance 
to integration at the departmental level. 
 
* Conformity (Isomorphic/Differentiating): The Trust change drivers 
were able to appeal to ‘acceptable’ NHS norms to justify their own 
prudent management. On the other hand, well-publicized examples of 
the failure of similar change initiatives in other hospitals led to a feeling 
of lack of control. 
 
* History (Stable/Threatened): Electrolux’s stable history meant that 
slack resources were available for change. The lack of a ‘burning 
platform’, however, led to some resistance. 
 
* Orientation (Project/Process) : Bechtel’s project culture enabled the 
senior change drivers to appoint experienced managers of change to 
define and drive the tasks needed for the reorganization. The managers, 
however, expected to move on to other projects before the change was 
finished. 
 
* Technical expertise (Low/High): The expectation that technical people 
can and will find reasons for not changing was evident in both the Trust 
and Bechtel. However, the knowledge that the details could be left to the 
experts was an enabler of a desired participative approach. 
 
This feature of the data, wherein each key organizational characteristic may 
have both positive and negative effects on personal control, has important 
consequences for practicing managers who attempt to drive organizational 
change. These consequences will be explored in Chapter 9. 
 
8.3.4 Summary model 
 
In summary, the findings of the six cases may be described by an integrated 
theoretical model. The model, shown in Figure 8.1, encapsulates the major 
theoretical contribution of the thesis.
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Figure 8.1: Integrated model of dimensions of key organizational 
characteristics, personal control and management process 
 
The practical implications of this model are explored in Chapter 9, where 




8.4 Summary of learning 
 
This section summarizes the learning stages in the six case studies. The 
learning has arisen both from the application of the constant comparison 
approach which continued through the study, as well as from the final cross-
case analysis presented in this chapter. 
 
Table 8.8: Summary of stages of learning 
 
Case Learning 
1 and 2 Development and application of qualitative coding, memoing 
and mapping technique, guided by research questions and 
simple analytical framework. 
 First stage narrative case presentation structured around 
elements of analytical framework with quotes illustrating 
specific instances of change drivers’ perceptions of action or 
intent. Second stage data reduction and summary tabular 
presentation. 
 Management processes in two projects with different 
characteristics capable of closely similar categorization. 
 Importance of principal change drivers as multiple informants. 
3 and 4 Management processes of two further projects in an 
organization with significantly different characteristics capable 
of closely similar categorization, despite details of application 
of processes influenced by characteristics, including 
public/private sector distinction. 
 Multiple informants in addition to change drivers confirm 
factual information but add no new data on management 
processes. 
 Change drivers’ conception and use of ‘projects’ is culturally 
determined, clearly different in the two organizations and an 
important feature of context. 
 Management processes reflect a desire for control. A review of 
literature on selected aspects of control reveals that the 
personal control construct is an attractive addition to 
conventional notions of project control as an analytical device 
linking management process with context. 
 Small projects place significant limitations on the range and 
depth of analysis. 
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Table 8.8 cont./ 
 
5 Importance of project orientation as a key organizational 
characteristic confirmed. 
 Collapsing dimensions into one continuum of extremes for 
each management process category simplifies and focuses the 
emerging model. 
 Five dimensions of personal control clarified and defined. 
 Conclusions on management process categories and range of 
informants confirmed. 
 Larger project provided the opportunity for a richer, more 
valuable study, more important at this stage in the study than 
the paired projects approach. 
6 Saturation of management process categories. 
 Saturation of personal control categories and confirmation of 
the useful conceptual role of the construct as intermediary 
between context and process. 
 Identification of key issues in each case. 
Cross-
case 
Tabulation of instances from all six cases in each of the six 
management process categories leads to generalization of 
relationships, including exceptions, between management 
processes and personal control. Generalized relationships 
presented as a series of propositions. 
 Summary of key issues generalized to seven context continua, 







This final chapter draws together and summarizes the conclusions of the study. 
In Section 9.1 the contribution to knowledge made by the research is made 
explicit. Section 9.2 examines the implications of the study for management 
practice, offering practical advice for change drivers. The study’s limitations 
are acknowledged in Section 9.3. In Section 9.4, opportunities for further 
research arising from this study are identified. The chapter ends, in Section 9.5, 
with a reflection on the need for a continued close relationship between 





In Chapter 2 it was argued that understanding of contemporary management 
practices in relation to projects of organizational change was in need of 
updating and development. Evidence was found in the literature that the rapid 
growth in importance to society of the planned change phenomenon in recent 
years has tended to outstrip knowledge of its ever-shifting processes. 
Researchers have begun to pursue new strands of investigation in new 
directions which cross boundaries traditionally delineated by such fields as 
project management, strategic management and the management of 
organizational change. They have revealed a need to explore the developing 
meanings of organizational actors who attempt to bring the application of 
micropolitical, cultural and social understanding into their realm of rationality. 
Further, there is a persistent undercurrent of demand for empirical enquiry 
which examines processes of organizational change in ways which take 
account of the acknowledged role of context. 
 
This research builds on the observation that, as a concept, the project 
management of organizational change is widely embraced and used by 
practicing managers as a means of defining, directing and energizing their 
efforts to respond to perceived environmental forces. It has confirmed the rich 
potential of entering a pre-paradigmatic field of knowledge with an open, 
exploratory approach. Case studies from four industries have provided novel 
insight into the complex processes which represent the interpretation of a 
changing context and the resulting management processes. By identifying, 
expanding and developing the role and meaning of personal control as an 
intermediary between managerial perception and action a fresh perspective has 
been brought to management processes in projects of organizational change. 
 
The contribution of this research, generalized within the limits of the cases 
studied, may be summed up as follows: 
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1 Management processes  
 
Management processes in projects of organizational change have been 
categorized and dimensioned in six elements. The six together represent a 
convenient device for describing the intentions and chosen actions of drivers of 
pre-defined projects of organizational change. The categorization provides an 
analytical framework which is distinct, robust, complete, parsimonious and 
accessible to the managers whose accounts informed it. It builds on previous 
work, in particular that of Buchanan and Boddy (1992), by expanding concepts 
of project control beyond the cybernetic sense, by integrating them with other 
processes rather than separating them, and by taking account of the roles of 
other change drivers in addition to that of the nominated project manager. 
 
A reoriented version of Pettigrew’s processual model has guided this analysis, 
and its application has formed the basis of the overall theoretical contribution. 
In Chapter 2 the meaning of process in this study was clarified and 
distinguished from other meanings of the term in strategy process literature and 
in operations management. The building of this processual approach 
contributes a novel dimension to conceptualizations of process in management 
literature. 
 
2 Personal control 
 
The extent of each of the six elements at any time has been conceived as an 
expression of change drivers’ perception of their personal control. In this way 
personal control is an intermediary between the context of change and the 
actions of managers. 
 
To a greater or lesser extent processes express either the possession and 
exercise of control, or the lack of possession and/or pursuit of control. 
Identification of the linking role of the personal control construct builds on 
previous work by providing a way of establishing how management processes 
are determined by their context. As Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest, 
intervening variables can clarify relationships. The personal control construct 
has been used to clarify the relationship between context and management 
process. The construct has been developed as five categories. This 
categorization builds on previous work by adding opportunity and co-operation 
to the three elements, autonomy, resources and self-competence mentioned by 
Jackson and Dutton (1988). 
 
Research by Carpenter and Golden (1997) suggests that that the personal 
control construct has the potential to play a central role in discussions of 
strategy formulation and implementation. They describe experimental research, 
using business students as subjects, which explores the related construct of 
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perceived managerial discretion and its links with other constructs, including 
locus of control and managerial power. Perceived managerial discretion, 
defined by Carpenter and Golden (1997: 187) as ‘executives’ [perceived] 
ability to affect important organizational outcomes’ clearly has a great deal of 
overlap with personal control, particularly with regard to perceived autonomy. 
 
There is great potential, discussed in Section 9.4 for further empirical research 
exploring how perceptions not only of autonomy but also of the other 
dimensions of personal control identified in this study relate to theories of 
cognition and decision making. Each of the six management process elements 
has been analytically linked to each of the five personal control elements. The 
conjectured links, which take full account of exceptions to generalized 
associations, are presented in the form of propositions (some links require two 
propositions to take account of positive and negative actions). This builds on 
previous work by providing a finely-fragmented account of relationships 
between management processes and their contexts. Each narrowly-specified 




A key reason for choosing a theory building approach to this study was the 
comparative lack of existing theories which could have been used as a 
foundation for enquiry into organizational change project management 
processes in context. Despite the widely acknowledged importance of a focus 
on context, discussed in Section 2.3, there have been few comparative 
empirical studies. A further contribution of this research has been to identify a 
series of generic characteristics of organizations which can help explain 
managerial behaviour. 
 
This contribution, which casts light on the role of specific organizational 
features such as ownership and technical orientation, builds on previous 
studies, described in Chapter 2, which use the role of context in a more 
conceptually indistinct way. 
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9.2 Implications for management practice 
 
Contemporary management literature explains how demands for organizational 
flexibility have led to a general move towards project-based approaches to 
management. This trend is accompanied by the related, but subtly different, 
notion of a project approach to organizational change. Application of the 
project approach to change is recommended in much prescriptive advice to 
managers. Its prevalence in practice has been supported by this study. Projects 
are, therefore, both the means and the end of many organizational change 
initiatives. It follows that understanding of processes of projects and project 
management of organizational change has a double significance for practicing 
managers. If the findings of this study are taken at face value, what are the 
implications for change drivers? What practical advice can be offered? What, 
in short, has been learned from this study about improving the chances of a 
project’s success and lessening the chance of failure? 
 
In Section 9.2.1 the importance of developing an understanding of how the 
context of a project of change affects change drivers’ feelings of personal 
control is asserted. Section 9.2.2 suggests two ways that the theoretical model 
presented in Chapter 8 can be used as an analytical framework for managers 
who seek to enhance their personal control, thereby improving their likelihood 
of taking positive, informed decisions. 
 
9.2.1 Understanding the effects of context on personal control 
 
In Chapter 2 evidence was reported of a growing appreciation of the 
importance of an awareness of a project’s context. Project context may be 
considered at different levels. At the global level, for example, Pant, Allinson 
and Hayes (1996) describe research which indicates that project management 
suits the culture of some countries (for example the USA) better than others 
(for example the UK). This has complex implications for multinational 
operators who use projects. Morris (1994) stresses the general centrality of 
context to the management of projects. He asserts that the future of the 
discipline will be characterized and determined by change in political, social, 
environmental, economic and technological context at both sectoral and 
organizational levels. A practical example of the importance of awareness of 
organizational context is provided by Von Dran, Kappelman and Prybutok 
(1996), who studied the effectiveness of training programmes in organizational 
transformation projects. They found that, without consideration of cultural 
context, training investments were wasted. 
 
The vital significance of context and the futility of searching for easy, context-
free universal rules for organizational success is summed up by Pettigrew and 
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Whipp (1991: 7). They stress that there may be ‘no assumption of single best 
management practice and no prospect of a quick fix’. By definition, managers 
who conceive and drive projects of organizational change believe that the 
external and internal context which makes up their professional domain is, at 
least to some extent, controllable. It follows that better understanding of that 
context and of its effect on their feelings of personal control, and on their 
attempts to exercise that control, is itself a worthwhile goal. 
 
In what way is context likely to affect personal control? A broad conclusion of 
the influential work on organizational decision-making by March and 
colleagues (see March, 1988 for a comprehensive account) is that managerial 
attention is a scarce resource. Rather than rationally weighing up all possible 
choices managers selectively attend to certain aspects of context at the expense 
of others. In the realm of project risk management Turner (1993a: 243) echoes 
this idea when he refers to the limitation of managerial attention to the 
‘significant few’ risks. Building on this principle, and linking it to the idea of 
personal control as a set of intervening variables between context and action, it 
is argued here that in order to comprehend the effects of context on their own 
management processes managers should seek to understand how the issues to 
which they direct their scarce attention relate to their own personal control. 
 
All the managers in this study had spent their professional careers largely 
within the confines of a particular sector. Many of them had remained in the 
same organization for practically the whole of their working lives. It is 
possible to speculate that such specialization leads to introspection and 
blindness to the effects of context on management process, when managers 
have no direct experiences of management processes in other sectors. 
 
Evidence of this ‘organizational introspection’ in the case studies has been 
revealed by the central presence of certain issues in the data and the absence of 
others. In Chapter 8 it was asserted that the central issues reflect a bias in 
managerial attention which is associated with certain key organizational 
characteristics. 
 
Jackson and Dutton (1988) describe experimental research by social 
psychologists which shows that when people feel that they have little control 
over a situation they are more likely to engage in wishful thinking, relying on 
faith or resigning their futures to fate, restricting the amount of information 
they attend to and the solutions they consider. Staw et. al. (1981) label this 
phenomenon ‘threat-rigidity’. In comparison high feelings of control are likely 
to be associated with more open information searching and in more overt 
appraisal processes. If managers are able to increase their feelings of control, 
they will create more favourable circumstances for effective decision making. 
Applying this notion to the findings of this research leads to the suggestion that 
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if managers are aware of the positive and negative effects of their 
organization’s characteristics on their own feelings of control they can take 
steps to publicize and enhance the positive effects and to play down and reduce 
the negative. 
 
9.2.2 Applying the theoretical model 
 
It is suggested that the theoretical model, summarized in Figure 8.1, may be 
used by change drivers as an analytical tool in two alternative ways. The great 
complexity inherent in organizational change means that either approach will 
demand high levels of analytic ability and learning skills. However the depth of 
understanding of how individual change drivers and their organizations 
contribute to their own successes and failures, which may be achieved by the 
approach, has significant potential. 
 
First, the model may be approached top to bottom, starting with the 
identification of key organizational characteristics and an explicit analysis of 
the positive and negative effects of those characteristics on managers’ feelings 
of personal control at any point in time. The purpose of this approach is, as 
suggested in Section 9.2.1, to identify and enhance the positive effects and play 
down the negative. 
 
To give an example, this study has shown that in multinational organizations 
the subsidiary status of a company can have important negative effects on 
change-drivers’ perceived autonomy, but that such negative feelings can be 
offset by positive feelings arising from central resource provision and the 
relative competence felt by change drivers operating on their own local 
territory. There is evidence in both Cases 5 and 6, where multinational issues 
were central, that both sets of change drivers arrived later at the point where the 
positive aspects outweighed the negative than they might have done if they had 
specifically analyzed the effects of their subsidiary status in this way. 
 
The alternative use of the model, which is particularly appropriate as a 
diagnostic tool for projects which are part-complete, is to work from the 
bottom up. By analyzing the actual management processes employed and 
seeing how these arise from positive and negative feelings of personal control, 
the key organizational characteristics may be identified and their positive and 
negative effects revealed. Change drivers whose actions indicate an emphasis 
on negative effects may be revealed as unsuitable, and vice-versa. 
 
In the Bechtel and Electrolux cases the latter approach was explored in detail, 
and its outcome used as part of the process of ‘consensual validation’ 
(Gouldner, 1970) of the study. A detailed analysis of the specific features of the 
projects’ context which gave rise to positive and negative feelings of control, 
 259
and which were expressed in the management processes, was carried out. The 
analysis was presented to the change drivers in the form of a list of paraphrased 
perceptions, each of which indicated positive feelings of control (associated 
with success) or negative feelings of control (associated with failure). 
 




The success of a change driver will be enhanced by the following 
perceptions: 
 
Arising from the company’s membership of a multi-national group: 
I am a detached, objective outsider to this part of the organization. 
I have seen the decentralization of the company’s decision authority. 
I have experienced in this division a comparatively good track record of change. 
I am contributing to an effort which has a corporate-wide mandate for change. 
I have seen that top management will not let anyone stand in the way of change. 
 
Arising from the company’s project orientation: 
I have experience of setting up, deploying and dismantling major projects. 
I am aware that my role is transient and that I will be reassigned to a real project. 
I know that in some ways the outcome of projects is always uncertain. 
I have experience of managing in unusual and difficult circumstances. 
I know that project companies just get on and do it. 
I know that planning a project in too much detail can be futile. 
I have experience of removing the old guard on to projects. 
I know that projects take people’s mind off change. 
I know that in project companies there will be a healthy variety of perspectives. 
I expect to have to do staff work and project work back to back. 
I know that we have a lot of competent senior project managers around the world. 
I always experience a lot of freedom when I’m managing a project. 
 
Arising from the technical nature of the company’s business: 
I have experienced at first hand the faults of the old way. 
I know you must leave the detail to the experts. 




The success of a change driver will be diminished by the following 
perceptions: 
 
Arising from the company’s membership of a multi-national group: 
I have seen the failure of corporate-wide attempts at change. 
I know that there are similar efforts going on in other parts of the company. 
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I have seen some top management hesitate to change. 
I know this is radical change, untried elsewhere. 
I have experienced top management misunderstanding of the change. 
I know there is international pressure to take action. 
 
Arising from the company’s project orientation: 
I know that there will always be important project-related issues for senior managers. 
We have always known the problems but have been unable to deal with them. 
I expect my attention to the change to be diluted by my involvement with other 
issues. 
I expect to be moved on before this is finished. 
I feel uncomfortable on projects where my accomplishments are not defined. 
I expect a lack of continuity of resources. 
I have experienced a reluctance for the company to invest in the future. 
 
Arising from the technical nature of the company’s business: 
People who are stuck in their silos will be incapable of implementing change. 
I know that in this business you have to be very careful about change. 
I know that engineers are rigid and inflexible. 
I know that technical people can always justify not changing. 
 
A further illustration of the importance of an awareness of positive and 
negative effects of organizational characteristics may be drawn from this 
analysis of the Bechtel case. The negative perception arising from the project 
managers’ temporary status, paraphrased, ‘I expect to be moved on before this 
is finished’, indicates lack of personal control (low autonomy, expected 
diminishing of resources). The corresponding positive perception, arising from 
the same feature of the context, is, ‘I am aware that my work will soon be done 
and I will be back on a real project’ (high competence, irrelevance of 
expected resistance). Both temporary change project managers clearly held the 
positive view over the negative, indicating their suitability in the role. 
 
On reading the analysis of positive and negative perceptions listed above the 
project manager of the main part of the company’s reorganization wrote 
encouragingly: 
 
 ‘I have read your draft study sent under your letter dated 2nd May 
1996 with great interest. Your interpretation of the situation at 
Bechtel is very credible and informative. It’s a good piece of 
work.’ (PM1) 
 
The extent to which the controllability of the effects of characteristics is 
enhanced by an awareness of those characteristics clearly depends on their 
nature. Some effects will clearly be less controllable than others. Nevertheless, 
it may be argued that a belief in the controllability of the world is itself a 
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desirable thing. March and Shapira assert the possible effect of a positive 
attitude towards control: 
 
 We may prefer to have managers imagine (sometimes falsely) that 
they can control their fates, rather than suffering the consequences 
of their imagining (sometimes falsely) that they cannot. (March 
and Shapira, 1988: 92) 
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9.3 Limitations of the study 
 
This section addresses the imperfections of the research design and 
acknowledges the limitations of this theory-building study. 
 
Theory-testing. According to Deetz (1996), the output of every piece of 
research is limited by its methodological perspective and is, to that extent, 
partial, one-sided and unfinished. An obvious criticism which can be levelled at 
theory-building studies such as this is: how do you know the theories hold if 
they have not been fully tested? The study is unfinished in this sense. The 
operationalization of variables for quantitative testing of propositions is an 
opportunity which will be discussed further in Section 9.4. Follow-up testing of 
propositions has not been attempted in this study because of limitations of time. 
One of the more obvious practical drawbacks of qualitative research, identified 
by Miles and Huberman (1994), is that it is very labour-intensive and time 
consuming. A great many hours have been spent collecting, processing, 
analyzing and re-analyzing the data from the six case studies. A number of 
skills have had to be developed, including case selection and access, 
interviewee selection, open-ended interviewing, data coding and memoing, and 
building theories from data. Because of the need to take a pragmatic approach 
to field access, to experiment with new techniques and at the same time to 
develop a more informed and critical understanding of the position and use of 
qualitative research, the output of this doctoral research project has this 
limitation on its scope. 
 
Retrospective, verbal data. Studies of change should be longitudinal, and 
ideally concurrent with the whole duration of the change (Pettigrew, 1987b; 
Van de Ven, 1987). Despite intentions to collect data as far as possible 
throughout the periods covered by the projects’ entire life cycles, there was a 
degree of retrospective data collection. To some extent this was unavoidable, 
since projects were necessarily identified by their sponsors at least part-
complete. Further, given the opportunistic nature of the study and the time 
scale limitations, compromise of the ideal was inevitable. Huber and Power 
(1985) provide guidelines for increasing the accuracy of retrospective reports 
by managers. Their suggestion that questions should imply richness without 
complexity was found particularly good advice. Another related issue is the 
inherent shortcoming of interview-based studies, identified by Outhwaite 
(1987: 13), that they emphasize language ‘to the virtual exclusion of the other 
aspects of social life’. Although data triangulation from archival sources was 
used where possible the use of sources other than interview data, for example 
observation of formal and informal meetings, was limited.  
 
Project diversity. Another problem relates to the organizational and project 
scope of the study. In the first stage of the fieldwork two projects in each of 
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two organizations were studied. In the second stage, for reasons explained in 
Chapter 6, two further, larger, single studies were done. All six projects shared 
certain important characteristics, including their very conceptualization as 
projects of change by their change drivers. They nevertheless differed to an 
extent which sometimes made direct comparison of their respective 
management processes awkward. Some research writers consider that cases 
should be selected for their difference of size, complexity etc. (for example 
Ragin, 1987; Vaughan, 1992) rather than for their similarity. This shortcoming 
could be overcome if enough different projects in enough organizations could 
be studied, but it is doubtful that, within the scope of a PhD, it would be 
possible to satisfy all critics of case generalizability. 
 
Content and process. The difficulty of separating the content of change 
from its process was acknowledged in Chapter 2. Clearly there will 
always be issues in separating ‘what’ (content) from ‘how’ (process). 
Every objective or action may be considered as part of a process of 
achieving a content at a higher level. The question of level must 
therefore provide the key. The following example from Case 6 illustrates 
the problem: 
 
What     How 
 
Stay in business   Become a world class manufacturer 
Become a world class manufacturer Cultural change 
Cultural change   Sell a vision of the future 
Sell a vision of the future  Written communication 
Written communication  Monthly newsletters 
Monthly newsletters   Appoint an in-house editor with a budget 
 
At each progressively lower level there is the possibility of divergence 
down many paths. Problems were encountered while analyzing the data 
which led to a seemingly unavoidable inconsistency in deciding when an 
instance depicted content or process. The more intangible the change the 
more difficult it became to make the distinction. The problem was 
nowhere more apparent than when dealing with issues of participation. 
When a project objective was to achieve a culture of employee 
empowerment, managers were bound to use an empowering approach to 
that end. 
 
Individual managerial style. Because of the limitations of the scope of the 
study it was not possible to control to any extent for the effects of the 
management style and project management decision making processes of the 
individuals who were interpreting the organizations’ needs and sponsoring and 
managing the projects. By focusing on differences between the circumstances 
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under which processes were adopted there was a lack of attention to individual 
effects. There was some opportunity to address this issue in the second stage of 
the study by selecting larger projects with more change drivers. Nevertheless, 
because the individual style of the change drivers was clearly so important as a 
determinant of management process it was difficult to assess the full effect of 
other context variables. 
 
Researcher bias. Coding and condensing open-ended interview data is, 
inevitably, a subjective process. Attempts were made to increase coding rigour 
by careful preparation and maintenance of definitions of codes, properties and 
dimensions and updating these to accommodate each new development, 
exception or alternative explanation. Care has been taken to attend to the 
qualitative maxims of leaving a clear trail of evidence and making an 
appropriate, plausible representation of how change drivers see the world. 
Despite these efforts, however, there is an awareness that a degree of bias 
arising from the unique experiences and expectations of an individual 
researcher is unavoidable. Some qualitative studies use teams of researchers 
who fulfill the explicit function of providing checks and confirmations of the 
replicability of one another’s analysis (see for example Gioia and Chittipeddi, 
1991). Due to resource constraints this ideal was not possible. 
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9.4 Opportunities for further research 
 
Glaser and Strauss (1967:103) state that the purpose of the constant comparison 
method is to generate theory which is ‘integrated, consistent, plausible, close to 
the data and in a form clear enough to be readily, if only partially, 
operationalized for testing in quantitative research’. The conclusions of the 
cross-case comparative analysis in Section 8.2 were presented as a set of 
propositions, each relating one of the management process elements to one of 
the personal control dimensions. The propositions are grouped into ten sets. 
Each set represents a balance of personal control which is expressed by the 
management process under question. A research opportunity arising from this 
study is the testing of the relationships between the pairs of variables within the 
sets, in further studies. Objective measures for the variables identified in this 
study could be developed and the propositions tested in a survey. This 
‘triangulation’, using different methods to examine the same issue from 
different perspectives represents a further, major study. 
 
This section begins by examining, in Section 9.4.1, literature on each of the six 
main elements of management process. The aim is not to undertake a full 
literature review of each, but to summarize relevant themes to the extent 
necessary to illustrate opportunities for further research. The chapter concludes 
in Section 9.4.2 with an examination of the implications of the research for 
other disciplines. 
 




The dominant perspective in research on the use of external agents of change 
has been that of organizational development (OD), defined by Burke (1982: 
10) as ‘a planned process of change in an organization’s culture’. Literature in 
the OD tradition focuses on the positive role of management consultants in the 
organizational change process. Ginsberg and Abrahamson (1991) summarize 
research findings from OD as well as from other perspectives which have less 
vested interest in the employment of outside experts. They conclude that two 
significant roles are played by management consultants. First, they create 
pressure for realignment by helping to reshape the perspectives of strategic 
decision makers. Second, they help to counteract resistance to the 
implementation of change. The presence of outside experts acts as a 
legitimating signal, emphasizing the importance of the change and thus tipping 
the balance of power in top managers’ direction. 
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Propositions 1(a) to 1(e) confirm the latter role, fragmenting motives for the 
engagement of external agents (including, but not limited to, management 
consultants) into a balance between positive and negative aspects of personal 
control. Propositions 2(a) to 2(e) add a new dimension, focusing on the process 




Formal definition, documentation and communication of project plans and 
controls is an important feature of project management’s body of knowledge. 
This is particularly true in relation to major engineering projects, where 
formality is equated with control over time, cost and quality. Some of the 
findings of this study show that the generalizability of this conventional 
wisdom to projects of organizational change is limited. In particular, instances 
of the avoidance of formality and the relationship of that avoidance with the 
desire for control, suggest that there are opportunities to develop an integrated 
perspective of project control which takes into account both the personal and 
the cybernetic meanings of the concept. Propositions 3(a) to 3(e) and 4(a) to 
4(e) could be tested both in the context of organizational change and in the 
context of conventional projects. 
 
Two specific findings in the literature are both confirmed and at the same time 
further clarified by this study. First, Pant, Allinson and Hayes’ (1996) assertion 
that managers in project-oriented organizations will tend to use more 
bureaucracy has been confirmed in all cases, but with the added proviso that 
this only applies below the level of the change drivers. Second, the conclusion 
of Leifer and Mills (1996), that measurable standards are inappropriate in 
conditions of uncertainty, and that information processing requirements must 
be matched with information processing capabilities, has been supported, 
particularly by the Electrolux case, where early demands for formality fell into 
disuse as project certainty declined. The effects of project orientation and 





Hassard (1996) argues that the structure of social time, and therefore of 
organizational time, is based on three ‘temporal factors’, namely 
synchronization, sequencing and rate of activity. This study has confirmed that, 
although all three are relevant and important aspects of the management of 
organizational change, rate of activity and sequencing (covered here in the 
dimensions of pace and formality respectively) dominated temporal perceptions 
in relation to management process, with synchronization being more related to 
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the events triggering the conceptualization of change itself, rather than to its 
management process after it had been conceived. 
 
Apart from the opportunity of testing the two sets of propositions on pace - 
Propositions 5(a) to 5(e) and 6(a) to 6(e) - two further possibilities for project 
management research have arisen from the findings of the study in relation to 
literature relating to pace. 
 
First, Gersick (1991) observed that a ‘pivotal moment’ occurred half way 
through the anticipated life cycle of projects of organizational change, at which 
pace quickened as it became ‘time to move’. This phenomenon was observed 
on both of the two major projects of change studied. In Bechtel the point 
occurred when the two project managers were appointed. The project had first 
been mooted two years previously and was expected to take a further two 
years. In Electrolux it coincided with the early termination of the consultants 
two years after the divisional director had first formed his ‘world class’ vision. 
In both cases the time had come to ‘do it’ or ‘just do it’. These words are a 
notable feature of the data, signifying the ‘pivotal moment’. There is scope for 
more specific research in this area, on all kinds of projects. 
 
Second, in an analysis of literature on the philosophy of time Hassard (1996) 
describes the evolution of two sociologically-relevant temporal metaphors, the 
cycle and the line. Primitive concepts of time, derived from man’s struggle with 
the seasons, were dominated by cyclic metaphors. More modern societies, 
influenced by Christianity, have adopted a linear concept of time. Hassard 
explains how the linear metaphor prevalent in industrial society has 
accompanied the association of time with value, giving it a quantitative, 
commodified image. He asserts that the growth in calls for temporal flexibility 
in organizational life implies that time in organizations is a richer phenomenon 
than is portrayed by the linear view. The issue becomes linear-quantitative 
versus cyclic-qualitative. The findings of a grounded study by Gersick (1994) 
of a deadline-based project to start a company backed by venture capital are 
relevant. She found that managers used two distinct mechanisms to regulate 
their developmental strategy. The two were temporal pacing, where planning 
was based on a timetable, and event-based pacing, where the project’s pace was 
determined by the achievement of events. This study contains examples of both 
types of pacing, with the latter apparently dominant. The life-cycle quality of 
projects may have significant implications for this fundamental issue. Again in 
the wider context of different kinds of projects there is scope for further 





Kotter and Schlesinger (1979) list six strategies for dealing with resistance to 
change, asserting that the correct choice of strategy is contingent on 
circumstances. The six are: 
 
1 Education and communication 
2 Participation and involvement 
3 Facilitation and support 
4 Negotiation and agreement 
5 Manipulation and co-option 
6 Explicit and implicit coercion 
 
Of these strategies, items 2 and 4 imply a two-way process characterized by the 
active involvement of the subjects of change. They have been represented in 
this study by the single element Participation. Items 5 and 6 represent its 
converse. (Items 1 and 3 are included in Justification). The findings expressed 
in Propositions 7(a) to 7(e) and 8(a) to 8(e) could be further examined in the 




Propositions 9(a) to 9(e) show that instances of justification in the data, which 
include processes of education, communication, facilitation and support, were 
associated with a need to increase personal control. The case studies show that 
the intended consequences of justification were associated with building 
support for their policies and actions, a common theme in change literature (see 
for example Goss, Pascale and Athos, 1993). A further, less expected, feature 
of the data is the extent of justification of possible or actual lack of progress, 
attributed to changing circumstances which created ambiguity in originally-
conceived change scopes. This relates to the work of Baier, March and Sætren 
(1988), who observe the need for implementers of change to accept ambiguity 
as a natural consequence of such dynamics as well as of the need to gain 
support for the change. Ashforth and Lee (1990) identify the avoidance of 
blame by justification as a way of defending organizational self-interest. 
Schwenk (1990) suggests that self-serving attribution1 reduces confidence of 
staff in management, in turn reducing managerial control. In this study there is 
some evidence that actual or impending failure of intended change was greeted 
with a mixture of admission of incompetence and blaming the environment. 
There is an opportunity to operationalize and test the propositions, at the same 
time exploring in more detail the links between changing circumstances and 
political compromise and the different elements of personal control. 
 
                                                          
1  Taking the credit for good performance and blaming the environment for poor performance. 
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Another interesting aspect of the data relating to justification was the frequent 
use of transport and journey metaphors. These were employed to objectify 
change and to emphasize both the change drivers’ own roles as drivers as well 
as the change subjects’ status as passengers who could get on board or risk 
being left behind. There is an opportunity to explore the role of metaphors in 




The studies support Pettigrew and Whipp’s (1991) assertion that leading 
change should not necessarily imply a single leader. Simple notions of a leader 
providing the vision and a project manager implementing the detail are 
challenged. A complex, shifting process of the use of both role definition and 
role ambiguity reflected the need for different approaches to this aspect of 
control under different circumstances and at different stages in the projects’ life 
cycles. Propositions 10(a) to 10(f) reflect the predominance in the data of 
positive associations between personal control and clear role definition, with 
the proviso that the relationship depends on the position in the hierarchy of the 
role in question. The dominant tendency in project management literature is to 
emphasize role clarity at all levels. Among the change drivers there was a 
tendency to avoid the constraining and exposing effects of role clarity. Trends 
towards the abandonment of hierarchies and the creation of flexible 
organizational forms suggest that the function of role definition in projects of 
internal change is not straightforward. The case studies confirm Morgan’s 
(1990) assertion that a central problem in realizing leadership is the enactment 
of followership. Evidence of lack of co-operation leads to the slackening of 
role definitions. In testing Propositions 10(a) to 10(e) there is a chance to 
examine the use of role flexibility and ambiguity and their associations with 
different aspects of control. 
 
9.4.2 Other opportunities 
 
The discussion of opportunities for further research presented in Section 9.4.1 
focuses on possible developments arising from the principal elements of the 
study’s output, namely the six elements of management process and their 
posited status as expressions of the individual and collective personal control of 
change drivers. Other significant opportunities exist to build on the approach 




This study has established the dimensions of personal control and their role as 
intermediary between context and management process. The particular aspect 
of context which has been considered is that relating to organizational 
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characteristics which lead to greater or lesser personal control. This position 
tends to ignore the effects of individual cognition and individual stable 
personality characteristics. Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1996) describe how 
research into the links between environmental contexts and managerial 
cognition shows that there can be significant variation in cognitions of similar 
environmental events. The study could be extended in two ways to take 
account of variations in individual characteristics. First, opportunities exist to 
examine the relationship between individual locus of control and perceptions of 
management process. Second, by studying projects of change in different firms 
in the same sector the effect of variations in cognition could be explored. The 
outcome of such a study is not necessarily predictable, since industries have 
been observed to fail collectively (Huff, 1982; Abrahamson and Fombrun, 
1994). 
 
Conventional major projects 
 
The planning/execution/control cycle in major engineering projects is the 
subject of much project management research. The approach taken in this study 
could be replicated in case studies of major projects, with their conventional 
emphasis on multi-party contracting arrangements. New conceptual and 
analytical frameworks for major project management, for example Morris’s 
integrated model (1994: 218), could be applied in the pursuit of knowledge of 
the determinants and results of personal control, thus contributing further to a 
wider understanding of the management of projects. 
 
 271
9.5 A final word 
 
In the field of management, academics and practitioners attempt to learn from 
one another. Now, as this learning process moves on it seems to be taking on a 
new urgency. The organizational world is changing rapidly. Developments in 
information technology and in the new global environment are bombarding 
individuals, firms and societies with a quickening succession of sudden threats 
and unprecedented opportunities. The shakeout of managers whose competence 
is based on an ability to operate in a command-and-control hierarchy is 
happening fast. In the immediate world effective managers already know that 
there is no future in discipline boundaries. They know that an instinct for 
striking a balance between defining and planning the unknowable, and at the 
same time moving forward with purposeful action, has become an essential 
‘sixth sense’. There is a new, elusive and barely touched discipline known as 
‘programme management’. Its emergence is a recognition that the new 
challenge is creating a diversity of discrete, small projects that are manageable, 
despite being intimately bound up with one another and with their changing 
environment. 
 
Morris (1994: 217) asserts that ‘project management is stuck in a 1960s time 
warp’. Observing the actions of managers we learn that, contrary to Morris, up-
to-the-minute, innovative forms of project management are alive and well. 
Irrespective of academics’ cherished discipline boundaries, and contemptful of 
organizations’ departmental boundaries, these new forms are already being 
practiced by enlightened managers. The challenge for academics is to keep 
track of what is happening, and to reflect and present new practices in such a 
way that the two-way learning process progresses with due urgency. The 
contribution of this study has been to take a step in the direction of building 
new and useful theories about contemporary management processes in projects 
of organizational change. 
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List of abbreviations 
 
A&E Accident and Emergency (Cases 1 and 2) 
ANL Associated Newspapers Limited 
APM Association for Project Management 
BoK Body of Knowledge (UK Association for Project Management) 
BSM Building Services Manager (Informant, Case 3) 
BSD Building Services Draughtsman (Informant, Case 3) 
CAD Computer Aided Design 
CAM Computer Aided Manufacturing 
CE Chief Executive (Informant, Cases 1 and 2) 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CPM Critical Path Method 
DD Divisional Director (Informant, Case 6) 
DDM Design and Development Manager (Informant, Case 6) 
EAMS Europe/Africa/Middle East/Southwest Asia (Case 5) 
ECR Extra-Contractual Referral (Case 1) 
EM Engineering Manager (Informant, Case 5) 
EPC Engineering, Procurement and Construction (Case 5) 
EPCPI Engineering, Procurement and Construction Process Initiative 
(Case 5) 
EIS Executive Information System 
GCS Group Computer Services (Case 4) 
GCSM Group Computer Services Manager (Informant, Case 4) 
GP General Practitioner (Cases 1 and 2) 
GSS Group Software Services (Case 4) 
GSSM Group Software Services Manager (Informant, Case 4) 
HP Head of Personnel (Informant, Cases 4 and 5) 
IM&T Information Management and Technology (Case 2) 
ISD Information Systems Director (Informant, Cases 3 and 4) 
IT Information Technology 
ITF Information Technology Facilitator (Informant, Case 4) 
JIT Just In Time 
LIFO Last In First Out (Case 6) 
MM Materials Manager (Informant, Case 6) 
MPAG Multi-Project Acquisition Group (Case 5) 
MPI Master Patient Index (Case 2) 
NAM Network Applications Manager (Informant, Case 4) 
NEAT Next Editorial and Advertising Terminal (Case 4) 
NHS National Health Service (Cases 1 and 2) 
NHSME National Health Service Management Executive (Case 1) 
NUD.IST Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and  
 Theorizing (software package) 
OD Organizational Development 
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OM Operations Manager (Informant, Case 5) 
OPM1 Operational Project Manager 1 (Informant, Case 5) 
OPM2 Operational Project Manager 2 (Informant, Case 5) 
OR Operations Research 
PC Personal Computer 
PERT Programme Evaluation and Review Technique 
PM Project Manager (Informant, Cases 1, 2 and 6) 
PM1 Project Manager 1 (Informant, Case 5) 
PM2 Project Manager 2 (Informant, Case 5) 
PMBOK Project Management Body of Knowledge (USA Project 
Management Institute) 
PMI Project Management Institute (USA) 
PRINCE PRojects in a Controlled Environment (project management 
procedure) 
PSM Photoservices Manager (Informant, Case 4) 
PS1 Photoservices Supervisor 1 (Informant, Case 3) 
PS2 Photoservices Supervisor 2 (Informant, Case 3) 
R&D Research and Development 
ROM Regional Office Manager (Informant, Case 5) 










CODING STRUCTURE 1: EARLIER VERSION OF CODING SCHEME 
SHOWING CATEGORIES, SUBCATEGORIES AND CODES 
 
EXTERNAL CONTEXT     EXCON 
 
External forces affecting the overall strategic direction of the organization 
 
COMMERCIAL FORCES FOR CHANGE   EXCON-COMM 
INDUSTRY NORMS AND CHARACTERISTICS  EXCON-INDUSTRY 
POLITICAL FORCES FOR CHANGE    EXCON-POLITICS 
SOCIAL FORCES FOR CHANGE    EXCON-SOCIAL 
TECHNOLOGICAL FORCES FOR CHANGE   EXCON-TECH 
 
INTERNAL CONTEXT     INCON 
 
Internal factors determining the change project's objectives, scope and perceived risks 
 
OVERALL STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF ORGANIZATION 
 TECHNOLOGICAL     INCON-STRATEGY-TECH 
 COMMERCIAL     INCON-STRATEGY-
COMM 
DESIRABILITY OF CHANGE TO THOSE AFFECTED INCON-DESIRE 
PERCEIVED RELATIVE POWER OF THOSE AFFECTED 
TO RESIST/FACILITATE ORGANIZATIONAL 
PERMANENCE/TRANSIENCE   INCON-POWER-PERM 
 POSSESSION OF EXPERTISE   INCON-POWER-EXPERT 
 CONTROL OF RESOURCES    INCON-POWER-
RESOURCE 
 SPONSOR'S FORMAL AUTHORITY   INCON-POWER-SPONSOR 
CULTURAL FACTORS     INCON-CULTURE 
LEARNING DURING CHANGE    INCON-LEARN 
STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF CHANGE  INCON-STRUCTURE 
 
PROJECT CHARACTERISTICS    PROJ 
 
The project's chronology, objectives, scope and risks 
 
CHRONOLOGY      PROJ-CHRON 
PURPOSE: INTENDED BENEFITS    PROJ-PURPOSE 
PROJECT OBJECTIVES (COST, TIME AND QUALITY) PROJ-OBJECTIVE 
SCOPE        PROJ-SCOPE 







MANAGEMENT OF THE PROJECT   MAN 
 
The dimensions of the management of the project, caused or influenced by the project context 
and the project characteristics. 
 
COST-TIME-QUALITY TRADE-OFF    MAN-CTQ 
USE OF EXTERNAL EXPERTS    MAN-EXPERT 
FORMALITY OF PLANNING AND CONTROL  MAN-FORMAL 
DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION IN DECISION MAKING MAN-PARTIC 
MANAGEMENT OF PACE     MAN-PACE 
DISTRIBUTION OF REWARDS    MAN-REWARD 
SELLING THE PROJECT     MAN-SELL 
MANAGEMENT OF SCOPE (DEFINED/EMERGENT) MAN-SCOPE 
TROUBLE SHOOTING    MAN-TROUBLE 
 
PROJECT PERFORMANCE     PERF 
 
REALIZATION OF INTENDED BENEFITS   PERF-BENEFIT 
ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES (CTQ)  PERF-OBJECTIVE 
EXECUTION OF SCOPE     PERF-SCOPE 





CODING STRUCTURE II: LATER VERSION OF CODING SCHEME WITH 
DEFINITIONS AND DIMENSIONS OF VARIABLES 
 
EXFORCE-COMMERCIAL 
Perceived changes in the commercial environment which are creating internal imbalance. 
 
AKOC (ACTIVE KEY ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS) 
... which have a positive or negative influence on feelings of control. 
 
AKOC-PUBLIC/PRIVATE SECTOR 
The extent to which the organization is a public or privately-owned entity 
Dimensions: Public sector... Private sector 
  Privately owned... Limited company 
 
AKOC-TRADITIONAL/MODERN 
The extent to which the organization has a traditional or modern self-image 
Dimensions: Old... Young 
  Staid... Vibrant 
  Backward-looking... Forward looking 
  Comfort... Pain 
  Blame... Tolerance of mistakes 
 
AKOC-TECHNICAL/UNSKILLED 
The extent to which the change subjects have “expert power”. 
Dimensions: High... Low 
  High tech... Low tech 
   
AKOC-PROJECT/PROCESS ORIENTED 
The extent to which the organization uses projects in its mainstream business 
Dimensions: High... Low 
 
AKOC-GROUP MEMBER/INDEPENDENT 
The extent to which the organization is part of a conglomerate 
Dimensions: High... Low 
  Centrally controlled... Locally controlled 
 
AKOC-STABLE/IN CRISIS 
The extent to which the organization has a recent history of stability 
Dimensions: Structurally stable... Structurally unstable 
  Not in crisis... In crisis 
  
AKOC-MANUFACTURING/SERVICE 
The extent to which the organization’s output is a tangible product 




The extent to which the organization is an active member of an isomorphic sector 
Dimensions: Isomorphic sector... Non-isomorphic sector 
  Active... Non-active 
 
FEELINGS OF CONTROL 
The individual and collective experiences, knowledge and expectation of the change drivers 
which give rise to greater or lesser feelings of “being in control” of the intended change 
(comfort or discomfort), and which enable or constrain the process response. 
 
FEELING-AUTONOMY. The extent of perceived autonomy about how to respond. Have I 
got the control and the freedom to act or am I constrained by rules or directives? 
 
FEELING-RESOURCES. Specifically day-to-day time, overall time, money, visible 
corporate backing and support, internal know-how. The extent of availability of resources or 
means for responding. Have I got access to the resources that I need? 
 
FEELING-OPPORTUNITY. The extent of perceived opportunity to effect the change. Is the 
opportunity there at the moment? 
 
FEELING-COMPETENCE. The extent of feeling of personal competence to act. Am I up to 
it, and am I perceived by others as being up to it? 
 
FEELING-COOPERATION. The perceived extent to which the change will be welcomed and 
supported by those change subjects with the potential ability to disrupt or block it. 
 
ACTION 
The chosen course of action. This represents the purpose and scope of the project. 
 
MP 
Dimensions of chosen management process. 
 
MP-EXTERNAL AGENTS  
Use of consultants and other “experts” from outside the organization. 
Dimensions: Low...High 
  Brief... Protracted 
 
MP-FORMAL 
Documentation and communication of plans. 
Dimensions: Formal... Informal 
  Detailed... Broad brush 
  Predetermined scope... Emergent scope 
  Predetermined sequence... Emergent sequence 
  Rigid... Flexible 
 
MP-PACE 
Pace of project (in relation to its scale). Relative rather than absolute. 
Dimensions: Fast... Slow 
  Persistent... Faltering 
  Dramatic... Barely perceptible 
  Burn the boats... Parallel stream 




Involvement of change subjects in decisions, up to the point of empowerment 
Dimensions: High... Low 
  Bottom up... Top down 
  
MP-JUSTIFICATION 
Educating and selling to the change subjects the benefits of the change 
Dimensions High... Low 
 
MP-TEAM 
Clarity of definition of roles and responsibilities of drivers and downward devolution of 
responsibility after the point of empowerment 
Dimensions: Clear... Unclear 
 
CHANGE 
Dynamics during the project which change forces. 
